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Abstract
The goal of this thesis is to study the international portfolio choices of coun-
tries in an asymmetric world. In practice, this corresponds to the salient facts of
country portfolios and the underlying structural asymmetries between develop-
ing and developed countries in a nancially integrated world. In the three main
chapters of the thesis, frameworks are developed to advance our understanding
of the way various country asymmetries contribute to the emergence of these
persistent phenomena in international capital markets.
The rst essay studies the question of why developing countries experience net
equity inows and bond outows while developed countries experience net equity
outows and bond inows, the so-called two-way capital ows. The analysis is
based on an open-economy New Keynesian model of endogenous country port-
folios with representative agents in each country. The model is so general that
it allows one to perform an assessment of the roles of a long list of country
asymmetries in determining the pattern of two-way capital ows.
While steady-state net country portfolios are zero in the rst essay, the second
and third essays consider the situations where this is not true. The second essay
presents an OLG model of an endowment economy with a country asymmetry in
householdspatience. Global imbalances in net positions emerge. Gross portfolio
positions are obtained as the sum of standard self-hedging and, moreover, the
hedging due to external imbalances. The valuation e¤ects of external adjustments
between creditor and debtor countries are rationalized.
By introducing non-tradable risks, the third essay models a production OLG
economy with a country asymmetry in wealth division. Global imbalances in
net positions again arise. Gross portfolio positions are composed of self-hedging,
hedging of non-tradable income and hedging of external interest payments, which
accounts for the reality of asymmetric asset home bias, i.e. although assets are
locally biased everywhere, the pattern is more pronounced in creditor countries.
JEL classications: E44; F21; F32; F36; F37; F41;
Key words: Financial globalization; Country portfolios; Two-way capital
ows; Global imbalances; External adjustments; Asset home bias
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last few decades, the world has witnessed dramatic increases in the scale
of cross-border asset transactions. This constitutes one of the most prominent
recent features of the world economy, i.e. nancial globalization. According
to the latest updated dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the index of
international nancial integration, dened as the sum of cross-border nancial
external claims and liabilities scaled by annual GDP , for developed countries as
a group has increased by a factor of over 6, from 68:4% in 1980 to over 438:2% in
2007. The index for developing countries has been rising steadily as well in the
meantime. It doubled from 34:9% in 1980 to 73:3% in 2007. By Gourinchas and
Reys (2013) computation, the sum of external assets and liabilities scaled by
world GDP for G8 economies increased substantially from 75% in the 1990s to
210% at its peak in 2007 while the same measure for the so-called BRICs (Brazil,
Russia, India and China), four large and fast growing emerging countries, has
increased tenfold, from 2% in the 1990s to 20% in 2007.
Almost during the same period, the world has entered an era of so-called
global imbalances, capital has owed from the poor south to the rich north,
notably, the United States. From the 1980s, the United States started to have a
current account decit and the size of the decit grew throughout the process of
global nancial integration. In 1987, the U:S: external debt was 4% of its GDP .
This ratio rose to 10:3% in 1997, 17% in 2007 and about 21% in 2011 (with
an average current account decit of over $600 billion per year in the period
of 2005   2011). Corresponding to the worsening of U:S: position, developing
1
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countries have seen a striking improvement in external balances since the 1990s
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). In particular, China, one star of the emerging
economies in terms of growth performance, is a main contributor to the global
imbalances from the side of the South. It enjoyed an average current account
surplus of over $250 billion per year in the period 2005  2011 and is the largest
holder of foreign reserve in the world with more than $3 trillion by the end of
2011, mostly in U:S: government bonds (Wang et al. 2015).
Rapid development of nancial globalization raises new questions in interna-
tional macroeconomics. Some patterns about both gross and net cross-border as-
set trade among countries, especially those between advanced and less developed
economies, have been arising and evolving into a set of persistent and puzzling
phenomena. Closely associated with the above two facts, i.e. massive expansion
of gross ows and positions and sustained current account global imbalances,
three other stylized facts in international nancial markets can be identied as
follows.
Firstly, two-way capital ows. There is a large heterogeneity in asset compo-
sition of the external balance sheet of countries. Although as a whole, developed
countries receive net capital inows, they are actually net exporters of equity
capital. The net capital inows into these countries are mainly in terms of trade
in international bonds. In contrast, while experiencing net capital outows, de-
veloping countries are in fact net importers of equity capital. And many of them
are at the same time holding net assets in terms of safe securities such as gov-
ernment bonds. If we use the U:S: and China to represent the developed and
developing countries respectively, then the pattern of two-way capital ows can
be summarized in the form of an investment strategy of long equity, short bond
in developed countries and the strategy of short equity, long bondin developing
countries (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007).
Secondly, valuation e¤ects of external adjustments. Unlike in a world with
only cross-border commodity trade, holding large-scale external assets exposes
countries to potentially large capital gains and losses as asset prices uctuate.
This poses a challenge to the traditional view of external current account ad-
justment. Empirical studies show that the e¤ects are economically sizable (Tille,
2003, Higgins et al., 2006, Gourinchas and Rey, 2007, Gourinchas, 2008). For
example, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) estimate that valuation e¤ects contribute
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about 30% percent of the cyclical external current account adjustments in the
U:S: More importantly, against the background of global imbalances, the e¤ects
imply revisions to the wealth of debtor and creditor countries along di¤erent
directions. To be specic, for instance, when debtor countries enjoy capital
gains creditor countries su¤er from capital losses. It can be calculated that, be-
tween 1970 and 2010, the e¤ects from which the U:S: benets are equivalent to
an additional current account surplus of about 2% of output every year. On the
contrary, the BRICs economies experience signicant valuation losses since 2010
which amount to, cumulatively, around 10% of output for Brazil and China, 25%
for India and 40% for Russia (Gourinchas and Rey, 2013).
Thirdly, asymmetric (equity) asset home bias. Asset home bias describes the
case where local assets account for a disproportionately high share in country
portfolios. This would be understandable in a more isolated world. With the
on-going accelerated pace of nancial globalization, despite the large reduction
in the trade costs of international assets, investors seem to be still reluctant to
diversify their asset choices in most countries. Moreover, this tendency is much
more signicant in developing countries than in developed countries.
See for instance the data shown in Table 1:1 for total market capitalisation
for OECD countries and the value of equity assets held locally for each country in
2005 (Sercu and Vanpee, 2007). Using a standard classication of countries into
developed and developing categories it is found that on average 70% of equity is
held locally in developed countries while the corresponding gure for developing
countries is 84%. Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) using a di¤erent measure of asset
home bias (which is dened as the di¤erence between 1 and the ratio of the share
of foreign equity in a countrys portfolio over that in world portfolio) report that
in developed countries their measure is close to 0:7 while the same measure in
developing countries is more than 20 percent higher, at 0:9.
This thesis is motivated by the observation of these stylized facts. These facts
are all well documented in the literature (for instance in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2007, Gourinchas and Rey, 2013, Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012 etc.) but have not
yet been fully analysed in theoretical terms. This thesis exploits advances in
the methodology of portfolio computations to allow these facts to be analysed
theoretically.
Previously, in most international macroeconomic models, gross portfolios
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Country Domestic capitalisation Domestic holding Home bias
Argentina 47; 590 45; 619 95:86%
Australia 804; 015 645; 679 80:31%
Austria 126; 309 89; 662 70:99%
Belgium 286; 326 200; 297 69:95%
Brazil 474; 647 374; 941 78:99%
Canada 1; 482; 185 1; 185; 688 80:00%
Chile 136; 493 130; 551 95:65%
Colombia 50; 501 49; 315 97:65%
Czech Republic 53; 798 47; 249 87:83%
Denmark 187; 161 147; 868 79:01%
Egypt 79; 509 74; 996 94:32%
Finland 228; 266 111; 225 48:73%
France 1; 769; 569 1; 169; 497 66:09%
Germany 1; 221; 106 713; 687 58:45%
Greece 145; 121 117; 117 80:70%
HongKong 1; 054; 999 935; 765 88:70%
Hungary 32; 576 19; 279 59:18%
India 1; 069; 046 968; 242 90:57%
Indonesia 81; 428 64; 153 78:78%
Israel 122; 578 86; 714 70:74%
Italy 798; 073 555; 177 69:56%
Japan 5; 542; 716 4; 613; 580 83:24%
Korea 718; 011 530; 508 73:89%
Malaysia 180; 518 157; 278 87:13%
Mexico 239; 128 163; 750 68:48%
Netherland 575; 843 226; 685 39:37%
New Zealand 40; 593 32; 398 79:81%
Norway 190; 952 135; 971 71:21%
Philippines 39; 818 34; 122 85:69%
Poland 93; 602 78; 848 84:24%
Portugal 75; 066 55; 352 73:74%
Russia 527; 022 478; 894 90:87%
Singapore 257; 341 202; 370 78:64%
South Africa 549; 310 490; 436 89:28%
Spain 959; 910 774; 475 80:68%
Sweden 420; 953 296; 161 70:35%
Switzerland 935; 448 534; 563 57:15%
Thailand 123; 885 98; 139 79:22%
Turkey 161; 538 135; 034 83:59%
United Kingdom 3; 058; 182 1; 840; 956 60:20%
United States 17; 000; 805 15; 336; 311 90:21%
Venezuela 7; 316 6; 729 91:98%
Table 1.1: Asset home bias across countries (USD million)
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played a negligible role. Because it is not easy to obtain the solution for port-
folio choices, asset structures are usually assumed such that either only one
non-contingent bond is traded internationally or a full set of Arrow-Debreu secu-
rities are available. These modelling strategies proved to be useful and su¢ cient
in many cases. For example, the former strategy can be used if one interprets
global net imbalances as the situation where one group of countries are borrow-
ing while the other group of countries are lending. However, when the analysis
of many assets is required, as it is the case of valuation e¤ects under global im-
balances, these simple modelling strategies are no longer adequate. Similarly,
although assuming a complete asset market avoids ones worries about portfolio
allocations (it is proper to do so when some other aspects than portfolio allo-
cations is the focus of research), it is obviously of limited use for modelling the
above listed stylized facts. No matter which one of the above stylized facts is to
be explored, a reliable method for obtaining the solution of gross asset positions
is vital.
Based on perturbation methods (Judd, 1998), Devereux and Sutherland (2010)
show that to solve for the zero-order (steady-state) portfolios, a second-order ap-
proximation of the rst order condition of optimal portfolios is needed, while the
other variables need to be approximated to rst-order accuracy. For a general
class of international macroeconomic models, Devereux and Sutherland (2011)
derive a formula which can be used to yield portfolio holdings in conjunction
with the solution of standard rst-order approximation of a model. The method
is applicable no matter whether the asset market is complete or incomplete and
how many assets are present in the model. It thus provides a powerful tool for
our analysis of the above listed stylized facts of country portfolios. In all three
core chapters of the thesis, we rely on the techniques in Devereux and Sutherland
(2010; 2011) to compute optimal gross portfolios.
For our purpose, the analysis in all of these three chapters is based on mod-
els consisting of two di¤erent large countries, i.e. a developing country and a
developed country. Instead of building an all-embracing model where the above
listed stylised facts can be taken into account altogether, we take a step-by-step
approach in explaining these facts in this thesis. All three chapters analyse nan-
cial globalisation in the sense that they provide an analysis of the importance of
gross asset positions. Each chapter then analyses di¤erent two-country models
1. Introduction 6
with emphasis being put on di¤erent aspects of the above stylised facts against
the background of nancial globalisation. To put it briey, Chapter 2 looks
at the determination of gross asset positions when there are two-way capital
ows. Chapter 3 explores the question of how the presence of the NFA global
imbalances a¤ects the determination of gross asset positions and how these re-
sulting positions can be used to shed light on the valuation e¤ects of external
adjustments between debtor and creditor countries. Chapter 4 is devoted to the
analysis of the emergence of asymmetric asset home bias in which process solving
gross asset positions is also inevitable. As a road map, the topics and questions
that are covered in each of these three core chapters are summarised below.
Chapter 2 focuses on two-way capital ows. To allow attention to be focused
on this specic question, it is assumed that there are no steady state net foreign
asset imbalances between the two countries in the model. Chapter 2 therefore
specically excludes analysis of global imbalances in net foreign assets. Even
though steady state net foreign asset positions are assumed to be xed at zero,
the subcategories of external balance sheets are not necessarily balanced. As seen
from the description of the stylised facts above, two-way capital ows require that
the developing country holds a negative net position in equities and a positive
net position in bonds while the developed country holds a positive net position
in equities and a negative net position in bonds. For this to emerge, on the one
hand, we assume that both countries can issue equities and bonds. On the other
hand, while both modelled following the New Keynesian approach in the same
way, the two countries are assumed to di¤er in certain aspects which are in turn
captured by asymmetric calibration of the associated structural parameters. A
long list of country asymmetries is considered in this chapter. These include those
related to economic structure, severity of economic frictions and monetary policy
stances, etc. The gross positions of both equities and bonds in the model are
computed for each asymmetry. And the resulting pattern of the gross positions
are examined, through which process the roles played by di¤erent asymmetries
in generating two-way capital ows individually are assessed both qualitatively
and quantitatively. In addition, we also assess the composite e¤ect of country
asymmetries on two-way capital ows through a fully asymmetric calibration
of the model. By adjusting the number of available assets in the model, this
chapter also assesses the e¤ect of the asymmetry associated with the structure
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of international nancial market on two-way capital ows.
Chapters 3 and 4 shift the focus away from two-way capital ows and con-
centrate instead on the analysis of gross asset positions with the presence of
global net foreign asset imbalances. This requires that we have models which
are capable of explaining the emergence of net foreign asset imbalances and, si-
multaneously, yielding solutions for gross asset positions. Nevertheless, as will
be demonstrated in Chapter 3, within a model with representative agents, the
presence of net foreign asset imbalances makes the model non-stationary. In
other words, for these individual variables there is no steady state around which,
as a standard procedure to solve such a model, we can linearize the model. For
this reason, the framework with representative agents is not suitable for our pur-
pose. Therefore, unlike Chapter 2, the analyses in Chapter 3 and 4 are thus
built on a model with overlapping generations (OLG) which overcomes the non-
stationarity problem. Besides, to not obscure the key implication of introducing
net foreign asset global imbalances, we simplify the structure of nancial mar-
kets by assuming that asset trade is restricted to trade in equities in these two
chapters.
Chapter 3 aims at analysing the valuation e¤ects of external adjustments
between debtor and creditor countries. To make our discussion simpler, we de-
velop an endowment OLG model with cross-country di¤erences in the degree
of patience (i.e. di¤erences in household discount rates). The reason why this
structural country di¤erence leads to global net foreign asset imbalances in the
model is explained. And the solution for gross positions in equities is obtained.
We also examine the hedging motives that support these gross positions in or-
der to understand the way in which these positions are structured and how this
di¤ers from that in a model of steady state zero NFA positions. As the most
important goal of this chapter, the processes of external adjustments between
the two countries, especially the asymmetric valuation e¤ects in this process,
are analysed. This chapter therefore provides a framework for analysing NFA
imbalances and the external adjustments under the NFA imbalances against the
background of nancial globalisation.
Chapter 4 seeks to explain the home bias of gross asset positions under global
net foreign asset imbalances. It extends the model of Chapter 3 to a world with
production. This on the one hand allows a broader array of cross-country asym-
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metries, for instance those associated with nancial development and production
structure, to be analysed. On the other hand, the extension of the model along
this dimension has important implications for portfolio allocation because both
nancial development and production structure a¤ect the share of income go-
ing to capital and therefore the share of income which can be traded on asset
markets via equities. Again the model shows that global NFA imbalances arise.
In addition, asset home bias also emerges and this bias displays an asymmetry
which is consistent with the stylised facts described above. Chapter 4 therefore
provides an analysis of NFA imbalances and asymmetric asset home bias against
the background of nancial globalisation.
Focusing on net, gross positions and asset composition of external balance
sheet of countries, the three core chapters of this thesis constitute a connected and
complete treatise on country portfolio allocations. In our last chapter, Chapter
5, we will conclude the whole thesis by summarizing our ndings throughout and
their further implications.
Bibliography
Coeurdacier Nicolas & Rey Hélène, 2012. Home Bias in Open Economy Fi-
nancial Macroeconomics, Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic
Association, vol. 51(1), pages 63-115, March.
Devereux Michael & Sutherland Alan, 2010. Country Portfolio Dynamics, Jour-
nal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34, 1325-1342.
Devereux Michael & Sutherland Alan, 2011. Solving for Country Portfolios in
Open Economy Macro Models, Journal of the European Economic Association,
9, 337-369.
Gourinchas Pierre-Olivier, 2008. Valuation E¤ects and External Adjustment:
A Review, Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in:
Kevin Cowan & Sebastián Edwards & Rodrigo O. Valdés & Norman Loayza (Se-
ries Editor) & Klaus Schmidt- (ed.), Current Account and External Financing,
edition 1, volume 12, chapter 6, pages 195-236 Central Bank of Chile.
Gourinchas Pierre-Olivier & Rey Hélène, 2007. International Financial Adjust-
ment, Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(4),
pages 665-703, 08.
Gourinchas Pierre-Olivier & Rey Hélène, 2013. External Adjustment, Global
Imbalances and Valuation E¤ects, NBER Working Papers, No 19240, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Higgins Matthew & Klitgaard Thomas & Tille Cédric, 2006. Borrowing without
Debt? Understanding the U.S. International Investment Position, Sta¤ Reports
271, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
9
BIBLIOGRAPHY 10
Judd, Kenneth L. 1998. Numerical Methods in Economics. Cambridge and Lon-
don: MIT Press.
Lane, Philip R. & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2007. The External Wealth of
Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Li-
abilities, 1970-2004, Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2),
pages 223-250, November.
Sercu Piet & Vanpee Rossane, 2007. Home Bias in International Equity Port-
folios: A Review. Available at SSRN 1025806.
Tille Cedric, 2003. The Impact of Exchange Rate Movements on U.S. Foreign
Debt, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, vol. 9 (Jan).
Wang P. & Wen Y. & Xu Z., 2015. Two-way Capital Flows and Global Imbal-
ances, Economic Journal, Forthcoming
Chapter 2
Portfolio choices in a general
model of representative agents:
Two-way capital ows between
developing and developed
countries
In this chapter, we focus on issues associated with the asset composition of coun-
try balance sheets. In particular, the di¤erences between the asset holdings of
developed and emerging market countries. We aim to shed light on the mecha-
nisms that determine how country asymmetries a¤ect the hedging properties of
di¤erent types of assets as well as the amount of risk that countries are exposed
to. This in turn will shed light on asymmetries in the gross portfolio holdings
of countries and will allow an analysis of two-way capital ows, i.e. the situ-
ation where developed countries are net holders of emerging market equity and
emerging market countries are net holders of developed country bonds. For the
purposes on this analysis, we ignore imbalances in net portfolios in this chapter,
i.e. the steady state net foreign asset positions of each country in the model is
assumed to be xed at zero. In chapter 3 and 4, we will relax this assumption
by introducing global imbalances into the model of country portfolios.
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2.1 Introduction
In international macroeconomics, the so-called two-way capital ows between
developing and developed countries is an interesting phenomenon, i.e. net bond
asset ows towards developing countries while net equity asset ows towards
developed countries as a whole. (See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2007a,
2007b, Ju and Wei, 2010.) What is the reason for this phenomenon? Why do
equity and bond assets ow in such ways rather than the other way around? Are
there any casual links between the stage of development of a country and their
preference over di¤erent types of international assets? If there are, what are they
and how do they work? This chapter seeks to answer these questions.
There has been an increasingly large literature studying net capital ows
between developing and developed worlds since 1990 when Lucas (1990) proposed
the famous question of why does capital not ow from developed countries to
developing countries. Or even though it does why is this ow not stronger than
observed. Based on standard neoclassical models, capital tends to ow to where
it is able to yield a higher return. And the most basic reason for a di¤ering return
in such models is the degree of capital scarcity. Since developing countries are
usually capital scarce in comparison to developed countries, the model predicts
that net capital should ow from the latter to the former. The puzzle might
not have gained so much attention if it was just a problem of size in a world
of balanced international payments. In a world featuring global imbalances, as
has emerged since 1990, this becomes even more puzzling because net capital
actually ows the opposite way to that predicted by the neoclassical model.
Various theories have been proposed to explain this puzzling fact. Explana-
tions include policy misalignments (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2007, Summers, 2004,
Blanchard et al., 2005, etc.), di¤erence in productivity growth (Hunt et al., 2005,
Engle and Rogers, 2006), demographic dynamics (Henriksen, 2005, Attanasio et
al., 2006), volatility of the business cycle (Fogli and Perri, 2006) and a global
savings glut (Bernanke, 2005) etc. In particular, one strand of the literature em-
phasizes the importance of nancial underdevelopment of developing countries
in reconciling the facts. According to these studies, various nancial frictions,
for instance lack of enforceability of nancial contracts (Mendoza et al., 2009),
incapability in supplying a su¢ cient asset stock (Caballero et al., 2009) or/and
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in insuring away idiosyncratic risk (Angeletos and Panousi, 2011) etc., can dis-
tort the decisions of saving and investment in emerging markets, which in turn
results in both a lower interest rate and a lower capital stock in autarky. While
saving cannot be e¤ectively channelled to investment domestically due to these
nancial frictions, under nancial integration, excess saving must nd its way to
developed countries in the form of a net capital ow.
There is also an expanding literature on two-way capital ows(i.e. where
bonds and equity ows in opposite directions). Most of this literature also focuses
exploring the e¤ects of nancial distortions on the choices of di¤erent types of
asset. Ju andWei (2010) attribute the major reason to nancial market imperfec-
tions and related institutions such as property rights protection. The mechanism
of nancial capital owing out while investment arriving in the form of FDI can
serve as a nice vehicle bypassing the adverse e¤ect of an ine¢ cient nancial
system within developing countries. Hagen and Zhang (2011) model nancial
development as an endowment xed in the short run. With the comparative ad-
vantage of providing nancial service, developed countries will nd it optimal to
import nancial capital and export FDI while the developing countries follow
the opposite pattern. Wang et al. (2015) show that the common presence of
underdevelopment factors in the credit market of developing countries can lower
the rate of return of nancial capital while raise that of xed capital at the same
time. So under capital liberalization, nancial capital ows out while the xed
capital ows in.
Rather than mainly focusing on the return and mobility aspects of assets in
the above literature, another strand of literature such as Devereux and Suther-
land (2010; 2011) and Tille and Wincoop (2010) pay attention to di¤erent risk
characteristics of international assets and the role they play in determining capi-
tal ows. The asset holdings of a country are determined because all assets have
di¤erent risk characteristics and thus satisfy specic demands of households in
di¤erent countries for risk-hedging devices. This approach allows for the analysis
of many other potential factors in addition to nancial frictions that behind net
capital ows. This current chapter of this thesis falls in the category of this
literature in explaining two-way capital ows. However, Devereux and Suther-
land (2010; 2011) focuse on methodological usefulness while Tille and Wincoop
(2010) on (both net and gross) portfolio dynamics in a world of two symmetric
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countries. In terms of two-way capital ows, asymmetries must be involved.
The analytical framework in this chapter is a model of a two-country world.
Two types of assets, equity and bond, are assumed to be present. In separa-
tion, each country can be described by a medium-scale full-edged model of the
New Keynesian approach. So as a whole, the model of the two economies also
represents an extension of the literature such as Woodford (2003), Gali (2008),
Christiano et al. (2010), etc. to the context of international economy with en-
dogenous portfolio choices. Specically, the environment in each country is very
close to that of Smets and Wouters (2007). For our purpose of distinguishing
developing and developed country, we assume di¤erent values of structural pa-
rameters for them. These parameters capture various aspects in which the two
economies may di¤er, including those of economic structure, policy stance, sever-
ity of various (real and nominal) frictions and properties of economic shocks, etc..
The studies in the literature employing econometric techniques to estimate the
DSGE models of developed (for instance Smets and Wouters, 2003; 2007, etc.)
and developing countries (for instance Sun and Sen, 2012, Dai, 2012 and Miao
and Peng 2012, etc.) provide us with these parameter values of empirical rele-
vance. Given the presence of the country asymmetries, optimal portfolio choices
are computed and then assessed from the perspective of conforming to or contra-
dicting the pattern of two-way capital ows. Through this process, we uncover
which asymmetries matter and to what extent they matter.
To summerize our ndings, rstly, we nd that the asymmetries associated
with countrys industrial structure, severity of nominal rigidities, trade open-
ness, consumption home bias, investment adjustment frictions, monetary policy
stance, market competitiveness and pricing strategy of international trade, etc.
can cause the two-way capital ows between developing and developed countries.
Secondly, among these factors, those from the real side of economy are more im-
portant than those from the nominal side. Lastly, we simulate the model with
fully asymmetric parameter values and nd that it yields a portfolio allocation
that are broadly consistent with the pattern of two-way capital ows. Besides,
if we take into account of the situation where international bonds can only be
issued by the developed country (as it is often the case in reality), this result still
holds.
This work is closely related to Devereux and Sutherland (2009). The latter
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considers asymmetry in asset market structure and nds that under the pattern of
two-way capital ows the economies achieve a relatively high level of international
risk-sharing, which supplies evidence in support of the emergence of the pattern.
We follow a similar idea in this chapter, however, with substantial extension of the
model and analysis. This, on the other hand, explains why we need such a general
framework of New Keynesian approach (with each economy being modelled with
rich features) in this chapter. Non-trivial monetary policy is present so that
bond assetsreturn can be dened while many frictions, price/wage rigidities and
costy investment adjustments for instance, are assumed here so that a long list of
asymmetries associated with these features can be examined in the analysis. The
work is also linked to Devereux et al. (2014) when it comes to decomposing the
hedging properties of assets into correlation and variability e¤ects which sheds
light on the machinery of each asymmetry. With the presence of the central
role of di¤ering hedging properties of di¤erent types of asset in the model, it
also connects to the literature on (symmetric) asset home bias in international
macroeconomics. Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) give a survey of the literature on
this topic.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2:2 presents the
model. Section 2:3 discusses the determination, representation and interpreta-
tion of optimal country portfolios in the general model. Section 2:4 simulates
the model symmetrically. Section 2:5 simulates the model asymmetrically and
assesses country asymmetries impact on the pattern of two-way capital ows.
Section 2:6 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model assumes a world consisting of two countries, Home and Foreign. For
the readers convenience, a gure, Figure 2:1, is employed to summarize the eco-
nomic structure of the two countries. At the top of the gure is a diagram of
resource ows while on the lower half are some key points of information. The
two countries are the same in terms of economic structure, which is reected by
the fact that the ows in the foreign country are drawn to be a mirror image of
those in the home country. As shown in the diagram, each economy consists of
ve sectors. From left to right, they are the sector of households, labour union,
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Figure 2.1: The structure of the model
intermediate goods sector, nal goods sector and government. The lines linking
sectors represent resource ows with the arrows showing the direction of ow.
In each economy, households consume nal goods from both home and foreign
countries. They supply, domestically, their labour to labour unions for wages and
capital to intermediate goods rms for capital rental. The labour unions distrib-
ute the labour supplies. And the intermediate goods rms combine the labour
and capital collected to produce intermediate goods whose usefulness is only to
be sold to the nal goods sector. The rms in the nal goods sector produce the
nal goods which are then ready for use for consumption and investment.
Following the literature, the intermediate and nal goods rms are further
divided into two parallel sectors of traded and non-traded goods production in
both countries. In the diagram, this is reected by the fact that the traded goods
sectors are circled in a shadowed area. The traded and non-traded goods sectors
are di¤erent such that the nal goods produced by non-traded sectors can only
be sold to domestic households while the nal goods produced by the traded
sector can be sold to both domestic and foreign households. There is one public
sector, government, in the economy. They tax and consume on the one hand and
implement scal and monetary policies according to rules on the other hand.
2. Two-way capital ows 17
On the lower half of the gure, the rst row lists the frictions embedded in the
private sector and the policy rules adopted by the governments while the second
row lists the shocks that are present. Being put forward without explanation,
they are gathered here to give a better general description of the whole model and
will be explained in more detail below. In what follows, the complete behaviours
of each sector will be specied. However, because the two economies have the
same structure, we will focus on the case of the home country. As a convention,
when it is necessary to mention foreign country variables, an asterisk is used.
2.2.1 Households
Assume a continuum of household z 2 (0 1). The representative household z is
an intertemporal optimizer whose objective is to maximize the following utility
function:
Et
1X
i=0
i
(
C1 Xt+i (z)
1     t+i
Lt+i

)
(2.1)
The function is an expected summation of an innite series of single period utility.
The latter equals the utility from consumption of a composite good C,
C1 Xt+i(z)
1  ,
less the disutility from hours worked, t+i
Lt+i

. ,  and  are respectively
the discount factor, the risk aversion parameter (or inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution) and the elasticity of labour supply.  represents a
weight between consumption and working hours. It is assumed to be a labour
supply shock following the process bt = bt 1 + "xt where a hat over a variable
indicates a log-deviation from the steady state. Here if "xt is realized to be
positive, there is negative shock to the labour supply.
The household z faces two restrictions when maximizing the above utility
function. First, there is an (external) habit formation process
CXt+i (z) = Ct+i (z)  hCt+i 1 (2.2)
where h is the degree of habit persistence.
Second, the household should meet the intertemporal budget constraint as
follows:
Ft = 
4
i=1ritit 1 +
wt
Pt
Lt   Ct (z) + t +t   Tt (2.3)
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where Ft is the net wealth of households at the end of time t. In the model of
representative agents, it also denotes per capita net foreign asset (NFA) of the
country. We assume that both the home and foreign countries issue equities and
bonds. So there are 2  2 = 4 assets in total in the model. To understand the
budget constraint, note that we denote the householdsholding of asset i at the
end of time t as it, so Ft = 4i=1it. We further denote the gross rate of return
for asset i during period t as rit, so the total return by holding the time-(t  1)
portfolio to the end of time t is given by 4i=1ritit 1 which explains the rst
term on the right hand side of Eq.(2:3). For the rest of the terms on the right
hand side, wt is the nominal wage received by households. Pt is home country
CPI, i.e. price index of composite good C. Lt is labour supply so wtPtLt is labour
income. We assume that households own rms and the labour unions. t and t
in the equation denote the prots of rms and labour unions that are received
by households. Ct (z) and Tt are households spending on consumptions and
taxation. So the budget constraint states that the amount of net total wealth
each period is given by the sum of the gross return by holding existing portfolio
and the newly earned saving.
The householdschoice variables include the levels of consumption C, labour
supply L and portfolio holdings is. The rst-order conditions associated with
optimal C, L and is are respectively:

t+i = 
iC Xt+i (2.4)
wt = tL
 1
t Pt
1

t
= tL
 1
t PtC

Xt (2.5)
C Xt = Et

C Xt+1rit+1

(2.6)
where 
t+i are multipliers for budget constraints at time t+i. Eqs.(2:4) and (2:5)
are familiar intertemporal and intratemporal optimal conditions which dene
optimal C and L. Eq.(2:6) determines the optimal portfolio choices i. To
understand it, it asserts that at the optimum, the marginal loss of utility by
forgoing consumption (and investing in an asset) today should be equal to the
marginal gain of utility by reaping the asset return tomorrow after discounting.
Once C is determined, following the literature, we assume the composite good
is made up of non-traded and traded goods by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation
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relation as follows:
C =


1
C
 1

N + (1  )
1
 C
 1

T
 
 1
(2.7)
where CN and CT are consumptions of non-traded and traded goods. Their
weights in the basket are respectively  and (1  ).  is the elasticity of sub-
stitution between the two types of good.
Investment goods are assumed to be aggregated in the same way, so
I =


1
 I
 1

N + (1  )
1
 I
 1

T
 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(2.8)
Given the aggregation relations of spending above, the demands for non-
traded and traded goods in the home country are given by
DN =  (C + I)

PN
P
 
(2.9)
DT = (1  ) (C + I)

PT
P
 
(2.10)
where PT and PN denote price indices for traded and non-traded goods. More-
over, the price index of the composite good at home P is
P =
h
P 1 N + (1  )P 1 T
i 1
1 
(2.11)
Further assume that the demand for traded goods is made up of home and
foreign traded goods (with subscript of H and F respectively) by the same tech-
nology with the weight and elasticity of substitution being now  and :
CT =
h
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(2.13)
Combining with their foreign counterparts, it follows that the home demands
of home and foreign traded goods are respectively:
DH = DT

PD
PT
 
(2.14)
2. Two-way capital ows 20
DF = (1  )DT

S

P X
PT
 
(2.15)
and the foreign demands of home and foreign traded goods are respectively:
DH = (1  )DT

S PX
P T
 
(2.16)
DF = D

T

P D
P T
 
(2.17)
where PD and PX are prices of home traded goods for home and foreign buyers.
P D and P

X are prices of foreign traded goods for foreign and home buyers. Note
that in Eqs.(2:15) and (2:16), prices of exports P X and PX are converted to local
terms if they are not set through local currency pricing (LCP ) but rather the
producer currency pricing (PCP ). The nominal exchange rate S, dened as the
price of foreign currency in terms of home currency, is thus involved in the above
equations. Note we use a switch parameter of di¤erent pricing strategies  here.
It takes the value of 1 in the PCP case or 0 in the LCP case.
The price index of the home traded goods is thus
PT =
h
P 1 D + (1  )
 
S

P X
1 i 11 
(2.18)
The price index of the foreign traded goods P T has a similar expression.
2.2.2 Labour unions
The representative labour union z buys labour from households and sells it to
intermediate goods producers. Their problem is to maximize the following prot
function
Et
1X
i=0

t+it+i (2.19)
with subject to

t+i = 
iC Xt+i (2.20)
Lt (z) = Lt

wt (z)
Wt
 
(2.21)
t = Lt (z)
wt (z)
Pt
  Lt (z) wt
Pt
(2.22)
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We assume that they use the same discount factor as the one used by households,
which leads to Eq.(2:20). w (z) andW denote respectively the optimal (nominal)
wage which is set by z and the aggregate wage index of labour sold to intermediate
goods sector. With a constant elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types
of labour supply , the labour amount sold by the labour union is given by Lt (z)
by Eq.(2:21). Using wt to represent the nominal wage paid by the labour union
to households, we obtain the labour unions period prot function, i.e. Eq.(2:22).
This denes the problem of how wt (z) is chosen optimally. Moreover, we
assume that the process of wage setting su¤ers from a rigidity friction. Wages
adjust infrequently through a Calvo-type contract. Each time only a fraction of
all wages (1  &) can be reset and the rest of wages & are indexed to past ination
automatically with an indexation degree of $.
To solve the labour unions problem, note that the related Lagrangian equa-
tion is:
Et
1X
i=0

t+i&
i
8><>: Lt+i
h
wt(z)
Wt+i

Wt+i 1
Wt 1
$i1 
Wt+i
Pt+i
 Lt+i
h
wt(z)
Wt+i

Wt+i 1
Wt 1
$i 
wt+i
Pt+i
9>=>; (2.23)
By the associated rst-order condition, the optimal wage rate set at time t
can be obtained as:
wt (z) =

   1
Et
P1
i=0
t+i&
iLt+i
W t+i
Pt+i
h
Wt+i 1
Wt 1
$i 
wt+i
Et
P1
i=0
t+i&
iLt+i
W t+i
Pt+i
h
Wt+i 1
Wt 1
$i1  (2.24)
from which it is clear that the optimal wage is a mark-up over a weighted average
of future marginal cost of labour wt+i. The weight is a¤ected by the degree of
wage rigidity & and other variables. The stronger the degree of wage rigidity, i.e.
a high &, the less is the importance of the current marginal cost comparing to
the future marginal cost. The mark-up factor 
 1 is a function of the elasticity
of labour substitution . The lower is the substitution rate , the lower is the
market competitiveness and the higher is the mark-up. We introduce a mark-up
shock V = 
 1 here and we assume that it follows the process V^t = V V^t 1+ "V .
When there is a positive realization of "V , there is a negative shock to market
power in labour market.
Given the optimal wage Xwt  wt (z), by aggregation, the aggregate wage
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index Wt is given by:
Wt =
(
&

Wt 1

Wt 1
Wt 2
$1 
+ (1  &)X1 wt
) 1
1 
(2.25)
2.2.3 Intermediate goods rms
As mentioned before, there are two parallel intermediate goods sectors within
each country. In either sector, the rms only supply intermediate goods to nal
goods rms of the same sector. Except for this di¤erence, the structure of the
two intermediate goods sectors is the same. So in this subsection, unless it
is necessary, we only discuss the behaviour of the traded sector. The related
equations for non-traded sector are similar.
The intermediate rms buy labour and capital and combine them to produce
the intermediate goods. For a representative rm z, its problem is to maximize
its prot:
Et
1X
i=0

t+iMt+i (2.26)
with subject to
Mt+i =
qt
Pt
Yt   Wt
Pt
Lt   It  
 
 
"tIt   I
2
2I
(2.27)
Kt+1 = It + (1  )Kt (2.28)
Yt = AtK
1 a
t 1 L
a
t (2.29)
The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form, Eq.(2:29).
The share of labour L and capital K in the output are respectively a and 1  a.
The factors of technology or e¢ ciency enter the function through variable A.
Following the literature (for instance Corsetti et al., 2008 and Devereux et al.
2014), the exogenous state vector of technology A^ 
h
A^T A^N
i
are assumed to
evolve according to
A^Tt = TT1A^Tt 1 + TT2A^Tt 1 + TN1A^Nt 1 + TN2A^

Nt 1 + "T (2.30)
A^Nt = NT1A^Tt 1 + NT2A^Tt 1 + NN1A^Nt 1 + NN2A^

Nt 1 + "N (2.31)
where ["T "N ] are disturbances to technology.
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Eq.(2:28) is the standard capital accumulation equation. Capital at the
end of time t, Kt+1, equals the sum of the investment this period, It, and the
depreciation-adjusted capital stock, (1  )Kt. The capital depreciation rate is
.
Eq.(2:27) gives the prot function for the intermediate goods rm. q is the
price of intermediate goods. The rst term of the equation represents the income
by selling the goods. The second and third terms on the right hand side of the
equation represent the cost of the labour and capital inputs respectively. We
assume a cost of investment adjustment, i.e.
 ("tIt I)2
2I
. The cost function is set
to be a quadratic form mainly out of tractability. Moreover, it also implies that
both accumulation and decumulation of capital will incur adjustment cost and
the cost is marginally increasing. The parameter  is used to govern the degree
of the friction. We assume there is a shock variable "t that a¤ects investment-
adjustment cost which follows the process of "^t = ""^t 1 + "".
The choice variables for intermediate goods rm are labour demand L, in-
vestment I and capital stock K. The associated rst-order conditions are:
MPLt =
Wt
qt
(2.32)
	t =
"
1 +
 
 
"tIt   I

I
"t
#
(2.33)

t	t = Et
t+1

qt+1
Pt+1
MPKt+1 + (1  )	t+1

= Et
t+1RKt+1 (2.34)
The optimal L is determined by Eq.(2:32). The condition states that at the
optimum the marginal product of labour should be equal to the real wage, which
should be familiar. Eq.(2:33) is a type of Tobins Q equation where the price
of the investment goods is set to be the same as the price of the nal goods
which is normalized to 1. The 	 on the left hand side of the equation is the
multiplier associated with the constraint of Eq.(2:28). It also stands for the mar-
ginal product of investment. In equilibrium, it should be equal to the marginal
cost of investment on the right hand side. This equation ties down the optimal
investment It. Eq.(2:34) determines the optimal capital stock Kt. It balances
the intertemporal use of capital. Existing capital can either be used today or be
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invested as capital tomorrow. At optimum, there should be no di¤erence between
the marginal benets of the two di¤erent uses.
2.2.4 Final goods rms
The nal goods sector is also divided into traded and non-traded sectors. As
before, in this subsection, we only consider the traded sector. The equations for
the non-traded sector are similar. In addition, because the rms in the traded
sector have to set the price for exports, this again involves di¤erent pricing
strategies, i.e. whether PCP or LCP is adopted. In what follows, as before,
this is represented by the cases of  = 1 for PCP and  = 0 for LCP .
The structure of the problem of the nal goods sector is similar to that of the
labour unions. The rms buy intermediate goods from the intermediate goods
sector, transform them into nal goods and sell the goods to domestic and foreign
buyers. The goods have some degree of heterogeneity so rms have power to set
prices. However, the prices cannot change every period. The change is subject
to a Calvo-type price rigidity.
A representative rm z chooses pDt (z) and pXt (z) to maximize the prot
function:
Et
1X
i=0

t+iFt+i (2.35)
subject to
Ft = y1t (z)
pDt (z)
PDt
PDt
Pt
+y2t (z)
pXt (z)
PXt
S1 t PXt
Pt
 y1t (z) qTt
Pt
 y2t (z) qTt
Pt
(2.36)
y1t (z) = Dt

pDt (z)
PDt
 '
(2.37)
y2t (z) = D

t

pXt (z)
PXt
 '
(2.38)
pDt (z) and pXt (z) are the prices of home traded goods for home and foreign
buyers respectively. With the assumptions of a constant elasticity of substitution
', the demand for zs goods from home and foreign countries y1t (z) and y2t (z)
are given by Eqs.(2:37) and (2:38). So the rst two terms on the right hand side
of Eq.(2:36) are the related income by selling nal goods while the last two terms
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are the costs of buying intermediate goods. By taking the di¤erence of the two,
Eq.(2:36) gives the prot of rm z at period t.
We assume that the degree of price rigidity and price indexation are given by
 and ! respectively, the related Lagrangian equation of the nal goods rms
problem can be set up following the same logic as in Eq.(2:23). The associated
rst-order conditions lead to the optimal pDt (z)
pDt (z) =
'
1  '
Et
P1
i=0
t+i
i Dt+i
Pt+i
P'Dt+i
h
PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!i '
qTt+i
Et
P1
i=0
t+i
i Dt+i
Pt+i
P'Dt+i
h
PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!i1 ' (2.39)
and the optimal pXt (z)
pXt (z) =
'
1  '
Et
P1
i=0
t+i
i D

t+i
Pt+i
P'Xt+i
h
PXt+i 1
PXt 1
!i '
qTt+i
S1 t+i
Et
P1
i=0
t+i
i D

t+i
Pt+i
P'Xt+i
h
PXt+i 1
PXt 1
!i1 ' (2.40)
As before, the optimal prices under the nominal rigidity are markups over weighted
average of the current and future marginal costs qTt+i and
qTt+i
St+i
. The weight over
time is a¤ected by how serious is the price rigidity, i.e. . And the markup
is mainly controlled by the degree of the market competitiveness i.e. '. As in
the case of the labour union, we assume V = '
1 ' is a price markup shock and
assume that it follows the process of V^t = V V^t 1 + "V .
2.2.5 Government
The government implements both scal and monetary policies. The scal policy
is assumed to be aimed at a balanced budget. So we have the following rule
PGtGt = PtTt (2.41)
As for the scale of government, we assume that the total expenditure of
government in the steady state amounts to a xed proportion of the total output
in steady state. Parameter g governs the ratio:
G = gY (2.42)
where for G and Y the time subscript t is dropped to indicate a steady state
value of them.
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Government spending is assumed to be subject to a scal policy shock:
G^t = GG^t 1 + "Gt (2.43)
We further assume that the government buys both traded and non-traded
goods. And the shares are consistent with that of private spending, i.e. a constant
proportion of the total expenditure  goes to non-traded goods and the remaining
proportion 1    goes to traded goods. We assume that the government only
buys domestic traded goods. So we have:
GNt = Gt (2.44)
GHt = (1  )Gt (2.45)
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor-type rule. By assumption, the
deviation of the chosen interest rate from its steady state can be broken down
into terms of interest rate smoothing, ination feedback, output gap feedback
and monetary shock respectively. In particular, the rule takes the form:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R "t

 Yt
Y
Y #1 R
rrt (2.46)
where Rt
R
denotes the deviation of the interest rate from its steady state. R
is the degree of interest rate smoothing.  and Y are respectively feedback
parameters of ination and output gap. And rr stands for a monetary shock
which follows the process of brrt = rr brrt 1 + "rr.
2.2.6 Financial markets
In this subsection, let us dene the rate of return for the assets available in the
international nancial market. As mentioned, both countries can issue equities
and nominal bond. For home and foreign equities, we assume that they represent
claims on the prot made by the rms in the issuer country. The gross (real)
rate of return for home and foreign equities are thus given by:
r1t =
t + Z1t
Z1t 1
(2.47)
r2t =
t Qt + Z2t
Z2t 1
(2.48)
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where t = Mt + Ft + t and t = 

Mt + 

Ft + 

t are the total prots of
rms, i.e. the prots belonging to intermediate and nal goods rms of both
traded and non-traded goods sectors plus labour unions, in the two countries.
Z1t and Z2t are the real prices of home and foreign equities. Qt = (St  P t ) =Pt in
Eq.(2:48) is the real exchange rate representing the price of foreign consumption
basket in terms of home consumption basket. The rate of return of the foreign
equity r2t is dened in terms of home basket and is comparable to r1t.
For the home and foreign bonds, we assume that they represent claims on
one unit of currency per period in the issuer country. The gross (real) rates of
return for them are thus given by:
r3t =
1=Pt + Z3t
Z1t 1
(2.49)
r4t =
(1=P t ) Qt + Z4t
Z4t 1
(2.50)
where 1=Pt and (1=P t )  Q denote real payo¤s of one unit of home and foreign
bonds. Again, Q is used to convert the foreign payo¤ into terms of the home
consumption basket.
2.2.7 Market clearing
In equilibrium, all markets should clear. These include market clearing in the
goods market, the labour market and asset markets.
In the goods market, for the non-traded sector, we should have
YNt = DNt + Gt (2.50)
where DN is the private demand for home non-tradables and G is the public
spending on them. Note that as explained there is no demand coming from the
foreign country for home non-tradables.
For the traded sector, we have
YTt = DHt +D

Ht + (1  )Gt (2.51)
where DH1 and DH2 are the private demands for home tradables from the home
and foreign countries, whose formulae are given by Eqs.(2:14) and (2:16), and
(1  )G is the public spending on home tradables.
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Aggregating the goods demands across sectors leads to the total demand for
goods
Yt = YNt + YTt (2.52)
In the labour market, the total labour supply L is made up of that of traded
sectors LT and that of non-traded sectors LN
Lt = LTt + LNt (2.53)
In the foreign country, these conditions are similar.
In asset markets, all assets are in net supply of zero, so
it + 

it = 0 (2.54)
for i = 1; 2; 3; 4. Note that i is an index of assets and the s with asterisk are
foreign holdings. By the market clearing conditions of assets, once (steady-state)
asset holdings of home country are obtained, those of foreign country are simply
i =  i. So in what follows, we only focus on the solutions of home portfolio
choices, i.e. the is.
2.3 Optimal portfolios in the general model
After specifying the details of the model, in this section, we are ready to discuss
the determination of the optimal portfolios, i.e. the is. We rst derive the opti-
mality condition that can be used to tie down the is from the Euler equations.
It turns out that the is are determined by rst-order behaviour of the cross-
country consumption di¤erential and asset excess returns. We approximate the
budget constraints of the two countries and apply them to the optimality condi-
tion to yield is as variance-covariance ratios. The correlationand variability
e¤ects are dened and derived following the literature, which provide useful hints
about the way of how the optimal portfolios are structured.
2.3.1 Optimality condition
As noted in the previous section, the optimal portfolio choices are determined
by equation set (2:6) and its foreign counterpart. In the home country, Eq.(2:6)
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gives us the following three restrictions that need to be satised:
E

C Xt+1rit+1

= E

C Xt+1r4t+1

(3.1)
for i = 1; 2; 3. Following Devereux and Sutherland (2011) (and also Tille and
Wincoop, 2010), to obtain the zero-order is, at least second-order approxima-
tions of the portfolio conditions are required. So we approximate the above
conditions in a standard way up to second-order accuracy. Combined with the
foreign approximated conditions, we can arrive at the following covariance con-
dition
E
h
C^Xt+1   C^Xt+1   Q^t+1=
 brixt+1i = 0 +O  3 (3.2)
where, except for r^ixt+1 which is dened as (r^it+1   r^4t+1), all other variables
with hats represent log deviations from their steady states. For example, C^Xt+1 =
log[(CXt+1   CX) =CX ] whereCX is steady-stateCXt. C^Xt+1 and Q^t+1 are dened
similarly.
Eq.(3:2) can serve as the condition to tie down the is for i = 1; 2; 3. Note
by this equation, the is are determined by two rst-order behaviours. There are
C^DXt+1 =

C^Xt+1   C^Xt+1   Q^t+1=

, which is referred to as the cross-country
consumption di¤erential (with habit formation), and r^xt+1, which is referred to
as the excess returns of asset i over asset 4 which is the numeraire asset in the
model. At the optimum, the is are chosen so that the covariance between the
two is zero, or the two are orthogonal, which indicates the optimal portfolios as
hedging vehicles smoothing relative consumption uctuations through generating
relative asset returns.
Once 1 to 3 are derived from Eq.(3:2), 4 can be obtained by the fact of
4 = F   (1 + 2 + 3) where F is steady-state NFA in the home country.
Because in this chapter, we assume that the steady state autarky interest rates
are equalized across countries r = r = 1

. There is no reason for capital ows to
particular country in net terms. Steady state net foreign assets in equilibrium is
thus zero, i.e. F = 0.
2.3.2 Approximating budget constraints
Obviously, C^DXt is endogenous and it depends on the optimal portfolio is in
the model. Most basically, consumptions link to portfolios through budget con-
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straints. By writing out the links between them, we can establish expressions of
portfolios explicitly instead of implicitly as in Eq.(3:2). This procedure is usually
very useful in providing us with intuitions on which kind of motive drives the
emergence of the observed portfolios, i.e. the motive to hedge away certain in-
come risks. In this subsection, we obtain the links by approximating the budget
constraints of countries. In the next subsection, we derive the portfolios as a
variance-covariance ratio representing them explicitly.
Let us start with the home budget constraint, Eq.(2:3), which can be rewritten
as
Ft = 
0
t 1rxt + r4Ft 1 + Yct   Ct (3.3)
where we dene portfolio vector 0t 1 = [1t 1 2t 1 3t 1], excess vector rxt =
[r1xt r2xt r3xt]
0 and disposable income Yct = wtPtLt +t +t   Tt.
First-order approximating the equation around the steady-state yields
C^t = Y^ct +
1
c
~0r^xt +
1
c
1

F^t 1   1
c
F^t (3.4)
where Y^ct = log[(Yct   Yc) =Yc] and C^t = log[(Ct   C) =C]. Because in steady
state, F = 0, F^t is dened here as deviation of Ft from its steady state (of
zero) as a percentage of equilibrium income Y instead of F , i.e. F^t = log[Ft=Y ].
Besides, we dene ~0 = 1
Y
0 and r^xt = [r1xt r2xt r3xt]
0. c is the steady-state ratio
of consumption to income c = C=Y .
The budget constraint in the foreign country is
F t
Qt
=
1
Qt
 
0t 1rxt + r4F

t 1

+ Y ct   Ct (3.5)
Note that exchange rate appears in the constraint because all asset returns are in
terms of the home consumption basket while foreign consumption and disposable
income are in terms of foreign consumption basket.
Similarly, approximating this constraint yields
C^t = Y^

ct +
1
cQ
~0r^xt +
1
cQ
1

F^ t 1  
1
cQ
F^ t (3.6)
where variables are dened analogously.
Notice that in a two-country world we have F t =  Ft so
F^ t =  
Y
Y 
F^t
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By the conditions of asset market clearing, we have
~ =

Y 
=
 
Y
Y
Y 
=   Y
Y 
~
Making use of these facts, we can rewrite Eq.(3:6) as
C^t = Y^

ct  
Y
Y 
1
cQ
~0r^xt   Y
Y 
1
cQ
1

F^t 1 +
Y
Y 
1
cQ
F^t (3.7)
2.3.3 Variance-covariance representation of portfolios
In this subsection, we represent ~ as a variance-covariance ratio. For convenience,
approximated home and foreign budget constraints that were obtained above are
put together as follows
C^t = Y^ct +
1
c
~0r^xt +
1
c
1

F^t 1   1
c
F^t
C^t = Y^

ct  
Y
Y 
1
cQ
~0r^xt   Y
Y 
1
cQ
1

F^t 1 +
Y
Y 
1
cQ
F^t
According to Eq.(2:2), i.e. CXt+1 = Ct+1   hCt, we have
(1  h) C^Xt+1 = C^t+1   hC^t
which can be used to rewrite C^DXt+1 as
C^DXt+1 =
1
1  h

C^t+1   hC^t

  1
1  h

C^t+1   hC^t

  1

Q^t+1
With the expressions of consumption behaviours above, it follows that
1X
i=0
iC^DXt+1+i =
1X
i=0
i
"
1
1 h

C^t+1+i   hC^t+i

  1
1 h

C^t+1+i   hC^t+i

 1

Q^t+1+i
#
=
X
i

1
1  h

Y^ct+1+i   hY^ct+i

  1
1  h

Y^ ct+1+i   hY^ ct+i

+
X
i

 1  2~0r^xt+1+i    2  2~0r^xt+i   1

Q^t+1+i

+ t:i:
where
 1 =

1
1  h
1
2c
+
1
1  h
Y
Y 
1
2cQ

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 2 =

h
1  h
1
2c
+
h
1  h
Y
Y 
1
2cQ

and t:i: denotes terms of irrelevance (whose covariance with r^xt+1 is 0). The
summation is equivalent to
1X
i=0
iC^DXt+1+i =
1
(1  )C^
D
Xt+1
=
1X
i=0
i
"
1 h
1 h Y^ct+1+i   1 h

1 h Y^

ct+1+i
+  2~0r^xt+1+i   1Q^t+1+i
#
+ t:i:
or
C^DXt+1 = (1  ) ( yt+1 +   2~0r^xt+1 + t:i:) (3.8)
where
 yt+1 =
1X
i=0
i

1  h
1  h Y^ct+1+i  
1  h
1  h Y^

ct+1+i  
1

Q^t+1+i

(3.9)
denotes the sum of discounted expected uctuations in relative disposable in-
comes and
 =  1    2 (3.10)
denotes a wedge whose value depends on the severity of the habit friction and
the degree of country di¤erences in the general model.
Putting Eq.(3:8) back into Eq.(3:2) leads to
Et fr^xt+1 ( yt+1 +   2~0r^xt+1)g = 0
or
~i =   1
2
cov
 
yt+1; r^xt+1

var (r^xt+1)
(3.11)
where ~i for i = 1; 2; 3 is element of ~. yt+1 =  yt+1   Et yt+1 is the sum
of discounted expected innovations in relative disposable incomes while r^xt+1 =
r^xt+1   Etr^xt+1 is the innovations in excess return of assets1. Eq.(3:11) states
1Note that Etr^xt+1 = 0 is derived from the rst-order approximation of Eq.(3:1). Both
Devereux and Sutherland (2011) and Tille and Wincoop (2010) also share this property. Later
on in Eq.(3:27) of next chapter, we show in more detail how this can be the case in a similar
context.
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that the optimal portfolios ~ depends on how the innovations in discounted
expected relative disposable incomes co-vary with that in excess return of assets.
The equation coincides with Eq.(24) of Devereux et al. (2014) if we ignore the
presence of  .2 While in Devereux et al. (2014),  collapses (into 1=C) because
the two countries are entirely symmetric and they do not consider the situation
where households form habits, in the current model we are interested in the
portfolio choices in an asymmetric world. And to consider possible asymmetry
in habit persistence between developing and developed countries and its e¤ects
on portfolio choices, habit formation is taken into account. So  emerges as one
measure of how ~ di¤ers in the asymmetric model from that in a symmetric
model. While  has a multiplicative e¤ect on the size of portfolio holdings, the
fundamental force underlying the determination of ~ is essentially the same as
that in the symmetric model, i.e. householdsmotive to hedge against those risks
that disturb their desired smooth schedule of relative consumption. Eq.(3:11)
makes sense given that relative consumption is always supported by relative
disposable income.
2.3.4 Correlation and variability e¤ects
We now dene and derive the correlationand variabilitye¤ects. These e¤ects
provide a useful decomposition of the portfolio expressions which will be used in
the analysis reported below. By Eq.(3:11),  is the same across ~is, i.e. elements
in ~. If there are di¤erences among the ~is they must come from the di¤erences
among the variance-covariance ratios. The correlation and variability e¤ects will
provide some clues about the causes of these di¤erences across assets.
Note that the ~is in Eq.(3:11) can be re-written as
~1 =   1
2
corr
 
yt+1; r^1xt+1j r^2xt+1; r^3xt+1
 StD  yt+1j r^2xt+1; r^3xt+1
StD (r^1xt+1j r^2xt+1; r^3xt+1) (3.12)
~2 =   1
2
corr
 
yt+1; r^2xt+1j r^1xt+1; r^3xt+1
 StD  yt+1j r^1xt+1; r^3xt+1
StD (r^2xt+1j r^1xt+1; r^3xt+1) (3.13)
2Except that yt+1 is also dened in a slightly di¤erent way. Specically, in their paper,
yt+1 is multiplied by steady-state consumption C which is equalized across countries in their
model. The degree of asymmetry in the model of this chapter is instead reected in  here.
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~3 =   1
2
corr
 
yt+1; r^3xt+1j r^1xt+1; r^2xt+1
 StD  yt+1j r^1xt+1; r^2xt+1
StD (r^3xt+1j r^1xt+1; r^2xt+1) (3.14)
According to above formulae, the signs of asset holdings are determined by the
correlation between relative disposable income and the excess return of the asset
conditional on the excess returns of other assets, i.e. corr
 
yt+1; r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1

where to ease notation we dene r^ ixt+1 as a vector consisting of all elements of
r^xt+1 except for r^ixt+1. In other words, the short or long positions of asset holdings
depend on the (conditional) hedging properties of related assets. Suppose for as-
set i, given the presence of the other assets, its excess return co-moves negatively
with the relative disposable income, so corr
 
yt+1; r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1

< 0. This
means after a shock, householdsrelative income moves in one direction while
the asset yields returns that move in the o¤setting direction. The asset is able
to stabilize householdsrelative consumption. In this sense the asset is deemed
as a good hedge and will be held in long position. Otherwise, if its excess return
co-move positively with the relative incomes corr
 
yt+1; r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1

> 0,
holding the asset would exaggerate the e¤ects of the risks. This means that
in order to provide a good hedge the asset will be held in a short position by
households.
Coming back to our model, ~1 and ~3 are gross holdings of home assets which
are supplied by the home country by default, so they are expected to be negative.
That is to say, the two associated correlations are expected to be positive. ~2
and ~4 are gross (and also net) holdings of foreign assets, so they are expected
to be positive. That is to say, the two associated correlations are expected to
be negative. (~4s expression can be obtained if another asset, say asset 2, is
chosen as the numeraire asset. The representation is analogous. Note that the
choice of numeraire asset does not matter in the sense that they all yield the
same portfolio solutions ~.)
The size of asset holdings are determined by both corr
 
yt+1; r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1

and the ratio of
StD(yt+1j r^ ixt+1)
StD(r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1) . Following the literature, from now on, we refer
them respectively as the correlationand variabilitye¤ects. The two e¤ects
have very intuitive interpretations when it comes to a¤ecting the size of ~is.
The size of the ~is positively depend on the correlation e¤ect. This is because
the higher is the conditional correlation (in absolute value), the closer is the co-
movement between the relative disposable income and excess return, the more
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signicant is the role of asset in serving as a good hedge against risks. So the
households desire to hold a more substantial amount of it, positively or negatively.
The e¤ect can be thought of as a quality e¤ect, i.e. the assets which are more
e¢ cient in hedging (or exaggerating) risks will be bought (or sold) more. The
correlation e¤ect measures how relevant are the assets. The more relevant they
are in risk-hedging, the more important they are in portfolios.
The size of the ~is also depends positively on the variability e¤ect as well.
Note that the latter is the ratio of the conditional standard deviation of relative
disposable income to that of excess return. It tells us how much the volatility
of the relative disposable income is relative to that of the excess return. While
the former volatility provides us with a measure of total amount of risks to be
hedged against, the latter provides a measure of the amount of hedging that is
made available by holding one unit of certain asset. A higher value of the ratio
implies that more units of the asset is required. So the e¤ect can be thought of
as a quantity e¤ect, i.e. more income volatility requires more units of hedging.
In the case of two-way capital ows, the developing country imports equities
while exports bonds in net terms. If we dene the net holding of equities and
bonds as, respectively, ~E = ~1 + ~2 and ~B = ~3 + ~4, then two-way capital
ows implies ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. Because ~1 and ~3 have negative signs, so
they are equivalent to the pattern of j~1j > j~2j and j~3j < j~4j in optimal
portfolios, i.e. the size of ~1 is larger than that of ~2 while the size of ~3 is
less than that of ~4. Applying the above analysis, we know that this pattern
can be the result of a certain combination of correlation and variability e¤ects.
As a central analysis of this chapter, in Section 2:5 we will assess the e¤ect of
various asymmetries between countries in generating the two-way capital ows.
The correlation and variability e¤ects we dene here will provide useful devices
in order to understand the ndings there.
To end this section, we have to remind that neither Eq(3:11) nor Eqs.(3:12  14)
are full reduced forms because as the determinants of ~ in Eq.(3:2), the second
moments in these formulae are also in themselves depending on ~. In other
words, both Eq.(3:2) and Eqs.(3:11  14) indicates ~ as a xed point except
that the former denes it implicitly while the latter explicitly and thus provide
intuitions for the results. To sum up, we apply Devereux and Sutherland (2011)s
method to Eq.(3:2) to obtain ~ and make use of this ~ and Eqs.(3:12) to decom-
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pose portfolios into correlation and variability e¤ects. In the sections below, we
analyse the model numerically.
2.4 Model simulation: Symmetric case
We will compute the numerical solution of equilibrium portfolios by simulating
the model. As a benchmark, the two countries are rstly calibrated symmetrically
in this section. We choose parameter values at their standard levels of calibration
in the literature which are basically descriptions of advanced economies or/and
from the estimates that are based on U:S: data. So we will see what the portfolios
will look like without country asymmetry. In the next section, we will take
into account the existence of a developing country by considering asymmetric
simulations.
2.4.1 Parameterization
The frequency is assumed to be quarterly which is consistent with the literature
on business cycles. The discount factor  is set at 0:99 which implies an annual
interest rate of 4 percent. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
traded goods is set at  = 1:5 which conforms to that of Backus et al. (1994). As
for the values of the share of home traded goods in traded consumption basket ,
the share of nontraded goods in the total consumption basket  and the elasticity
of substitution between traded and nontraded goods , we choose them based
on an average of values used in Benigno and Thoenissen (2008), Corsetti et al.
(2008) and Stockman and Tesar (1995). The elasticity of substitution among
individual nal goods is set at 10 which implies an approximate 10 percent price
mark-up over marginal cost.
For the production technology, the labour share of income a is calibrated to
approximately 2=3 which is common in the literature and consistent with U:S:
data. Based on the same grounds, the share of government spending in total
expenditure g is assumed to be 0:18. The depreciation rate of capital  is set
at 0:025 implying an annual depreciation rate of capital of 10%. The coe¢ cient
of investment adjustment cost  is chosen as 0:25 so that the variance of total
investment is approximately 3 times the variance of GDP which is consistent
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with U:S: data.
The values for the remaining parameters come from the median estimates by
Smets and Wouters (2007) based on the data of the U:S: economy. These para-
meters include those related to preference (such as risk aversion , labour supply
elasticity  and habit persistence h), Calvo price-setting, the monetary policy
rule and structural shocks. Note by the parameter values, the U:S: households
feature a persistent habit formation with h = 0:7. The price and wage adjust
infrequently and the average duration of a price is about 3 quarters,  = 0:66 and
& = 0:7. In addition, the price and wage index to previous levels to some degree
and the degree of wage indexation is higher than that of price, ! = 0:24 while
$ = 0:58. The interest rate is highly persistent with a persistence of R = 0:81.
The related feedback coe¢ cients of monetary policy with regard to ination and
output gap are respectively 2 and 0:1. The table 2:1 lists all values of parameters
used in the benchmark calibration.
2.4.2 Symmetric case: Benchmark
Table 2:2 reports the result for equilibrium portfolios (divided by Y ) under
the benchmark calibration. The home householdsholdings of home and foreign
equity are  2:2985 and 2:2985 (times of steady-state income) while their hold-
ings of home and foreign bonds are  0:7756 and 0:7756 (times of steady-state
income). The home demands of home assets ~1 and ~3 are negative reecting the
fact that the home country is net supplier of home assets. The home demands of
foreign assets ~2 and ~4 are positive reecting the fact that the home country is
net demander of foreign assets. The home net holdings of equities and bonds are
both equal to zero ~E = ~B = 0 because the two countries are the same. In the
light of portfolio decomposition, the symmetry of the countries implies that the
correlation and variability e¤ects of the same type of assets across countries are
also equal to each other in absolute value. (The correlation e¤ects have opposite
signs because of di¤erent country identity.) As references, the value of  here is
1:6818. The correlation and variability e¤ects associated with ~1 are respectively
0:1763 and 43:8628 while those associated with ~2 are  0:1763 and 43:8628. For
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Description Variable values
Calvo price rigidity parameter  = 0:66
Calvo wage rigidity parameter & = 0:70
Price indexation ! = 0:24
Wage indexation $ = 0:58
Discount factor  = 0:99
Habit persistence h = 0:70
Risk aversion coe¢ cient  = 1:38
Labour supply elasticity  = 2:83
Share of home traded goods in traded basket  = 0:58
Share of nontraded goods in consumption  = 0:40
Substitutability between traded goods  = 1:50
Substitutability between traded and nontraded goods  = 0:45
Substitutability among individual goods ' = 10
Labour share of income in traded goods sector aT = 0:67
Labour share of income in nontraded goods sector aN = 0:67
Capital depreciation rate  = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost  = 0:25
Share of government spending g = 0:18
Interest rate smoothing factor in Taylor rule R = 0:81
Ination feedback in Taylor rule  = 2
Output feedback in Taylor rule Y = 0:1
Pricing strategy  = 0
Persistence of technology shock in traded sector TT1 = 0:95, TT2 = 0
Variance of technology shock in traded sector T = 0:0045
Persistence of technology shock in non-traded sector NN1 = 0:95, NN2 = 0
Variance of technology shock in non-traded sector N = 0:0045
Cross terms of technology shocks TN1 = TN2 = 0:60
NT1 = NT2 = 0
Monetary policy shock rr = 0:15, rr = 0:0024
Government spending shock G = 0:97, G = 0:0053
Mark-up shock V = 0:89, V = 0:002
Labour supply shock  = 0:90,  = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost shock  = 0:71,  = 0:0045
Table 2.1: Parameter values: Symmetric case
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Assets menu Optimal portfolio choices
Home equity ~1 =  2:2985
Foreign equity ~2 = 2:2985
Home bond ~3 =  0:7756
Foreign bond ~4 = 0:7756
Table 2.2: Optimal portfolio choices: Symmetric case
bond assets, the two e¤ects associated with ~3 are respectively 0:4156 and 6:2776
while those associated with ~4 are  0:4156 and 6:2776. One can verify that these
values are consistent with the optimal portfolios via Eqs.(3:12  14). It also fol-
lows by inspection of the e¤ects that the (conditional) correlation between the
innovation in the equity excess return and that of relative disposable income is
relatively low while the correlation between the innovation in the bond excess
return and that of relative disposable income is relatively high. The bond assets
return moves more closely with relative disposable income in the model. Accord-
ing to the analysis in the last section, more sizable bond positions should be held
in optimal portfolios due to the relative correlation e¤ect. In contrast, the (con-
ditional) variability e¤ect belonging to equity assets is relatively high while that
belonging to bond assets is relatively low. Due to this relative variability e¤ect,
however, more sizable equity positions should be held in optimal portfolios. It
turns out that the relative variability e¤ect dominates the correlation e¤ect, so
in the end we observe that the size of equity positions outweighs that of bond
positions.
The key information conveyed by the benchmark calibration is that the pat-
tern of two-way capital ows cannot arise in a symmetric model. There must
be some asymmetries between the two countries which make this happen. By
design, our model is general enough to allow for assessments of various asym-
metriesimpact on the capital ows. The next section is thus dedicated to such
assessments in which course the result of the symmetric simulation in this section
is always used as a comparison.
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2.5 The two-way capital ows: developing vs
developed countries
Now we turn to consider asymmetric situations in this section. The integration
of developing country into the world economy is considered. To distinguish,
in what follows, the home country is viewed as developing country while the
foreign country is viewed as developed country. Because it is very likely the case
that between the two types of countries various asymmetries coexist at the same
time, we take two steps to investigate their impacts. First of all, we consider the
individual e¤ect of each asymmetry on net portfolio positions and two-way capital
ows. Through the exercise, we will know whether the asymmetry considered
matters for the emergence of the pattern of two-way capital ows. Moreover, if
we nd that an asymmetry does generate a two-way capital ow we also examine
the question of in which direction the asymmetry plays its role (i.e. does it cause
equity capital to ow to or from the developing country). The correlation and
variability e¤ects will also be traced during the course of the analysis in order to
uncover the main channels in operation. After checking these individual e¤ects,
we put all asymmetries together into the same picture. By picking di¤erent
sets of parameter values for the two countries, we simulate a fully asymmetric
model mimicking a world of developing and developed countries that di¤er along
multiple dimensions. We will thus check the composite e¤ect of all asymmetries
on portfolio choices.
2.5.1 Asymmetric cases: Single factors
To separate the e¤ects of the asymmetries from each other, in this subsection, we
examine them one by one. The process is as follows. We treat the foreign country
as a control group and x all foreign country parameter values at the benchmark
levels. For each asymmetry, in the home country, we change the value of the
associated parameter over a range around the benchmark value. Our target is to
see how the net foreign equity and bond positions, ~E and ~B, respond to such
changes.
2. Two-way capital ows 41
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
-0.2
0
0.2
(a) Net foreign equity
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
(c) Corr( zy,r1x| r-1x ) & Corr( zy,r2x| r-2x )
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
35
40
45
50
(e) StD( zy| r-1x )/StD(r 1x| r-1x ) & StD( zy| r-2x )/StD(r 2x| r-2x )
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
(g) StD( zy| r-1x ) & StD( zy| r-2x )
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
x 10 -3
(i) StD(r 1x| r-1x ) & StD(r 2x| r-2x )
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
-0.2
0
0.2
(b) Net foreign bond
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
(d) Corr( zy,r3x| r-3x ) & Corr( zy,r4x| r-4x )
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
5
6
7
8
(f) StD( zy| r-3x )/StD(r 3x| r-3x ) & StD( zy| r-4x )/StD(r 4x| r-4x )
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
0.05
0.055
0.06
0.065
(h) StD( zy| r-3x ) & StD( zy| r-4x )
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
6
8
10
12
x 10 -3
(j) StD(r 3x| r-3x ) & StD(r 4x| r-4x )
Figure 2.2: Labour intensity of technology aT and aN
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Labour intensity
As the rst experiment, we look at labour intensity of technology. The parameter
characterizing this aspect is a. In the experiment, the foreign labour share a is
xed at the standard value of 0:67 while the home share a ranges from 0:55 to
0:79. The results are depicted as Figure 2:2. In this gure, panels (a) and (b)
demonstrate the variations in ~E and ~B respectively. At the horizontal middle,
~E and ~B are both equal to zero which corresponds to the benchmark case of
a = a = 0:67. To the right hand side of the point, a > a. We observe ~E < 0
and ~B > 0. That is to say, when the labour share is higher in the home country
than in the foreign country, the home country holds a negative net equity position
and a positive net bond position, i.e. there are two-way capital ows in the form
observed for developing countries. Moreover, as the magnitude of the asymmetry
grows, i.e. when a is much higher than a, the pattern in capital ows become
more signicant, ~E and ~B both increase in absolute size.
To explore why this is the case, we decompose the portfolios into associated
correlation and variability e¤ects, whose results are documented in the remaining
panels of the gure. Since we will present the results of other asymmetries in the
same way, some explanation on how to read these gures will be useful. Panels
(c) and (e) report the correlation and variability e¤ects for equities (in absolute
value), i.e. ~1 and ~2. Panels (d) and (e) do the same for bonds, i.e. ~3 and
~4. Because the variability e¤ect is a ratio between two volatilities, the latter
are also displayed as bottom panels, i.e. in panels (g) and (i) are the conditional
volatility of relative disposable income and that of the excess return belonging to
the two equities while in panels (h) and (j) are conditional volatility of relative
disposable income and that of the excess return belonging to the two bonds. In
all these panels, solid lines are used for home assets while dashed lines for foreign
assets.
According to (c) and (d), ~E decreases because both the correlation and
variability e¤ects associated with ~1 are higher than those of ~2. As is shown,
as a increases, the correlation e¤ects of both equities increase, which implies an
enhancement of equitiesrole as a good hedge against income risks. However,
the increase in the correlation e¤ect for home equity is more signicant. On
the other hand, the variability e¤ects of both equities decrease, which implies
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lower gross positions are required to hedge against risks. (This is in turn due to
a decrease in the volatility of relative incomes while there is an increase in the
volatility of asset returns based on the facts in panels (g) and (i)). However, the
decrease in the variability e¤ect of the home equity is less signicant. Both facts
point to a relative rise in the size of ~1 which favours presence of a negative ~E.
For ~B, we look at panels (d) and (f). As a increases, the correlation e¤ect of
~3 decreases while that of ~4 increases, which favours presence of a positive ~B.
On the other hand, the variability e¤ect of ~3 increases while that of ~4 decreases.
(Based on the facts in panels (h) and (j), the rise in ~3 is because the associated
volatility of relative income decreases less than that of the asset return while the
decline in ~4 is because the associated volatility of relative income increases less
than that of the asset return.) So the change in the variability e¤ect favours the
presence of a negative ~B instead. It turns out that in the race between the two
e¤ects the former one wins out and ~B becomes positive.
Nominal rigidity
We consider both price and wage rigidities in this subsection.
First, for the degree of price stickiness , we set the foreign value at the
standard value of 0:66 while we vary the home value from 0:54 to 0:78. As is
shown in Figure 2:3, on either side of the middle point of  =  = 0:66, the
pattern of two-way capital ows emerges with ~E < 0 while ~B > 0; so the
home country has a negative net position in equities and a positive net position
in bonds in the way observed in the data for developing countries.
It is rather surprising that, in the case illustrated in Figure 2:3, the direction
of the asymmetry in price rigidity appears to be unimportant in generating an
outcome with ~E < 0 while ~B > 0: To test the sensitivity of this result, we
conduct further experiments in which  (i.e. the foreign degree of price rigidity)
is di¤erent from 0:66. These experiments are illustrated in Figures 2:4 and 2:5.
These gures show the e¤ects of varying  on ~E and ~B for a high value of
 (Figure 2.4) and a low value of  (Figure 2.5). By Smets and Wouters
estimation, the value of  lies in a condence interval of 0:56 and 0:74 so we use
these two extremes as values for : These two gures show that in general the
e¤ects of  and  on ~E and ~B are quite complicated. Both gures show that
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Figure 2.3: Nominal (price) rigidity 
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Figure 2.4: Price rigidity: High 
the plots for ~E and ~B cross at two values of : For either high values of  or
low values of  the pattern of two-way capital ows is observed with ~E < 0 and
~B > 0: But for intermediate values of  the opposite result emerges.
From the last paragraph, the impact of asymmetry in  on two-way capital
ows is in general complicated in terms of signs. However, in terms of magni-
tude, it turns out that the asymmetry in  is always a factor of little importance.
The sizes of ~E and ~B under asymmetric cases are generally below 0:01. This
is consistent with the results of the decomposition into correlation and variabil-
ity e¤ects. The other panels in Figure 2:3 show that the conditional second
moments that are associated with home and foreign assets are generally very
similar regardless of the value of .
Turning now to the degree of wage stickiness &, we set & at the standard
value of 0:7 while we vary & from 0:58 to 0:82. The result is shown in Figure
2:6. It is obvious that when & > &, ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. The more severe is
the problem of wage stickiness in the home country, the more signicant is the
pattern of two-way capital ows in the model. For di¤erent foreign values, the
result is robust.
When & > &, a rise in & increases the correlation e¤ect of equities to approx-
2. Two-way capital ows 46
0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
x  10-3
Net Equity  Asset
Net Bond Asset
Figure 2.5: Price rigidity: low 
imately the same degree (see panel (c)). It also increases the variability e¤ect,
however, with that belonging to ~1 more signicantly according to panel (e). (By
panel (i), this is in turn because the excess return of the home equity becomes
relatively less volatile.) This leads to ~E < 0.
A rise in & moves the correlation and variability e¤ects of bonds as well. While
the correlation e¤ect associated with ~3 is higher than that of ~4, its variability
e¤ect is lower than that of ~4. It turns out that the correlation e¤ect dominates
the variability e¤ect so ~B > 0.
As was seen with the asymmetry in price stickiness, the pattern of two-way
capital ows is insensitive to the asymmetry in wage stickiness, with the sizes of
~E and ~B under asymmetric calibrations being generally below 0:01 (in panels
(a) and (b)) so we can conclude that asymmetries in the degree of both wage
and price stickiness are of little importance in generating large two-way capital
ows.
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Figure 2.6: Nominal (wage) rigidity &
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Home good bias
The parameter that determines the steady state share of home traded goods in
the traded consumption basket, ; governs the severity of home good bias. The
higher is the value of , the more severe is home good bias. We set  at the
standard value of 0:58 and vary  from 0:46 to 0:70. Figure 2:7 reports the
results for this experiment. From panels (a) and (b), when  < , we obtain
~E < 0 and ~B > 0. So a less severe home good bias in the home country
will lead to two-way capital ows, with the home country holding a net negative
position in equities and a net positive position in bonds (as observed in the data
for developing countries).
Panel (c) tells us that when  < , the relative return on home equity
is more closely correlated with relative income than that of the foreign equity,
which implies a relatively large absolute position of ~1. This is the reason for
a negative ~E. By panel (e), the relative variability e¤ect actually works in the
other direction. When  < , the relative returns conditional on r 1x and r 2x
have the same volatility (panel (g)), but because the excess return of home equity
has a relatively high volatility compared to that of the foreign equity (panel (i)),
the variability e¤ect is lower (panel (e)), which entails a relatively small position
of ~1. This partially o¤sets the relative correlation e¤ect.
For bond positions, when  < , the relative variability e¤ect between home
and foreign assets are similar to that of equity assets. The variability e¤ect
associated with home bond is relatively low (panel (f)), which entails a relatively
small position of ~3 (and a relatively large position of ~4 correspondingly). This
is the reason for a positive ~B. The relative correlation e¤ects between ~3 and
~4 are approximately zero, i.e. the lines representing the two e¤ects overlap each
other (panel (d)).
Trade openness
Trade openness can be represented by the share of nontraded goods in the total
consumption basket, which is determined by the parameter . The higher is
the value of , the less open is trade in the country. We set  at the standard
value of 0:4 and vary  from 0:28 to 0:52. As is shown in the Figure 2:8, the
result is that as the home country has a smaller share of nontraded goods in the
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Figure 2.8: Trade openness 
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consumption basket, the more pronounced are two-way capital ows (panels (a)
and (b)) i.e. where ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. The pattern therefore resembles that of
home bias shown above.
In terms of decomposition into correlation and variability e¤ects, we observe
that, when  < , the correlation e¤ect associated with ~1 is always higher than
that of ~2 (panel (c)). This gives rise to a large position of ~1 and a negative
~E. In addition, both the conditional volatility of relative income and that of the
excess return associated with home equity are higher than those associated with
foreign equity (panels (g) and (i)). But the volatility of the excess return rises
more than that of relative income. This generates a lower variability e¤ect of ~1
compared to that of ~2 (panel (e)), which partially o¤sets the relative correlation
e¤ect.
For bond positions, when  < , the correlation e¤ect associated with ~3 is
always greater than that associated with ~4 (panel (d)), which implies a relatively
large position of ~3 and a negative ~B. However, the variability e¤ect associated
with ~3 is always below that associated with ~4 (panel (f)), which, in contrast,
implies a relatively small position of ~3 and a positive ~B. The importance of the
relative variability e¤ect quantitatively outweighs that of the relative correlation
e¤ect. This justies the presence of a positive ~B.
Household preferences
In this subsection, we consider asymmetries associated with two parameters of
householdspreferences. These are the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign tradables, ; and the elasticity of substitution between tradables and
non-tradables, .
For the former,  is set at 1:5 while  ranges from 1 to 2. The result is shown
in Figure 2:9. It is obvious that there is no e¤ect of this asymmetry on ~E and
~B. The asymmetry associated with  seems to be an irrelevant factor when it
comes to two-way capital ows.
For the latter parameter,  is set at 0:45 while  ranges from 0:33 to 0:57. It
is clear from Figure 2:10 that as  increases, the portfolio pattern displays two-
way capital ows where the home country has a negative net position in equities
and a positive net position in bonds in line with observed data on developing
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Figure 2.9: Substitutability between home and foreign tradables 
countries. The higher is  relative to , the more signicant are the two-way
capital ows.
When  > , the correlation e¤ect associated with ~1 is greater than that
associated with ~2 (panel (c)), which implies that home equity as a hedge against
income risks is relatively superior to foreign equity. This tends to generate a
negative ~E. However, the variability e¤ect associated with ~1 is less than that
associated with ~2 (panel (e)), which implies, given the presence the other assets,
it requires a relatively smaller ~1 to hedge against the related income risks. This
tends to generate a positive ~E. It turns out that the relative correlation e¤ect
is more important, so ~E < 0 is observed.
For bond positions, when  > , the correlation e¤ect associated with ~3
is below that associated with ~4 (panel (d)) which tends to generate a positive
~B. Moreover, the variability e¤ect associated with ~3 is below that associated
with ~4 (panel (f)), which tends to reinforce the relative correlation e¤ect in
generating a positive ~B.
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Figure 2.10: Substitutability between tradables and non-tradables 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Capital adjustment costs
It is possible that marginal costs of capital adjustment in developing and devel-
oped countries are not equal. What is the consequence of this asymmetry on
country portfolios? In our model, this can be determined by manipulating the
parameter  . We set   at its benchmark level of 0:25 and vary  from 0:13
to 0:37. The results are displayed in Figure 2:11. By panels (a) and (b), when
 <  , we have ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. Thus the lower is  relative to  
, the
more signicant is the pattern of two-way capital ows (with the home country
holdings a negative net position in equities and a positive net position in bonds).
By panel (c), ~E is negative mainly because the correlation e¤ect associated
with ~1 is above that associated with ~2. The variability e¤ect associated with ~1
is, by panel (e) however, below that associated with ~2. This is in turn because
even though the conditional relative income and excess return of home equity
both are more volatile than that of foreign equity, the volatility in excess return
dominates.
By panel (d) and (f), the correlation and variability e¤ect associated with
~3 are both below that associated with ~4. They combine to lower the size of ~3
comparing to that of ~4, which explains why ~B is positive. Besides, by panels
(h) and (j), the relatively low variability e¤ect of the home bond is due to the
relative low volatility of disposable income and relative high volatility of excess
return when  <  .
Monetary policy
Monetary policies in developing and developed countries may be conducted in
di¤erent ways. In this subsection, we explore the possibility that they put dif-
ferent weights on ination and output gap stabilization. This is captured by
asymmetries associated with the two feedback coe¢ cients of Taylor rule in the
model, i.e. ination feedback coe¢ cient  and output gap feedback coe¢ cient
y respectively.
For the former, we set  at the benchmark level of 2 and vary  from 1:1
to 2:8. We plot the results in Figure 2:12. By panels (a) and (b), it is obvious
that when  < 

, we have ~E < 0 and ~B > 0, i.e. if the home country
puts relatively less weight on ination stabilization when conducting monetary
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Figure 2.11: Capital adjustment costs  
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Figure 2.12: Monetary policy: Ination feedback 
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Figure 2.13: Monetary policy: Output gap feedback y
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policy, there tends to be a two-way capital ows with the home country holding
a negative net position in equities and a positive net position in bonds.
When  < 

, by panel (c), the correlation e¤ect associated with ~1 is
above that associated with ~2, which involves a relatively large negative position
in home equity and thus a negative net equity position. However, there is a
minor conicting e¤ect from the variability e¤ect. By panel (e), the variability
e¤ect associated with ~1 is below that associated with ~2, partially o¤setting the
correlation e¤ect.
By panel (d), when  < 

, both the correlation and variability e¤ects
associated with the home bond are lower than those associated with the foreign
bond. This means the position in the home bond should be smaller than that of
foreign bond, which explains a positive net bond position.
For the asymmetry in y, we set 

y at the benchmark level of 0:1 and change
the home value from 0:01 to 0:19. As shown in Figure 2:13, it turns out that
when y > 

y, ~E < 0 and ~B > 0, i.e. if the monetary policy in home country
reacts more to the output gap than in foreign country, there tends to be a two-
way capital ow between the two countries, with the home country holding a net
negative position in equities and a net positive position in bonds.
When y > 

y, the correlation e¤ect associated with the home equity is well
above that associated with the foreign equity (panel (c)) while the variability
e¤ect associated with the home equity is slightly below that associated with the
foreign equity (panel (e)), so in total, the position of the home equity will exceeds
that of the foreign equity which leads to a negative ~E.
For bond assets however, when y > 

y, both the correlation and variabil-
ity e¤ects associated with the home bond are below those associated with the
foreign bond (panels (d) and (f)). The emphasis on output stabilization in the
developing country at the same time (relatively) undermines the relevance of the
home bond in risk hedging and the risk amount to be hedged against by it, which
implies a smaller position in the home bond compared to that of the foreign bond
and thus a positive ~B.
2. Two-way capital ows 59
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
-5
0
5
x 10 -4 (a) Net foreign equity
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.174
0.176
0.178
(c) Corr( zy,r1x| r-1x ) & Corr( zy,r2x| r-2x )
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
43.7
43.8
43.9
44
(e) StD( zy| r-1x )/StD(r 1x| r-1x ) & StD( zy| r-2x )/StD(r 2x| r-2x )
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.0516
0.0518
0.052
(g) StD( zy| r-1x ) & StD( zy| r-2x )
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
1.18
1.1805
1.181
1.1815
x 10 -3
(i) StD(r 1x| r-1x ) & StD(r 2x| r-2x )
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
-5
0
5
x 10 -4 (b) Net foreign bond
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.41
0.415
0.42
(d) Corr( zy,r3x| r-3x ) & Corr( zy,r4x| r-4x )
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
6.26
6.28
6.3
6.32
(f) StD( zy| r-3x )/StD(r 3x| r-3x ) & StD( zy| r-4x )/StD(r 4x| r-4x )
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.0558
0.056
0.0562
(h) StD( zy| r-3x ) & StD( zy| r-4x )
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
8.8
8.9
9
x 10 -3
(j) StD(r 3x| r-3x ) & StD(r 4x| r-4x )
Figure 2.14: Price indexation !
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Figure 2.15: Wage indexation $
2. Two-way capital ows 61
Price/Wage indexation
We turn to asymmetries in price and wage indexation across countries in this
subsection. For price indexation, we set ! at the standard value of 0:24 and
change the home value from 0:12 to 0:36 while for wage indexation, we set $
at the standard value of 0:58 and change the home value from 0:46 to 0:70. As
is shown in Figure 2:14 and 2:15, when ! > ! or/and $ > $, then ~E < 0
and ~B > 0; so there is a two-way capital ow with the home country holding a
negative net position in equities and a positive net position in bonds. The results
tend to suggest that a high degree of price and wage indexation in developing
countries is consistent with the emergence of two-way capital ows between the
two groups of countries. However, as in the case of asymmetries in the degree of
price and wage rigidity ( and &), the asymmetries in ! and $ have a very small
e¤ect on net equity and bond positions.
Habit formation
The degree of habit formation is governed by the parameter h. To assess the
e¤ect of asymmetry in h on two-way capital ows, we set h at the benchmark
value of 0:7 and vary the value of h from 0:58 to 0:82. Figure 2:16 plots the
result. It is clear from panels (a) and (b) that when h < h, we have ~E < 0
and ~B > 0, i.e. if the home households have a lower degree of habit formation
than foreign households, this will result in two-way capital ows with the home
country holding a negative net position in equities and a positive net position in
bonds.
When h < h, we have ~E < 0 because both the correlation and variability
e¤ect associated with the home equity are above those associated with the foreign
equity (panels (c) and (e)). For bond positions, when h < h, we have ~B > 0
because on the one hand, the correlation e¤ect associated with the home bond is
relatively lower than that of the foreign bond, on the other hand, the variability
e¤ect associated with it is relatively higher but the correlation e¤ect dominates.
Market competitiveness
We can use the parameter of ' to represent the degree of competitiveness in an
economy. The lower is ', the lower is the substitutability between varieties and
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Figure 2.16: Habit formation h
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Figure 2.17: Market competitiveness '
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so the more power rms have when setting prices. Also note that the optimal
price of nal good is a mark-up over associated marginal cost of production, '
' 1 ,
so the lower is ' the higher is the mark-up. In other words, the lower is ', the
lower is the degree of market competitiveness.
To check the e¤ect of the asymmetry associated with ' on two-way capital
ows, we set the value of ' at 10 as in the benchmark calibration and vary the
value of ' from 7 to 13 which corresponds to a price mark-up from about 8:3%
to 16:7% in economy. As is shown in Figure 2:17, two-way capital ows arise if '
is less than ', i.e. the home market is less competitive than the foreign market.
When ' < ', the correlation e¤ect associated with the home equity is below
that associated with the foreign equity while the variability e¤ect associated with
the home equity is above that associated with the foreign equity (panels (c) and
(e)). The di¤erence in variability e¤ect is quantitatively more important, so
the gross position in the home equity is relatively large (in absolute value) and
~E < 0. For bond assets, the correlation e¤ect associated with the home bond
is also below that associated with the foreign bond while the variability e¤ect
associated with the home bond is above that associated with the foreign bond
(panels (d) and (f)). However, the di¤erence in correlation e¤ect is quantitatively
more important, so the gross position in the home bond is relatively small (in
absolute value) and ~B > 0.
Pricing strategy
Di¤erent pricing strategies, PCP or LCP , have di¤erent implications for behav-
iour of import prices. So it is worthwhile to check the cases in which the devel-
oping and developed countries price products according to di¤erent strategies.
Because, without loss of generality, the home country is viewed as developing
country and the currencies used in international transactions are usually those
of developed country, it is natural to believe that the rms in the home country
use LCP while the rms in the foreign country use PCP . Based on this belief, in
what follows we consider two experiments. First, suppose the rms in the home
country all set prices of tradables according to LCP and the foreign countrys
pricing strategy stands at di¤erent position between perfect LCP and PCP , one
can interpret this as such that some foreign rms adopt LCP while others adopt
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PCP . Second, suppose conversely that the rms in foreign country all set prices
of tradables according to PCP and the home countrys pricing strategy stands
at di¤erent positions between perfect LCP and PCP , again one can interpret
this as such that some home rms adopt LCP while others adopt PCP .
For the former experiment, we set  = 0 and vary value of  from 0 to
1. The result is displayed in Figure 2:18. Note that the symmetric benchmark
corresponds to the allocation at the left-hand side in all panels in the gure.
It is obvious from the gure, as the foreign countrys choice of pricing strategy
approaches PCP , the portfolio allocations exhibit two-way capital ows, i.e.
when 0 =  < , we have ~E < 0 while ~B > 0 (panels (a) and (b)), so the
home country has a net negative holding of equities and a net positive holding of
bonds. Further investigation shows that when 0 =  < , the correlation e¤ects
associated with home assets are roughly the same as those associated with foreign
assets, however, the variability e¤ect associated with the home equity is above
that associated with the foreign equity (panel (e)) while the variability e¤ect
associated with the home bond is below that associated with the foreign bond
(panel (f)), so the net equity position is negative while the net bond position is
positive.
For the second experiment, we set  at 1 and vary the value of  from 0 to 1.
The result is displayed in Figure 2:19. Note that the allocation at the right-hand
side in all panels in the gure corresponds to a symmetric case. By panels (a)
and (b), as the home countrys choice of pricing strategy approaches LCP , the
portfolio allocations always exhibit two-way capital ows, i.e. when  <  = 1,
we have ~E < 0 while ~B > 0; so the home country has a negative net holding
of equities and a positive net holding of bonds. Further investigation shows
that when  <  = 1, as in the previous experiment, the correlation e¤ects
of home and foreign assets are roughly the same, however, the variability e¤ect
associated with the home equity is above that associated with the foreign equity
(panel (e)) while the variability e¤ect associated with the home bond is below
that associated with the foreign bond (panel (f)), so the net equity position is
negative while the net bond position is positive.
So to sum up, if the home country has a lower  compared to the foreign
country, i.e. the developing countrys pricing strategy is relatively close to LCP
while the developed countrys strategy is relatively close to PCP , two-way capital
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Figure 2.18: Pricing strategy: Foreign country moving to PCP 
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Figure 2.19: Price strategy: Home country moving to LCP 
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ows arise. However, again we have to notice that the magnitude of the e¤ect
that the asymmetry has on net positions is very small. It turns out that it is
always below 0:001 so we also view the asymmetry as a minor factor in a¤ecting
the pattern of two-way capital ows.
Short summary
In this section, we have examined the various asymmetriesrole in generating two-
way capital ows between the two types of countries. We have obtained at least
two sets of result. The rst set of result concerns the question of which direction
the asymmetries impact the pattern of capital ows. And we have found that the
following facts are candidates in favour of the emergence of two-way capital ows
(which are consistent with observed data for developing countries). Compared to
a developed country, in a developing country, if rms use more labour intensive
technology a > a; it is less costly for them to adjust investment  <  ; when
setting prices for products and labour (given that both countries feature high
nominal rigidity) they are confronted with more frictions  >  and/or & > &;
in the traded sector, rms set the prices through LCP more often,  < ;
households consume more traded goods  <  and imports  < ; traded
and non-traded goods are more substitutable  > ; there is less persistent
habit formation h < h; the monetary authority responds more intensely to the
output gap while less so to ination, y > 

y and/or  < 

; the market in
developing country is less competitive ' < '; and the degree of price/wage
indexation is higher ! > ! and/or $ > $. The second set of results concerns
the magnitude of the e¤ects of asymmetries on two-way capital ows. While
some asymmetries that we mentioned do a¤ect the pattern of capital ows, they
are not that important because the magnitude of their e¤ects is relatively low.
These include the asymmetries associated with nominal rigidities, the degree of
price/wage indexation and pricing strategy. So we see that the pattern of two-
way capital ows is more likely driven by asymmetries in real factors instead of
asymmetries in nominal factors. In addition, we found that not all asymmetries
in the model are relevant for the question of two-way capital ows. For instance,
asymmetry in the substitutability between home and foreign traded goods has
no e¤ect on the pattern of two-way capital ows.
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Description Variable values
Calvo price rigidity parameter  = 0:95,  = 0:66
Calvo wage rigidity parameter & = 0:79, & = 0:70
Price indexation ! = 0:97, ! = 0:24
Wage indexation $ = 0:61, $ = 0:58
Discount factor  =  = 0:99
Habit persistence h = 0:81, h = 0:70
Risk aversion coe¢ cient  =  = 1:38
Labour supply elasticity  =  = 2:83
Share of home traded goods in traded basket  =  = 0:58
Share of nontraded goods in consumption  =  = 0:40
Substitutability between Home and Foreign tradables  =  = 1:50
Substitutability between nontraded and traded goods  =  = 0:45
Substitutability between individual goods ' = ' = 10
Labour share of income in traded goods sector aT = 0:5, aT = 0:67
Labour share of income in nontraded goods sector aN = 0:5, aN = 0:67
Capital depreciation rate  =  = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost  =   = 0:25
Share of government spending g = g = 0:18
Interest rate smoothing factor in Taylor rule R = 0:98, 

R = 0:81
Ination feedback in Taylor rule  = 1:67, 

 = 2
Output feedback in Taylor rule Y = 0:15, 

Y = 0:1
Pricing strategies  = 0,  = 1
Persistence of technology shock in traded sector TT1 = 0:93, TT2 = 0
TT1 = 0; 

TT2 = 0:95
Variance of technology shock in traded sector T = 0:0277; T = 0:0045
Technology shock in non-traded sector NN1 = 0:93, NN2 = 0
NN1 = 0; 

NN2 = 0:95
Variance of technology shock in non-traded sector N = 0:0277; N = 0:0045
Cross terms of technology shocks TN1 = TN2 = 0:60;
NT1 = NT2 = 0
TN1 = 

TN2 = 0:60;
NT1 = 

NT2 = 0
Monetary policy shock rr = 0:15, rr = 0:0015
rr = 0:15, 

rr = 0:0024
Government spending shock G = 0:90, G = 0:0877
G = 0:97, 

G = 0:0053
Mark-up shock V = 0:89, V = 0:05
V = 0:89, 

V = 0:002
Labour supply shock  = 0:90,  = 0:025
 = 0:90, 

 = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost shock  = 0:78,  = 0:0128
 = 0:71, 

 = 0:0045
Table 2.3: Parameter values: Asymmetric case
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2.5.2 A fully asymmetric simulation
After investigating the e¤ect of each asymmetry on the pattern of country port-
folios, we will now undertake another exercise, i.e. taking into account all asym-
metries at the same time. In this section, we simulate the model in a fully
asymmetric way. This will yield steady-state portfolios allowing us to assess the
composite e¤ect of coexistence of multiple asymmetries.
Following our convention, the home and foreign countries are labelled as de-
veloping and developed country respectively. Our strategy is to choose parameter
values for the home country from the estimates based on the data of developing
countries, especially China, (if they are available) while choosing parameter val-
ues for the foreign country from the estimates based on the data of developed
countries, especially U:S:. The task of choosing parameter values for the foreign
country is already done in the symmetric simulation. Now we describe how we
choose parameter values for the home country.
In the model, the value of many parameters in the foreign country is obtained
from Smets and Wouters (2007). That paper estimates a New Keynesian model
of the U:S: economy. Recently, there are many studies applying the framework
to emerging markets, in particular China, and these provide us with estimates
of parameters in the context of developing countries. The main contributions to
this empirical literature include Mehrotra et al. (2011), Sun and Sen (2012), Dai
(2012) and Miao and Peng (2012) among others. In the following exercise, we
mainly rely on Sun and Sens (2012) estimation in choosing parameter values.
These parameters include the degrees of price/wage stickiness  and &, the degrees
of price/wage indexation ! and $, habit persistence h, the feedback coe¢ cients
in monetary policy R,  and y and the persistence and volatility of various
shocks.
The discount factors are assumed to be equalized to be consistent with our
assumptions of equalized autarky interest rates across countries and F = 0 in
steady state. For the same reason, the values of the parameters appearing in
householdspreference are assumed to be in line with the benchmark. These
include  and . Mehrotra et al (2011) estimates the elasticity of investment
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with respect to the current price of installed capital in China, 1= , and nds it
is very close to that found in the U:S: by Christiano et al. (2005), which make
us to choose  =  . Based on Miao and Pengs (2012) estimation, the values
of g and  are also the same as their foreign counterparts. For the choice of
labour share of production a, there is a wide spectrum. According to Chinese
data (that reported in china statistical yearbook), the labour income share is
at around 0:5 which is much lower than that in the U:S:. However, the current
literature suggests that the real share in China should be higher than this and
view the reported level as puzzling. Based on the literature, the reason for a
reported low a are possibly due to measurement problems (Golin 2002) or/and
misallocation frictions (Hsieh and Klelow 2009). Na (2015) estimates an average
labour share for emerging countries of 0:7. For our simulation, because a is
chosen based on reported share we also use the reported level of a = 0:5. Note
that according to our analysis in the last section, a higher a tends to strengthen
the pattern of two-way capital ows.
It is another challenge to obtain the estimates of the parameters that associ-
ated with open economy for the developing country. These include the share of
traded goods in all tradables, , the share of non-traded goods in the consump-
tion basket, ; and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded
goods, ; and that between traded and non-traded goods, . Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2015) ; using data from 38 poor and emerging countries, calibrate  and
 at 0:44 and 0:5 which are still within the range of the parameter estimation for
developed countries. Some literature, such as Laxton et al. (2010) and Prasad
and Zhang (2015) ; use the same value of these parameters for the di¤erent types
of country. Due to the lack of accurate estimate for these parameters for develop-
ing countries and the fact that (to our knowledge) no evidence shows a signicant
di¤erence between these estimates in developing and developed countries, we fol-
low the approach of Laxton et al. (2010) and Prasad and Zhang (2015) to be on
the safe side in our simulation. (We also assume that the elasticity of substitu-
tion among individual goods ' are the same across countries.) For simplicity, we
assume that the rms in the home country use LCP to price their exports while
those in the foreign country use PCP , so  = 0 and  = 1.
Given that the di¤erences between the two countries are specied by the
parameter values as in Table 2:3, the result of fully asymmetric simulation of the
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Assets menu Optimal portfolio choices
Home equity ~1 =  0:4177
Foreign equity ~2 = 0:1341
Net equity asset ~E =  0:2836
Home bond ~3 =  0:0739
Foreign bond ~4 = 0:3575
Net bond asset ~B = 0:2836
Table 2.4: Optimal portfolio choices: Fully asymmetric case
model is documented in Table 2:4. According to the results, the home country
sells the home equity to the amount of 0:42 (multiplied by Y ) while it buys the
foreign equity to the amount of 0:13, which results in a negative net position of
equity, ~E =  0:28 < 0. On the other hand, the home country also sells the
home bond to the amount of 0:07 while it buys the foreign bond to the amount
of 0:36, which results in a positive net position in bonds, ~B = 0:28 > 0. By
the condition of asset market clearing, the short position of an asset at home is
a long position of the asset in the foreign country, ~i =  ~i . This leads to the
fact that in foreign country we must have ~E > 0 and ~

B < 0. Putting these
facts together, we observe that the optimal portfolio allocations between the two
asymmetric countries can be just described by the pattern of two-way capital
ows, i.e. the home (developing) country ends up with a negative net position in
equities and a positive net position in bonds while the foreign (developed) country
ends up with a positive net position in equities and a negative net position in
bonds.
2.5.3 Asymmetry in asset menu
In our model, we assume that both countries can issue equities and bonds. How-
ever, due to nancial underdevelopment and high risk of default in emerging
markets, international bonds that are frequently transacted are those issued by
advanced economies. In this subsection, let us consider the situation where the
asset menu o¤ered by the two countries in international nancial market is asym-
metric. Specically, suppose that the home (developing) country can only issue
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Assets menu Optimal portfolio choices
Home equity ~1 =  0:4442
Foreign equity ~2 = 0:1081
Net equity asset ~E =  0:3361
Foreign bond ~4 = 0:3361
Net bond asset ~B = 0:3361
Table 2.5: Optimal portfolio choices: Asymmetry in asset menu
home equity while the developed country can issue both foreign equity and a
bond. The specication of other aspects of the model is the same as before.
Under the current fully asymmetric parameterization, the optimal country port-
folios is computed and displayed in Table 2:5. By this result, the home country
sells the home equity to the amount of 0:44 (multiplied by Y ) and buys the for-
eign equity to the amount of 0:11, which, again, implies a negative net position
of equity ~E =  0:34 < 0. At the same time, the home country buys the foreign
bond to the amount of 0:34. The home bond being absent, this also implies the
net position in bonds of the same volume ~B = 0:34 > 0. By the same argument,
the reverse pattern of net asset positions will be seen in the foreign country. As
in the last subsection, with the asymmetric asset menu, a two-way capital ow
between the two countries persists. Moreover, because net positions of equities
and bonds are both higher (in absolute value) than before, the asymmetry in
fact strengthens the pattern of capital ows.
2.6 Conclusion
There is a noticeable heterogeneity in countrys asset composition of the gross
ows and positions. In the literature, this is documented as the pattern of short
equity, long bondin (many) developing countries and long equity, short bond
in developed countries. We present an international macroeconomic model of
both equity and bond portfolios in this chapter. It shows that the presence of a
selection of empirically relevant asymmetries between two countries can generate
such a pattern of capital ows.
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We nd that these asymmetries include those related to industrial structure,
severity of nominal rigidities, trade openness, consumption home bias, investment
adjustment frictions, monetary policy stance, market competitiveness and pricing
strategy of international trade, etc. In particular, for the two-way capital ows
to happen, it is found that this can be the case if the developing country relies
on more labour intensive technology to produce, or/and is more dependent on
international trade, or/and features less local goods preference, or/and faces a
relative low cost of investment adjustment, or/and is less focused on ination
stabilization while more focused on stabilization of the output gap when conduct
monetary policy, or/and has a less competitive goods market. We also nd that
the factors from the real side of economy are more important than those from
the nominal side. With the help of other empirical studiesresults of parameter
estimation, the fully simulated model yields optimal portfolio holdings that are
broadly consistent with the pattern of two-way capital ows. Moreover, if we
assume that international bonds can only be issued by the developed country (as
it is often the case in reality) the result is strengthened.
The chapter highlights the role of correlation and variability e¤ects in under-
standing the size of gross positions of certain types of asset which have particular
importance in driving two-way capital ows. The correlation e¤ect reects how
relevant the asset is in hedging risks while the variability e¤ect reects how much
the amount of risk exposure is for the asset to hedge against. It turns out that
the size of portfolio holdings are increasing in both of the e¤ects.
The contribution of this work is at least threefold. Firstly, we use an open
economy model with full-edged New Keynesian features and endogenous portfo-
lio choices. This framework is very general and obviously convenient to be mod-
ied for the purposes of understanding many other international macroeconomic
issues where the presence of distinct country portfolios is required. Secondly, we
identify a selection of factors that matter in accounting for heterogeneous asset
composition. This is not only useful for explaining the two-way capital ows
between developing and developed countries. As an example, the patterns of
international capital ows within the group of developed countries or that of de-
veloping countries can be explored. Lastly, we make use of the recent estimation
of structural parameter values that are based on the data of the U:S: and China
when simulating our model. The results contribute to the related literature on
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emerging markets, especially China.
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Appendix
2.A Price setting in the nal goods sector (LCP)
In this section, we show how optimal prices are chosen in the nal goods sector.
The case of the traded sector is considered while the case of non-traded sector can
be obtained similarly. Besides, the case of LCP is considered while the case of
PCP can be obtained by removing S from the prot function and then following
similar derivations.
The rmsproblem has been described by Eqs.(2:35  38) in the main text.
The related Lagrangian function for the problem is
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@t
@pDt (z)
= Et
1X
i=0

t+i
i (1  ') Dt+i
Pt+i

pDt (z)
PDt+i

PDt+i 1
PDt 1
! '
PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!
+Et
1X
i=0

t+i
i'
Dt+i
PDt+i

pDt (z)
PDt+i

PDt+i 1
PDt 1
! '
qTt+i
Pt+i

PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!
= 0
so
Et
1X
i=0

t+i
iDt+i
Pt+i

PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!8<: ('  1)
h
pDt(z)
PDt+i

PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!i '
 
'
PDt+i
h
pDt(z)
PDt+i

PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!i ' 1
qTt+i
9=; = 0
so
Et
1X
i=0

t+i
iDt+i
Pt+i
P'Dt+i

PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!1 '
('  1)
8<: pDt (z) PDt+i 1
PDt 1
 !
'
' 1qTt+i
9=; = 0
2. Two-way capital ows 77
Rearranging the equation, one obtains Eq.(2:39).
Similarly, rst-order condition with respect to pXt (z), @t@pDt(z) = 0, leads to
Eq.(2:40). We omit the derivations here.
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Chapter 3
Portfolio choices in an
endowment OLG model:
External adjustments under
global imbalances
Observed net portfolio positions across countries can deviate from zero persis-
tently so that some countries appear to be creditors in steady state while others
appear to be debtors in steady state. It must therefore be the case that un-
derlying country asymmetries are such that there is a permanent imbalance in
the schedules of total saving and investment. In this chapter, we consider one of
such asymmetry, namely a di¤erence in the discount factor between countries. In
consequence, net country portfolios are non-trivial in the model of this chapter.
To avoid some technical problem intrinsic to a model with the presence of non-
trivial net portfolios, we abandon the representative-agent framework used in
the previous chapter and turn to an OLG framework from now on. In addition,
to reduce the complexity of the model and focus our analysis only on how to
merge net and gross portfolios into the same model, in contrast to Chapter 2, we
simplify the structure of asset market by assuming that only one type of asset is
present and we focus on an endowment economy with a single good. In Chapter
4 the model will be extended to an economy with production and multiple goods.
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3.1 Introduction
External adjustments in debtor and creditor countries have long been an im-
portant issue in international macroeconomics. Over the last two decades, the
study of this question has gained new impetus following developments in both
trade and nancial globalization. In a world with large current account imbal-
ances and large net foreign asset (NFA) imbalances, the adjustment dynamics
of NFA is very important to understand from both a theoretical and a practical
policy point of view.
Traditional open economy macroeconomic analysis has focused on models
with trade in a single asset. This type of framework means that attention is
conned to terms of trade e¤ects or intertemporal e¤ects related to consumption
and saving. But with accelerating nancial globalisation and the growth of gross
portfolios it has become clear that portfolio valuation e¤ects can play a big role
in NFA dynamics. Traditional open economy macro models with trade in a
single asset cannot be used to analyse these e¤ects.
Recent developments in the analysis of country portfolios (see for instance
Devereux and Sutherland, 2010, Tille and Wincoop, 2010 and Ghironi et al.,
2015, etc.) have focused attention on the determination of country portfolios
and have allowed greater understanding of portfolio valuation e¤ects and their
role inNFA adjustment. However, an important limitation of this new literature
is that it is usually based on a modelling framework where steady state NFA
positions are assumed to be zero. Indeed, the modelling framework adopted in
this literature does not provide any way to explain or endogenously determine
the steady state NFA position. The analysis of portfolio valuation e¤ects is
therefore conducted in isolation from any attempt to explain or analyse the
country asymmetries which give rise to the NFA imbalances which make the
question of NFA adjustment such an important issue in the rst place.
There are two well-developed lines of research in the current literature which
investigate external adjustment. One attempts to explain why steady state global
imbalances exist due to structural asymmetries between the north and south
while the other stresses how international portfolio valuation e¤ects work along-
side trade e¤ects in leading to adjustments in net external assets. However,
any truly satisfactory analysis of NFA adjustment dynamics must start with a
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framework which captures the underlying causes of net imbalances on the one
hand, i.e. a model which is based on some underlying structural asymmetry
which causes steady state NFA imbalances. On the other hand, the model must
then also incorporate portfolio allocation in a multi-asset world in order to cap-
ture the determination of gross positions which lead to valuation e¤ects. The
existing literature emphasizes either one approach without the other or, when
accommodating the two, uses an approach which lacks microeconomic founda-
tions (see for example, Obstfeld 2004, Blanchard et al., 2005 and Gourinchas and
Rey, 2007, etc. Gourinchas and Rey, 2013 surveys the related literature.) This
chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework integrating both the structural
asymmetry approach to global imbalances and the portfolio approach to external
adjustments in a model with fully developed microeconomic foundations.
For this purpose, and not to incur too much complexity, in this chapter we
assume the following three constructs in a simple two-country endowment econ-
omy. First, for emergence of global imbalances in such a model, this chapter
follows Buiter (1981) in assuming a di¤erent degree of patience in the two coun-
tries. Second, we introduce international portfolio choices by allowing trade in
two equity-style assets to hedge against endowment shocks. Third, to induce
stationarity in this asymmetric model, an OLG structure is assumed à la Weil
(1989).
Under these assumptions, our analysis proceeds with the following logic.
Countries are di¤erentiated by a di¤ering value of the discount factor  < .
This structural country di¤erence gives rise to steady state NFA imbalances. So
non-trivial net positions of country portfolios can be tied down. Households con-
sume their permanent income, i.e. an average of their life-time resource. With the
presence of the asymmetry in the model, their life-time resource is composed of
two parts. The rst part is the GDP income (just as it is in a symmetric model).
The second part is the interest payments that arise from NFA imbalances. So
consumption depends on the country asymmetry and NFA imbalances. Interna-
tional assets are vehicles for smoothing (cross-country) consumption volatilities.
So portfolio choices will in general depend on the country asymmetry and NFA
imbalances as well. The solution of the model ties down gross positions of coun-
try portfolios and can thus make the connection between the determination of
NFA positions and gross positions. With both the net and gross country port-
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folios in hand, the economic responses and especially the external adjustments
of countries under global imbalances can be examined.
The ndings revolve around the answers to the following questions. (1) How
are the optimal portfolio holdings determined in an asymmetric model? (2) What
would the pattern of the portfolio allocations look like in such a case? (3) And
how do NFA positions adjust in response to shocks in both debtor and creditor
countries?
In answer to the rst question, the (gross) portfolio holdings are composed of
diversication term and imbalance terms. While only the diversication term is
present in symmetric models to hedge against GDP income risks, the imbalance
terms emerges in our asymmetric model to hedge against additional risks. These
risks include those related to interest payments (corresponding to second part
of the wealth e¤ect in consumption) and those related to di¤ering consumption
averaging (the composition e¤ect in consumption). The properties of all these
terms are analysed qualitatively and quantitatively in this chapter.
In answer to the second question, due to the presence of the asymmetry, the
portfolio allocation is found to depart from the Lucas (1982) benchmark result
of full diversication. The result of numerical experiments shows that under our
assumptions, the optimal portfolio allocation under global imbalances always
and in all countries exhibits an asset home bias. Moreover, the degree of the
bias positively depends on the severity of the asymmetry, i.e. the asset home
bias deepens as the gap between the two s widens. When the asymmetry is
removed, the bias in portfolios disappears and we return to the benchmark of
full diversication.
In answer to the third question, and to understand the contribution of the
model to understanding NFA dynamics, consider in more detail the shortcom-
ings of the approaches taken in the existing literature. In a model which focuses
on trade in one asset, a temporary positive supply shock to a country (for ex-
ample) makes households save more and tends to raise the net external wealth
of the country, i.e. the shock creates a trade balance e¤ect. Besides the trade
balance e¤ect, the current interest rate falls, which tends to decrease the net
interest income of a creditor country and decrease the interest payments of a
debtor country, i.e. this is often referred to as an intertemporal terms-of-trade
e¤ect. However, a portfolio valuation e¤ect is absent in this traditional approach
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because one cannot distinguish gross portfolios from net portfolios. In the mod-
els with portfolio choices yet without steady state NFA imbalances, country
external adjustments take place through the trade balance e¤ect and a valu-
ation e¤ect. Considering again the example of a positive home supply shock,
in addition to the expansionary trade balance e¤ect, given that now the home
asset return will be relatively higher than the foreign asset return, a negative
gross holding of the home asset means that wealth will transfer from the home
to foreign country, i.e. there is a valuation e¤ect. However, the intertemporal
terms-of-trade e¤ect mentioned above is absent here because net portfolios are
zero in these models of existing portfolio literature. The model in this chap-
ter thus constitutes a very general and consistent framework which captures all
three channels of external adjustment and is thus more suitable for analysing
external dynamics of nations and evaluating the implications of related shocks
and policies in a world of nancial integration and global imbalances.
The work in this chapter is related to the following strands of the existing
literature. (1) The vast literature on global imbalances, especially Buiter (1981)
which, as mentioned, uses the asymmetric degree of patience across countries
to justify the emergence of non-trivial net foreign assets. In the introduction of
Chapter 2, we listed many other popular explanations along this line. However,
these contributions share one common feature, i.e. while focusing on the deter-
mination of net positions of external assets they do not touch on the issue of how
gross positions of country portfolios are determined. Our framework overcomes
this problem. (2) The literature on the determination of gross portfolios, most
of which aims to reconcile the puzzle of equity home bias with various types
of hedging motive, e.g. those following Baxter and Jermann (1997). However,
this literature only considers symmetric models (see Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012
for a survey) while we introduce a country asymmetry which explains asymmet-
ric gross portfolio holdings across countries (and a home bias as a motive to
hedge against the risks associated with global imbalances.) (3) The literature
on the portfolio approach to external adjustments. For example, Devereux and
Sutherland (2010), Tille and Wincoop (2010) and Ghironi et al. (2015) study the
process of external adjustments between two identical countries and highlight the
role of valuation e¤ects in the process. They nd that because countries all hold
sizable cross-border asset positions, they experience large capital gains/losses af-
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ter shocks on top of traditional trade balance e¤ect. But due to the symmetry
between countries, the terms-of-trade e¤ect is missing from the analysis. The
current work generalizes this approach to asymmetric situations.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3:2 presents the
model. Section 3:3 derives per capita steady states and key model equations in
their linearized form. In section 3:4, we state portfolio optimality conditions and
discuss how we compute optimal portfolios. Section 3:5, 3:6 and 3:7 analyse the
behaviour of the consumption di¤erential, optimal portfolio choices and external
adjustments. The model is simulated and analysed numerically in section 3:8.
Section 3:9 concludes.
3.2 Model assumptions
The model is essentially the one of Weil (1989) extended to a two-country world
and modied to encompass international portfolios. To be specic, this is a
one-good, two-country endowment economy. To focus only on the inuence of
asymmetric patience, I assume all the other aspects of the two countries are
the same. In each country, at time t = 0, the population is normalized to 1.
Afterwards new households are born in each period and the population grows at
a net rate of n and no one dies. The households born in di¤erent periods are
of the same structure. A household born at time v maximizes an additive log
utility function of the following form in period t
U vt = Et
1X
s=t
s t log (cvs) (2.1)
where Et ,  and cvs are the expectation operator, the discount factor and in-
dividual consumption respectively. Superscripts are used to denote vintage and
subscripts for time.
The period-to-period budget constraint for vintage v household at time t is
v1t+1 + 
v
2t+1 = 
v
1tr1t + 
v
2tr2t + y
v
t   cvt (2.2)
where v1t+1 and 
v
2t+1 denote the households gross holdings of the two assets at
the end of time t. r1t and r2t are gross rates of return of assets from time t 1 to
t. The individual endowment and consumption are yvt and c
v
t so (y
v
t   cvt ) is net
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saving within period t. Eq.(2:2) simply states that net wealth of the household
at the end of time t equals the portfolio returns from the last period plus the net
saving generated this period.
For individual households, the rst order condition for optimal choice of cvt+i
is
t+i = Et
h
i
 
cvt+i
 1i
(2.3)
where t+i is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with time-(t+ i) budget con-
straint.
The rst order conditions for optimal choice of v1t+1 and 
v
2t+1 are
(cvt )
 1 = Et
h 
cvt+1
 1
r1t+1
i
(2.4)
(cvt )
 1 = Et
h 
cvt+1
 1
r2t+1
i
(2.5)
Similar conditions also apply for the foreign country.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the home country is less patient so
 <  for emergence of global imbalances. An asterisk is used to denote foreign
(except for asset-related) variables.
In addition, we assume that the two assets are respectively home and foreign
equities representing claims on endowment income of issuing country. So r1t and
r2t are dened as
r1t =
yt + z1t
z1t 1
(2.6)
r2t =
yt + z2t
z2t 1
(2.7)
where z1t and z2t denote equity prices.
The uncertainty in the model comes from shocks to endowment income. We
assume that yvt = yt, y
v
t = y

t for all v and t for simplicity where yts represent
per capita aggregate incomes. The processes that the yts follow are AR (1) as
follows
log (yt=y) =  log (yt 1=y) + "t (2.8)
log (yt =y
) =  log
 
yt 1=y
+ "t (2.9)
For a per capita aggregate variable in this chapter, we use a overbar (with time
subscript being dropped) to denote its steady-state value. So y and y in above
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equations denote steady-state aggregate incomes. We assume that 0    1 and
" and " are zero-mean i:i:d shocks with var (") = var (") = 2 and cov ("") =
0.
3.3 Non-stochastic aggregate steady state
In this section, we show that because  <  individual consumption is tilted
downwards in the home country and upwards in the foreign country along the
perfect foresight optimal path. So there is no steady state for individual vari-
ables (other than consumption of new-borns). However, with the assumed demo-
graphic structure, aggregate steady states are shown to be available. So analysis
in the following sections will all revolve around per capita variables. For this
reason, in this section we also derive and linearize per capita Euler equations,
country budget constraints and the world resource constraint and compare them
to those of a symmetric model.
3.3.1 Non-stationary individual variables
To see the non-stationarity of individual variables, we can check individual Euler
equations Eqs.(2:4) and (2:5). Because  < , the steady-state international
interest rate r lies between two extreme autarky interest rates 1
 < r <
1

(shown
below). For example for the home country we have r < 1. By Euler equations
cvt is decreasing over time along the perfect foresight optimal path
cvt+1 = rc
v
t (3.1)
Note that for a individual variable in this chapter, we use a overbar to denote
its value under the non-stochastic perfect foresight.
In the home country households consume less and less as they grow older.
The intuition is that since they value consuming now more than in the future in
comparison to the foreign households, it is optimal for them to shift resources
from the future to the present given the life-time budget constraint to be re-
spected. Conversely, we have r > 1 for the foreign country. So cvt is tilted
upwards (toward the future).
3. External adjustments under global imbalances 91
cvt is not stable, so, from the budget constraint, gross and net individual
portfolios are not stable either.
To derive the consumption of new-borns, rst we dene net wealth of house-
hold as wvt+1 = 
v
1t+1 + 
v
2t+1 so Eq.(2:2) can be rewritten as
wvt+1 = w
v
t r2t + 
v
1trxt + y
v
t   cvt (3.2)
where rxt = r1t   r2t denes the excess return of asset 1 over asset 2.
By iterating forward this constraint and imposing a transversality condition
lim
T!1
1
1i=1r2t+i
wvt+T = 0 (3.3)
we obtain a life-time budget constraint which in turn can be used to combine
with an income normalization
yvt = y = 1 (3.4)
and Euler equations to obtain the consumption function as follows
cvt = (1  )
"
v1tr1t + 
v
2tr2t +
1X
i=0
1
ri
yvt
#
(3.5)
Following Weil (1989), we assume that households are born with no wealth,
i.e. t1t = 
t
2t = 0, so at the time they are born they only consume a fraction of
the discounted sum of their life-time endowments.
ctt  cnt =
(1  ) r
(r   1) y (3.6)
where we introduce cnt with superscript n to denote new-bornsconsumption.
3.3.2 Net foreign assets, w
Non-stationarity of individual variables in the model poses a di¢ culty in at-
tempting, as is usually done when dealing with representative-agents models, to
use the individual variables and their steady states to represent the country-level
variables and steady states. This is for two reasons. First, generally, individual
variables do not coincide with country level variables in this model. Second, they
do not even have steady states around which we can perform standard approxi-
mation procedures. So we will instead focus on the country per capita average of
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individual variables which, by denition, is free of the rst problem and, by Weil
(1989), enjoys a steady state because of the assumed OLG structure. We will
rst show how steady state per capita net external positions, w; in the two coun-
tries are determined in this subsection. The determination of the steady-state
international interest rate, per capita consumptions and key model equations are
studied subsequently.
According to the assumption regarding population growth, per capita aggre-
gation of a variable, for example cvt , can be conducted according to
ct =
c0t + nc
1
t + n (1 + n) c
2
t +   + n (1 + n)t 1 ctt
(1 + n)t
(3.7)
where ct without superscript v denotes per capita aggregate consumption at
time t. To understand Eq.(3:7), note that at time t, the total population is
(1 + n)t within which the number of vintage 0 households is 1, the number of
vintage 1 households is (1 + n)   1 = n, the number of vintage 2 households is
(1 + n)2   (1 + n) = n (1 + n) and so on.
To nd steady-state w, rst use Eq.(3:7) to aggregate the budget constraint
Eq.(3:1)
(1 + n)wt+1 = r2twt + 1trxt + yt   ct (3.8)
while the terms on the right hand side (RHS) are obvious, the term on the left
hand side (LHS) is
w0t+1 + nw
1
t+1 + n (1 + n)w
2
t+1 +   + n (1 + n)t 1wtt+1
(1 + n)t
= (1 + n)
w0t+1 + nw
1
t+1 + n (1 + n)w
2
t+1 +   + n (1 + n)twt+1t+1
(1 + n)t+1
= (1 + n)wt+1 (3.9)
where the assumption that t1t = 
t
2t = 0 so w
t
t = 0 is used in the rst equality
and the aggregation relation is used in the second equality. Divided by (1 + n),
the constraint becomes
wt+1 =
r2twt + 1trxt + yt   ct
(1 + n)
(3.10)
Then, by aggregating the consumption function Eq.(3:5) we obtain
ct = (1  )
"
r2twt + 1trxt +
1X
i=0
1
ri
yt
#
(3.11)
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which can be used to substitute into Eq.(3:10) to eliminate ct and simplied to
yield the law of motion of w
wt+1 =
r
(1 + n)
wt +
r   1
(1 + n) (r   1)yt (3.12)
Assuming the following stability condition
(1 + n) > r (3.13)
steady-state w can be obtained as
w = 1 + 2 = wyy (3.14)
where
wy =
r   1
((1 + n)  r) (r   1) (3.15)
denotes the steady-state ratio of net wealth to endowment. Note that for the
impatient country (the home country here) we have (r   1) < 0. The wealth
ratio wy is negative, so the country will be in a position of net debt. In contrast,
we have (r   1) > 0 for the patient country. So the foreign country will be in
the position of net credit, i.e.
w = 1 + 

2 = 

wyy
 (3.14)
where
wy =
r   1
((1 + n)  r) (r   1) (3.15
)
These results conrm the intuition that the impatient country consumes by bor-
rowing while the patient country saves by lending.
3.3.3 International interest rate, r
The international interest rate in the steady state is determined by international
asset market clearing conditions. To obtain the latter, we observe that the net
asset holdings in the two countries are as in Table 3:1.
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Home holdings Foreign holdings
Asset 1-Home equity 1 + z1 1
Asset 2-Foreign equity 2 = w   1 2 + z2 = w   1 + z2
Table 3.1: Net asset holdings across countries
Two facts are used here. First, the home country is assumed to be the default
owner of home equity whose amount is normalized to 1. So the home countrys
net holding of the home equity is given by z1 + 1 where z1 is the home equity
price. Second, the denition of w = 1 + 2 so the home holding of the foreign
equity is given by w 1. Foreign holdings are obtained following the same logic.
Market clearing of the two assets implies
z1 + 1 + 

1 = z1 (3.16)
w   1 + z2 + w   1 = z2 (3.17)
or
1 =  1 (3.18)
w =  w (3.19)
Eq.(3:18) implies only 1 is important in solving portfolio allocations of two
countries by Table 3:1. The other three s can be linked to 1 by w and z. So I
denote   1 to represent portfolios from now on and focus on solving for  in
Section 3:6.
Eq.(3:19) simply states that the home decit and the foreign surplus are two
sides of the same coin. This condition can be used to determine the steady-state
interest rate as follows
r =
(2 + n) ( + ) 
q
(2 + n)2 ( + )2   16 (1 + n) 
4
(3.20)
One can verify that Eq.(3:20) conrms our previous assertion that the value
of r lies between 1
 and
1

. In addition, r is decreasing in the s and increasing
in n.
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3.3.4 Consumption, c
Substituting the steady-state wealth ratio wy back into the steady-state version
of Eq.(3:8), we get the related steady-state consumption ratio to endowment
cy = 1 + (r   (1 + n))wy (3.21)
For the steady state to be dynamically e¢ cient, we assume r > (1 + n). In this
case, wy < 0 and so cy < 1 for the home country. For the foreign country,
because wy > 0 by (3:15
), Eq.(3:21) implies cy > 1. This point can also be
seen by noting that the following resource constraint always holds
c+ c = y + y (3.22)
The relation between cy and 

cy is thus
cy + 

cy = 2 (3.23)
So when cy < 1 it must be that 

cy > 1.
It is useful to compare the current case of an asymmetric world with that
of a symmetric one in terms of the value of wy and cy we found above. Now
we have wy < 0 and cy < 1 for the home country and 

wy > 0 and 

cy > 1
for the foreign country, which implies the impatient country consumes less than
its average income and runs a trade decit in the steady state while the patient
country consumes more than its average income and runs a trade surplus in the
steady state. The emergence of these unbalanced ratios is completely due to the
existence of our assumption of asymmetry in . If the two countries are the
same, i.e.  = , we end up with wy = 

wy = 0 and cy = 

cy = 1, i.e. global
imbalances disappear and the two countries eat their average resources, neither
more nor less.
For later use, we derive the relation between c and cn by making use of
Eq.(3:21) and (3:6). That is
c =
n
(1 + n  r)c
n (3.24)
This relation can also be obtained from the aggregation relation Eq.(3:7).
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3.3.5 Euler equations, budget and resource constraints
To nd the per capita Euler equations corresponding to Eqs.(2:4  5), we ap-
proximate the individual equations rst and then aggregate them. As explained,
because there are no steady states around which we can approximate individ-
ual consumptions, the approximation is conducted around the levels along their
perfect foresight optimal path Eq.(3:1). The individual Euler equations after
approximation are
c^vt = Etc^
v
t+1   Etr^1t+1 (3.25)
c^vt = Etc^
v
t+1   Etr^2t+1 (3.26)
A few words on notations are in order. In the model, all individual variables
with hats denote percentage deviation of variables from their levels along the
optimal path while aggregate variables with hats denote that of variables from
their steady states. So in the above equations, c^vt =
cvt cvt
cvt
and r^ = r r
r
: (To ease
notation, r is replaced by r in all other places in this chapter).
One result from the two equations above is that expected asset returns are
equalized in equilibrium
Etr^1t+1 = Etr^2t+1  Etr^t+1 (3.27)
To aggregate the approximated equations, we also approximate the aggrega-
tion relation
c^t =
1
(1 + n)t c
"
c0t c^
0
t + nc
1
t c^
1
t + n (1 + n) c
2
t c^
2
t +   
+n (1 + n)t 2 ct 1t c^
t 1
t + n (1 + n)
t 1 cttc^
t
t
#
(3.28)
which links the per capita consumption deviation c^t to the individual consump-
tion deviation c^vt .
In period t+ 1, Eq.(3:28) is
Etc^t+1 =
1
(1 + n)t+1 c
"
c0t+1Etc^
0
t+1 + nc
1
t+1Etc^
1
t+1 +   +
n (1 + n)t 1 ctt+1Etc^
t
t+1 + n (1 + n)
t ct+1t+1Etc^
t+1
t+1
#
(3.29)
The above two equations are put together because on the RHS of these equations
are c^vt and c^
v
t+1 which are linked by the individual Euler equations given by
Eqs.(3:25) and (3:26). At the same time, on the LHS of the equations are c^t
and c^t+1 which are linked by the per capita Euler equations to be established.
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Before proceeding, it is useful to dene some steady-state (weighted average)
consumption shares. We label all generations other than that of the new-born
as the old vintage in every period. So at any time, for example time t+ 1; total
consumption can be divided into the consumption by the old and that by the
new-born
c =
1
(1 + n)t+1
"
c0t+1 + nc
1
t+1 + n (1 + n) c
2
t+1
+   +n (1 + n)t 1 ctt+1
#
| {z }
Weighted average consumption of the old
(3.30)
+
n
(1 + n)
ct+1t+1| {z }
Weighted average consumption of the newborn
Because c and ct+1t+1 are constant, so for di¤erent t steady-state (weighted aver-
age) consumption of the old should also be constant. Dividing the two sides of
Eq.(3:30) by c and making use of the relation between c and ct+1t+1, i.e. Eq.(3:24),
we obtain the following consumption shares of the old and the new-born respec-
tively
1
(1 + n)t+1 c
"
c0t+1 + nc
1
t+1 + n (1 + n) c
2
t+1
+   +n (1 + n)t 1 ctt+1
#
=  (3.31)
n
(1 + n) c
ct+1t+1 = (1  ) (3.32)
where
  r
(1 + n)
< 1 (3.33)
Eq.(3:30) can be rewritten as
1 = 
Consumption share due to the old
+ (1  )
Consumption share due to the newborn
(3.34)
Now let us return to the aggregation problem. We take aggregating Eq.(3:25)
for example. The method is to impose it on the approximated aggregation rela-
tion, i.e. substitute Etc^vt+1 = c^
v
t + Etr^1t+1 into the RHS of Eq.(3:29) and then
simplify the equation in which course the above steady state consumption shares
of the old and the new-born can be used.
The resulting per capita Euler equation is thus
Etc^t+1 =  c^t + (1  )Etc^nt+1 + Etr^1t+1 (3.35)
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The foreign counterpart of Eq.(3:25) can be aggregated similarly which leads
to
Etc^

t+1 = 
c^t + (1   )Etc^nt+1 +  Etr^1t+1 (3.35)
where   is also dened similarly
   r

(1 + n)
< 1 (3.33)
For comparison, the counterpart of the pair of Eq.(3:35) (3:35) in a symmet-
ric model with  =  is
Etc^
0
t+1 = c^
0
t + Etr^
0
1t+1 (3.35
0)
for both countries. So the di¤erences between the Euler equations of the model
with and without global imbalance are:
1. From one period to another there is always a new generation coming in. We
have a new term c^n in the Euler equation reecting this fact. The parameter  de-
termines the relative importance of consumption of di¤erent population groups.
The higher the growth rate n, the more important is the new-borns consumption
relative to the olds, i.e. the rst two terms of the RHS of Eqs.(3:35) (3:35).
While n is the same across countries, the new-borns consumption in the home
country is relatively more important ((1  ) > (1   )) than that in the foreign
country due to the fact that  < .
2. As the coe¢ cient of Etr^t+1,  gains another interpretation, i.e. the con-
sumption tilting factor under the assumptions of global imbalances r 6= 1 and
population growth n > 0. The tilting e¤ect is dampened ( ;   < 1) comparing to
a symmetric model because only the existing population (which accounts for only
a fraction of aggregate consumption now) tilts consumption each time in response
to a variation in Etr^t+1, i.e. the third term of the RHS of Eq.(3:35) (3:35).
The per capita country budget constraint and world resource constraint can
be obtained from Eq.(3:8) and (3:22). We linearize them to yield
(1 + n)wyw^t+1 = rwyw^t + rwyr^2t + ryr^xt + y^t   cy c^t (3.36)
cy c^t + 

cy c^t = y^t + y^

t (3.37)
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Compare these to their counterparts in a symmetric model (w^0t is dened as
w0t=y
0 since w0 = 0) which are as follows
w^0t+1 = r
0w^0t + r
00yr^
0
xt + y^
0
t   c^0t (3.360)
c^0t + c^
0
t = y^
0
t + y^
0
t (3.37
0)
The main di¤erences between the budget and resource constraints of the
model with and without global imbalances are
1. With the existence of population growth, we have (1 + n) in the budget
constraint when being aggregated.
2. Because steady-state w is non-zero, variation in its return emerges as the
term rwyr^2t in contrast to the case of the symmetric model.
3. Unbalanced consumption ratios appear in the budget and resource con-
straints, i.e. cy < 1 and 

cy > 1 as opposed to the case of symmetric case where
0cy = 
0
cy = 1.
We will show in subsequent sections that the above di¤erences in Euler equa-
tions, budget and resource constraints between the models with and without
global imbalances, lead to important revision of risks, optimal portfolio alloca-
tions and the external adjustment process for both debtor and creditor countries.
The full description of the asymmetric and symmetric models (the symmetric
portfolio model is essentially the one in Devereux and Sutherland, 2010) can be
found in Section 3:A of the Appendix.
3.4 Portfolio optimality condition
In this section, we derive the optimality condition used to determine per capita
country portfolios. By the condition, two determinants of per capita portfolios
turn out to be respectively the rst-order behaviour of the consumption di¤eren-
tial, c^Dt ; and that of the excess return, r^xt. At the end of this section, we explain
how we compute the optimal portfolios in the model.
3.4.1 Individual conditions
Householdsdecisions on portfolio choices are made individually. So we consider
individual portfolio conditions rst. v is determined by Eqs.(2:4) and (2:5).
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Combining the two yields the condition
Et 1

(cvt )
 1 r1t

= Et 1

(cvt )
 1 r2t

(4.1)
Following Devereux and Sutherland (2011) and Tille and Wincoop (2010), to
pin down zero-order component of the portfolio, the above condition should be
approximated to at least second-order accuracy, which is
Et 1 [c^vt r^xt] = Et 1[
1
2
r^
(2)
xt ] +O
 
"3

(4.2)
where r^xt  r^1t   r^2t, r^(2)xt  r^21t   r^22t which denotes the second-order term of r^xt.
For the foreign country, a similar condition is obtained as follows
Et 1 [c^vt r^xt] = Et 1[
1
2
r^
(2)
xt ] +O
 
"3

(4.3)
Combining Eqs.(4:2) and (4:3) leads to
Et 1 [(c^vt   c^vt ) r^xt] = 0 (4.4)
which can serve as the condition determining v.
3.4.2 Aggregate conditions
What matters for our analysis is the per capita aggregate portfolio, ; rather
than individual vs, which implies we need a per capita aggregate condition.
This can be achieved by aggregating individual conditions derived above. In
what follows, we rst aggregate Eqs.(4:2) and (4:3) and then combine the two
resulting conditions to obtain the nal per capita condition.
To aggregate Eq.(4:2), remember the rst-order approximation of the aggre-
gation relation is given by Eq.(3:28) or
Et 1c^t =
1
(1 + n)t c
"
c0tEt 1c^
0
t + nc
1
tEt 1c^
1
t + n (1 + n) c
2
tEt 1c^
2
t +   
+n (1 + n)t 2 ct 1t Et 1c^
t 1
t + n (1 + n)
t 1 cttEt 1c^
t
t
#
(4.5)
Multiplying r^xt to both sides of the equations yields
Et 1 [c^tr^xt] = Et 1

1
2
r^
(2)
xt

+O
 
"3

(4.6)
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By the same token, aggregating Eq.(4:3) yields
Et 1 [c^t r^xt] = Et 1

1
2
r^
(2)
xt

+O
 
"3

(4.7)
Combining the above two equations gives us the following condition
Et 1

c^Dt r^xt

= 0 (4.8)
where c^Dt  (c^t   c^t ) is dened as the (per capita) consumption di¤erential be-
tween countries. Given individual conditions Eqs.(4:2) and (4:3) being always
satised, the above aggregate condition should be always satised as well. We
used Eq.(4:8) as the key condition to tie down  in this chapter.
3.4.3 Portfolio solution as a xed point
By Eq.(4:8), the optimal portfolio, ; is determined by c^Dt and r^xt. Usually, for
a model that is already approximated up to rst-order accuracy, the rst-order
behaviour of the model can be easily obtained by solving a multi-variable linear
system. However, with  not yet known, this behaviour generally depends on
. Representing this behaviour as functions of , we can then rely on Eq.(4:8)
to translate the problem into the one of solving an equation in . In other
words, in the optimality condition Eq.(4:8), two determinants of  are themselves
endogenous functions of , in which sense the solution of  is viewed as a xed
point.
In the current model the solution process is less di¢ cult than the fully general
case because r^xt does not depend on the portfolio. According to the equations
dening asset returns, i.e. Eq.(2:6  7), r^xt is simply given by
r^xt =
(r   1)
(r   ) (y^t   y^

t )  (z^1t 1   z^2t 1) (4.9)
For our purpose, we consider the case where the model is in a steady state at
time t  1. So r^xt is
r^xt =
(r   1)
(r   ) ("t   "

t ) (4.10)
Because "t and "t are i:i:d: shocks, by this formula, r^xt is also an i:i:d: shock.
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Notice that by the budget constraint Eq.(3:36), the portfolio enters the model
through a term t
t  ~r^xt (4.11)
where a re-scaled optimal portfolio ~ is dened as
~  (r=y) (4.12)
So t can be viewed as an i:i:d: shock as well.
Our strategy to solve for  is, rstly, to suppress  and replace it with an
i:i:d: shock t. So without loss of generality, the solution of model variables,
specically for instance c^Dt , will take the form of
c^Dt = 
D
cww^t + 
D
cz1z^1t 1 + 
D
cz2z^2t 1 + 
D
ce1y^t + 
D
ce2y^

t + 
D
cxt (4.13)
in which the responses of c^Dt to 5 state variables fw^t; z^1t 1; z^2t 1; y^t 1; y^t 1g are
given respectively byfDcw; Dcz1; Dcz2; Dce1; Dce2g and the responses to 3 shocks
f"t; "t ; tg are given respectively by fDce1; Dce2; Dcxg.
Secondly, by replacing t with Eq.(4:11) (and r^xt with Eq.(4:10)), we obtain
the following expression for c^Dt
c^Dt = 
D
ce1"t + 
D
ce2"

t + t:i: (4.14)
where
Dce1 = 
D
ce1 +
(r   1)
(r   )
D
cx~ (4.15)
Dce2 = 
D
ce2  
(r   1)
(r   )
D
cx~ (4.16)
and t:i: denotes terms of irrelevance whose covariance with "t and "t is zero.
Lastly, substituting for c^Dt and r^xt using Eqs.(4:14) and (4:10) into Eq.(4:8)
it is possible to obtain an equation in ~ which can be easily solved for.
The above procedures are actually an implementation of those described in
Devereux and Sutherland (2011). We follow them when we derive expressions
of ~ (and ) in our model using the software Dynare and Mathematica. In
Dynare, we parameterize the model rst and following the above procedures
derive numerical solution for ~. It is convenient to generate model dynamics with
the help of the software, which makes our work in Section 3:8 easier. Nevertheless,
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all solutions to variable responses and ~ are in numerical form. As a supplement,
we employ Mathematica to derive analytical solution of ~. The key idea is still
to obtain responses of endogenous variables as function of ~, in which process
the method of undetermined coe¢ cients is used. In Sections 3:B and 3:C of the
Appendix, we provide more details on this. Using either Dynare or Mathematica,
we arrive at the same result of ~, which is veried through parameterising the ~
that obtained by Mathematica.
With ~ having being solved for, it is natural then to analyse its main de-
terminants. Eq.(4:8) tells us that ~ as a whole can be viewed as the hedging
of risk of the consumption di¤erential c^Dt , i.e. it is driven by householdsdesire
to smooth volatile relative consumptions by investing in the assets which have
volatile excess returns. However, the interpretation does not reveal much about
how ~ is composed. In fact, as the outcome of (relative) disposable income, (rel-
ative) consumption is composed of a series underlying income risks. From this
perspective, the nal ~ must also be composed of a series hedging components
corresponding to these underlying income risks. In the next section, we examine
the question of which income risks make up c^Dt s behaviour in our model and the
associated di¤erence with the symmetric model. Then in Section 3:6, we explore
what makes up  under global imbalances and the associated di¤erence with the
symmetric model.
3.5 Consumption di¤erential
In response to a shock, uctuations in current consumption are made up of two
e¤ects from the point of view of consumption smoothing. The rst is the e¤ect
due to the change in total consumption or life-time resource (a wealth e¤ect). The
second is the e¤ect due to the change in the optimal ratio of current consumption
to overall consumption (a composition e¤ect). In this section, we use respectively
the budget constraints and Euler equations to decompose these two e¤ects.
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3.5.1 Wealth e¤ect
We start from the budget constraints and decompose the wealth e¤ect. It is
convenient to copy Eq.(3:36) here
(1 + n)wyw^t+1 = rwyw^t + rwyr^2t + ^t + y^t   cy c^t (5.1)
and rearrange to yield
c^t =  
(1 + n)wy
cy
w^t+1 +
rwy
cy
w^t +
rwy
cy
r^2t +
1
cy
^t +
1
cy
y^t (5.2)
Lead the time period forward to yield
c^t+1 =  
(1 + n)wy
cy
w^t+2 +
rwy
cy
w^t+1 +
rwy
cy
r^2t+1 + 0 +
1
cy
y^t+1 (5.3)
c^t+2 =  
(1 + n)wy
cy
w^t+3 +
rwy
cy
w^t+2 +
rwy
cy
r^2t+2 + 0 +
1
cy
y^t+2 (5.4)
  
We dene ct as the discounted sum of consumption in the home country
(with discount factor (1+n)
r
) and rnt+1 as the discounted sum of future interest
rates (with discount factor (1+n)
r
)
ct  c^t +
(1 + n)
r
c^t+1 +
(1 + n)2
r2
c^t+2 +    (5.5)
rnt+1  r^t+1 +
(1 + n)
r
r^t+2 +
(1 + n)2
r2
r^t+3 +    (5.6)
Using the above budget constraints and imposing a transversality condition,
we obtain
ct|{z}
Total wealth e¤ect
=
rwy
cy

r^2t +
(1 + n)
r
rnt+1

| {z }
Net portfolio return
+
1
cy
^t| {z }
Gross portfolio return
+
r
r    (1 + n)
1
cy
y^t| {z }
Total endowment
(5.7)
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Similarly, we can obtain ct for the foreign country.
ct|{z}
Total wealth e¤ect
=  rwy
cy

r^2t +
(1 + n)
r
rnt+1

| {z }
Net portfolio return
  1
cy
^t| {z }
Gross portfolio return
+
r
r    (1 + n)
1
cy
y^t| {z }
Total endowment
(5.8)
The analogues of the above equations in the symmetric case by the budget
constraint Eq.(3:360) are
c0t = ^
0
t|{z}
Gross portfolio return
+
r0
r0   y^t| {z }
Total endowment
(5.70)
c0t =  ^
0
t|{z}
Gross portfolio return
+
r0
r0   y^

t| {z }
Total endowment
(5.80)
where ^
0
t  r00yr^xt. Notice that Eqs.(5:70) and (5:80) can also be obtained by
simply imposing the facts that n = 0,  = , 0wy = 0, 
0
cy = 
0
cy = 1 in
Eqs.(5:7) and (5:8) and adjusting the meanings of ct and r by Eqs.(5:5) and
(3:20) according to
c0t  c^0t +
1
r0
c^0t+1 +
1
r02
c^0t+2 +    (5.50)
r0 =
1

(3.200)
Eqs.(5:7) and (5:8) describe the movement in the discounted sum of consump-
tion after shocks for the two countries. By these equations, after a shock, the
total resource that a country can enjoy changes through three channels. First,
the endowments change. Second, the current and future returns to net portfolio
w change. Third, the return to the gross portfolio  changes.
Comparing the result to the symmetric case, the net portfolio return emerges
to be a new channel in the asymmetric case as the result of wy 6= 0. Moreover, in
the asymmetric case the other two e¤ects are not symmetric for the two countries
due to the unequal consumption ratios cy 6= cy.
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3.5.2 Composition e¤ect
Now, let us turn to the Euler equations and decompose the composition e¤ect.
We copy Eq.(3:35)
c^t+1 =  c^t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  r^2t+1 (5.9)
Use the discount factor (1+n)
r
to aggregate Eq.(5:9) for s = t; t+1; ::: to yield
c^t = (1  ) ct| {z }
Average wealth e¤ect
  (1  ) (1 + n)
(r    (1 + n)) c^
n
t+1| {z }
Newborns consumption e¤ect
  rnt+1| {z }
Interest rate tilting e¤ect| {z }
Composition e¤ect
(5.10)
Similarly, for the foreign country
c^t = (1  ) ct| {z }
Average wealth e¤ect
  (1  
) (1 + n)
(r    (1 + n)) c^
n
t+1| {z }
Newborns consumption e¤ect
  rnt+1| {z }
Interest rate tilting e¤ect| {z }
Composition e¤ect
(5.11)
Note that rnt+1 is the same across countries by Eq.(3:27).
The analogues of above two equations in the symmetric case can be found to
be
c^0t = (1  ) c0t| {z }
Average wealth e¤ect
  r0t+1| {z }
Interest rate tilting or Composition e¤ect
(5.100)
c^0t = (1  ) c0t| {z }
Average wealth e¤ect
  r0t+1| {z }
Interest rate tilting or Composition e¤ect
(5.110)
As before, Eqs.(5:100) and (5:110) can also be obtained by imposing n = 0,  = ,
 =   = 1 in Eqs.(5:10) and (5:11) and replacing ct , r, 
rn
t+1 with 
c0
t , r
0, r0t+1
where r0t+1 is dened as
r0t+1  r^t+1 +
1
r0
r^t+2 +
1
r02
r^t+3 +   
Eqs.(5:10) to (5:110) describe the movements in date-t consumption for the
two countries. Due to the existence of the interest rate tilting e¤ect, the move-
ments in consumption are not at even in the symmetric case. Thus the e¤ect
on c^t is based on the average total wealth e¤ect and adjusted by the interest-
rate-tilting e¤ect. However, two places distinguish the asymmetric model from
3. External adjustments under global imbalances 107
the symmetric one. First, in the asymmetric model the tilting e¤ects di¤er in
their strengths in the two countries while in the symmetric model their strengths
are the same. Second, in addition to the interest rate tilting e¤ect, because we
assumed the entry of new generation, we have the new new-borns consumption
e¤ect as shown in the equations.
3.5.3 Country di¤erence
Take the di¤erence between c^t and c^t to yield
c^Dt = (1  ) ct   (1  ) ct| {z }
Di¤erence in average total consumptions
  (1 + n)
(r    (1 + n))

(1  ) c^nt+1   (1   ) c^nt+1

| {z }
Di¤erence in average total adjustments due to newborns consumption
  (   ) rnt+1| {z }
Di¤erence in average total interest rate tilting e¤ects
(5.12)
and for the symmetric case
c^D0t = (1  ) (c0t   c0t )| {z }
Di¤erence in average total consumptions
(5.120)
For the asymmetric case, because all the weights involved di¤er in size, all sub
e¤ects are retained. For the symmetric case, however, because the interest-rate-
tilting e¤ects work in the same way and to the same strength in both countries,
they disappear when we take the di¤erence.
We use Eqs.(5:7) and (5:8) to expand the ct and 
c
t above to nally obtain
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c^Dt = 
g ^t| {z }
Gross portfolio return
+
r
r    (1 + n)

1  
cy
y^t   1  

cy
y^t

| {z }
c^Dt [1]Endowment e¤ect
+ grwyr^2t| {z }
c^Dt [2]Current net portfolio return
+
(1 + n)
r
grwy
rn
t+1| {z }
c^Dt [3]Future net portfolio return
  (1 + n)
(r    (1 + n))

(1  ) c^nt+1   (1   ) c^nt+1

| {z }
c^Dt [4]Newborns consumption e¤ect
  (   ) rnt+1| {z }
c^Dt [5]Interest rate tilting e¤ect
(5.13)
where
g  (1  )
cy
+
(1  )
cy
(5.14)
For the symmetric case
c^D0t = 
g0^
0
t| {z }
Gross portfolio e¤ect
+
(1  0) r0
(r0   ) (y^t   y^

t )| {z }
Endowment e¤ect
(5.130)
where
g0 = 2 (1  0) (5.140)
In summary, by Eq.(5:13), c^Dt consists of ve risk factors. They are:
1. The endowment e¤ect. Endowments move directly because of shocks. This
is the only risk term of c^Dt in a symmetric model.
2. The current and future net portfolio return e¤ects. These e¤ects emerge
because in an asymmetric model, the steady-state net portfolio is non-zero. The
net portfolio return e¤ect collapses into zero when the steady-state net portfolio
goes to zero as it does in the symmetric model.
When endowments change, the extra consumption resources into the innite
future for a country also change. The endowment e¤ect and the current and
future net portfolio return e¤ects taken together constitute this wealth e¤ect.
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3. The new-borns consumption e¤ect. This e¤ect captures the movements
in new-borns consumption. As explained above, this e¤ect emerges because we
assume the entry of new generation which is absent from the symmetric model.
4. The interest-rate-tilting e¤ect. This e¤ect captures householdsbehaviour
in shifting consumption across time to take advantage of intertemporal oppor-
tunities. This e¤ect only emerges in the asymmetric model because in the sym-
metric model the tilting e¤ects are equal in the two countries so it does not have
a role in the country di¤erence.
For the current model, the new-borns consumption e¤ect and the interest-
rate-tilting e¤ect taken together constitute the composition e¤ect. They dictate
how far the result deviates from the situation where desired per capita consump-
tion is smoothed over time.
3.6 Steady-state portfolio, 
Substituting c^Dt from Eq.(5:13) into Eq.(4:8), we obtain the steady-state inter-
national portfolio, .
 =   1
gr
cov
 
c^Dt [1] ; r^xt

var (r^xt)| {z }
[1]
  1
gr
cov
 
c^Dt [2] ; r^xt

var (r^xt)| {z }
[2]
  1
gr
cov
 
c^Dt [3] ; r^xt

var (r^xt)| {z }
[3]
+
1
gr
cov
 
c^Dt [4] ; r^xt

var (r^xt)| {z }
[4]
+
1
gr
cov
 
c^Dt [5] ; r^xt

var (r^xt)| {z }
[5]
(6.1)
Eq.(6:1) expresses the optimal portfolio as the sum of a series of variance-
covariance ratios. Following the explanation in Chapter 2 and at the end of
Section 3:4 of this chapter, each of these ratios represents a hedging of the di¤er-
ent income risks in c^Dt . c^
D
t is composed of ve income risks, so  is composed of
5 corresponding components. We now discuss each of these components in turn.
Diversication term The rst term in Eq.(6:1) is
 [1] =   (r   )
2 (r   1) (r    (1 + n)) < 0 (6.2)
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where  [1] is dened as the diversication term (or self-hedging term). The
term reects householdsmotive to hedge against the risk of c^Dt that is directly
associated with the uctuation in endowments, i.e. c^Dt [1] or the endowment
e¤ect of Eq.(5:13) dened in the previous section.
To better understand  [1], note that in symmetric model, it follows that
0 = 0 [1] =   1
2 (r0   1) < 0 (6.2
0)
In this case the endowment e¤ect is the only risk to be hedged, so the diver-
sication term is the only term in the portfolio in the symmetric model. Note
that steady-state equity prices are given by z1 = z2 = 1r 1 , so 1 =   z2 . Re-
call net portfolio holdings across countries are given in Table 3:1, we thus have
z + 1 =
z
2
and 2 = w   1 = z2 for the home country and 1 =  1 = z2 and
z + 2 = z + w   1 = z2 for the foreign country. That is, both countries hold
the world portfolio. We arrive at the classic conclusion that country portfolios
should be fully diversied in the symmetric model.
Comparing Eqs.(6:2) to Eq.(6:20) we can see that the diversication term in
the asymmetric model is the same as that in symmetric models except for the
inclusion of a wedge of (r )
(r (1+n)) . This result has nothing to do with country
asymmetry here but is due to our assumption of the entrance of a new cohort
in each period. Abstracting from the assumption by imposing n = 0, we get
back to the symmetric situation,  [1] = 0 [1]. Otherwise with 1 < (1 + n) < r,
(r )
(r (1+n)) > 1. So  [1] is larger than 
0 [1] in absolute value.
Hedging the current net portfolio return The second term in Eq.(6:1) is
 [2] =  (r   ) (re1   re2)wy
2 (r   1) (6.3)
where re1 and re2 are responses of r^2t to home and foreign shocks f"t; "tg. Ac-
cording to the asset pricing relations, a positive shock in either country increases
rates of return for both the asset in the other country (through inducing lower
expected future interest rates and thus higher capital gains today) and the as-
set domestically (through both the channel of higher capital gains and dividend
payments). So re1 and re2 are both positive and it is very likely that re1 < re2.
3. External adjustments under global imbalances 111
This term reects householdsmotive to hedge against the risk associated
with uctuations in the returns to the current net portfolio when endowments
are shocked, i.e. the current net portfolio e¤ect of c^Dt of Eq.(5:13) in the previous
section. This risk is absent from the symmetric model, so  [2] does not exist
in symmetric models. This can be also seen by noting that in Eq.(6:3) when
wy = 0,  [2] = 0.
The sign of  [2] depends on the relative magnitude of re1 and re2. If
as conjectured, re1 < re2, then  [2] is negative. To understand, note that
the home country is a debtor country and has to pay interest on its steady-
state net foreign liability. Home and foreign (positive) shocks both boost the
current interest rate and so also interest payments to the foreign country. When
re1 < re2, the increase in interest payments is smaller in response to the home
shock, i.e. when home consumption is high the excess return is also high so
asset 1 is a bad hedge against the risk of this income stream. The home country
therefore chooses to short asset 1. Otherwise, if re1 > re2, by the opposite
argument, asset 1 would be a good hedge against the risk from the net portfolio
return which would in turn result in a long position.
Hedging future net portfolio returns The third term in Eq.(6:1) is
 [3] =  (r   ) (sre1   sre2)
2 (r   1)
(1 + n)wy
r
(6.4)
where sre1 and sre2 are the responses of 
rn
t+1, dened in Eq.(5:6), to home and
foreign shocks f"t; "tg. Because a positive shock in either country tends to reduce
expected future interest rates, sre1 and sre2 are both negative.
This term reects householdsmotive to hedge against the risk associated
with uctuations in the returns to the net portfolio in subsequent periods when
endowments are shocked. The risk corresponds to the future net portfolio e¤ect
of c^Dt , i.e. c^
D
t [3] of Eq.(5:13) in the previous section. This risk is absent from
symmetric models, so this hedging term does not exist in symmetric models.
This can be also seen by noting that in Eq.(6:4) when wy = 0, 
0 [3] = 0.
The sign of  [3] depends on the relative magnitude of sre1 and sre2. If
sre1 > sre2, then  [3] is positive. To understand, note that the home country
also has to pay interest on its net foreign liability in subsequent periods after
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shocks. Home and foreign (positive) shocks both depress expected future interest
rates and so interest payments to the foreign country in the future are depressed.
When sre1 > sre2, the home shock induces a relatively smaller decrease in
interest payments (so consumption is low) while the excess return on asset 1 is
high. So asset 1 is a good hedge against future portfolio return risk. The home
country therefore chooses a long position in asset 1. Otherwise, if sre1 < sre2,
asset 1 would be shorted as a bad hedge against future portfolio return risk.
Hedging risk from new-borns consumption The fourth term in Eq.(6:1)
is
 [4] =
(1 + n) (2      )
2gr (r    (1 + n)) > 0 (6.5)
The forth term reects hedging of the country as a whole against the risk associ-
ated with the uctuations in new-borns consumption. This risk corresponds to
the new-borns consumption e¤ect of c^Dt , i.e. c^
D
t [4] of Eq.(5:13) in the previous
section. The term is absent from a symmetric model. To see this, note that
in a symmetric world we have  =   = 1 in Eq.(6:5) so this term disappears.
Because  and   are both less than 1,  [4] is positive.
To understand this, note that the Euler equation in this model, i.e. c^t+1 =
 c^t+(1  ) c^nt+1+ r^t+1, is di¤erent from that in an OLG-free symmetric model,
i.e. c^t+1 = c^t + r^t+1. Besides the interest tilting e¤ect, r^t+1, the future consump-
tion c^t+1 is equal to a weighted average of the current consumption and expected
future consumption of new generation. To obtain the current consumption, it
is necessary to adjust the average total resource of the whole country (at the
per capita level) by deducting the consumption of yet unborn generations (see
Eqs.(5:10) and (5:11)). According to the Euler equation, the deduction is more
responsive to the home shock than to the foreign shock due to the fact that
(1  ) > (1   ). In other words, when, for instance a positive shock in the
home country takes place, (because the deduction of new-borns consumption is
relatively high) the home consumption is low while the excess return on asset 1
is high. So asset 1 is a good hedge against the new-born consumption risk which
explains a positive value of  [4].
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Hedging risk from di¤ering consumption tilting The fth term in Eq.(6:1)
is
 [5] =
(r   ) (sre1   sre2) (1 + n) (    )
2gr2 (r   1) (6.6)
The fth term reects householdsmotive to hedge against the risk associated
with the country di¤erence in shifting consumptions across time in response to
variations in expected future interest rates after shocks. The risk corresponds
to the interest rate tilting e¤ect in the last section, i.e. c^Dt [5] of (5:13) which
is absent from symmetric models. This point can be also seen by noting that
 [5] = 0 if  =  .
As before, the sign of this term also depends on relative magnitude of two
s in the expression. If sre1 > sre2, then we would have  [5] < 0. The
explanation for this is as follows. Lower expected future interest rates after
positive shocks tilt consumption to the present. So besides adjusting to the
new-borns consumptions, the average total resource should be further adjusted
by adding this interest tilting e¤ect to obtain the current consumption. By the
asymmetry and Eq.(5:12), the addition to the current consumption (or the tilting
e¤ect) is less at home ( <  ). However, when sre1 > sre2, the home shock
depresses interest rates less in absolute value. So the relatively lower tilting at
home becomes less important (current consumption is high) when the excess
return on asset 1 is high. So asset 1 is a bad hedge against the risk associated
with consumption tilting. The home country therefore chooses to short asset 1.
Otherwise, if sre1 < sre2, the asset 1 will be a good hedge and the home country
will choose a long position.
Asset home bias As explained before, once the home (gross) holding of do-
mestic asset  is known, net asset holdings across countries are determined by
market clearing conditions as shown in Table 3:1. Specically, here, holdings of
asset 1 and 2 in the foreign country are respectively   and z2   w + . And
holdings of asset 1 and 2 in the home country is z1 +  and w   . The condi-
tion for the emergence of asset home bias, i.e. the proportion of domestic asset
holding in country portfolio is more than that in world portfolio, is equivalent to
z1 +  > w    (6.14)
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Figure 3.1: Testing asset home bias under global imbalances
In symmetric models where w = 0, (because  < 0) the condition is
  = jj   1
2 (r   1) < 0 (6.15)
However, in the current asymmetric model with w 6= 0, inequality (6:14) leads
to a slightly di¤erent condition from inequality (6:15):
  = jj   1
2 (r   1)

1 +
(1  r)
(1 + n  r)

< 0 (6.16)
Numerical experiments suggest that this condition always holds given that the
country asymmetry ( 6= ) exists and the stability and dynamic e¢ ciency
conditions (r > (1 + n) > r; r) are satised.
Figure 3:1 is an illustration of the test of inequality (6:16). In the gure, 
is set at 0:95 and  ranges from 0:93 to 0:97. We plot   for the cases of n = 1%,
2%, 3% (while set 2 at 1)1. (The choices of n are to make sure the stability
and dynamic e¢ ciency conditions are satised.) As is shown in the gure,   is
1Note that the solution of portfolio  does not depend on the value of 2. This is because
when  is computed as a covariance-variance ratio, 2 appears in the numerator and denom-
inator at the same time and therefore drops out in our model. This is also the case for the
next chapter, i.e. chapter 4. To see how this is taking place, one is referred to Devereux and
Sutherland (2011) where a much simpler set-up and thus solution of  are provided. In the
calibration here, 2 can be specied to be any positive value.
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always negative given  6= . Similar to this, further tests where the value of
 moves are conducted and the results of   < 0 are very robust.
A caveat on the above discussion of asset home bias should be highlighted in
anticipation of the analyses in Chapter 4. The portfolio allocation of this model
exhibits asset home bias in the sense that in the portfolio of individual countries
the role of domestic assets outweighs that of foreign assets. As described in
Chapter 1, however, asset home bias in reality is so pronounced that in addition
to this type of bias we also observe that, across countries, domestic asset are
mostly held by domestic investors. In other words, to account for the biased
pattern in the empirical relevance, condition Eq.(6:14) should be replaced by the
following conditions for the two countries
z1 + 
z1
>
1
2
(6.17)
z2   w + 
z2
>
1
2
(6.18)
which state that in either country the domestic ownership of assets exceeds the
critical level of one half. A tricky fact about the two characterisation of asset
home bias is that they are not always consistent with each other. To be specic,
Eqs.(6:17) and (6:18) are stronger conditions than Eq.(6:14) in dening the pat-
tern of asset home bias. When both Eqs.(6:17) and Eq.(6:18) hold, Eq.(6:14)
and the resulting Eq.(6:16) must also be satised. However, when Eq.(6:14) and
Eq.(6:16) hold, Eqs.(6:17) and Eq.(6:18) are not necessarily true as is the case of
this model. This point can be seen much more clearly once we proceed to Sec-
tion 3:8 of this chapter where the portfolio allocation of this model is depicted
in a gure, Figure 3:5. However, the weak denition is adopted here in order
to provide a description of the portfolio allocation in this model. In Chapter 4
where the empirically relevant asset home bias is to be taken up as the central
theme of analysis, we will adopt the stronger measure of asset home bias in the
form of the domestic ownership of assets, i.e. the fractions (dened as  and 
in Chapter 4) on the left hand side of Eqs.(6:17) and (6:18).
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3.7 Net portfolio dynamics, w^
In this section, we study the dynamics of net foreign assets from a theoreti-
cal point of view. We show that in addition to the trade channel, the current
model generates an intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect on the net portfolio and
valuation e¤ects on gross portfolios. Following the literature, the intertemporal
terms-of-trade e¤ect is dened as the e¤ect working through the change in the
return of numeraire asset, while the valuation e¤ects are dened as the e¤ects
working through the change in the relative excess returns of the other assets.
The external budget constraints in the two countries are
w^t+1 =
r
1 + n
w^t +
rwy
1 + n
r^2t +
ry
1 + n
r^xt +
1
1 + n

y^t   cy c^t

(7.1)
w^t+1 =
r
1 + n
w^t +
rwy
1 + n
r^2t +
ry
1 + n
r^xt   1
1 + n

y^t   cy c^t

(7.2)
Combining them yields
w^t+1 =
r
1 + n
w^t +
rwy
(1 + n)
r^2t| {z }
TT
+
ry
(1 + n)
r^xt| {z }
V AL
+
1
(1 + n)g

y^t
cy
  y^

t
cy
  c^Dt

| {z }
TB
(7.3)
where
g =
1
cy
+
1
cy
(7.4)
Eq.(7:3) shows how the trade balance e¤ect TB, intertemporal terms-of-trade
e¤ect TT and valuation e¤ect V AL are all nested in a unied framework in this
chapter. From a glance at the equations, it follows that the existence of TT
e¤ect depends on whether in a model there is non-trivial net portfolio, i.e. global
imbalances, while the existence of the V AL e¤ect depends on whether there are
portfolio choices. By incorporating both of these two ingredients, adjustments
in w take place through all these three channels here. Let us consider them one
by one.
3.7.1 Trade balance e¤ect
The TB e¤ect will survive even in a portfolio-free symmetric model. The term
remains in the current general framework, however, with a di¤erent composition
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and implication. By expanding c^Dt in Eq.(7:3) with Eq.(4:13), we obtain the
following expression for TB which decomposes it into three components on the
right hand side.
TB =
1
(1 + n)g

y^t
cy
  y^

t
cy
   Dce1y^t + Dce2y^t 
  
D
cx~ [1]
(1 + n)g
r^xt| {z }
V ALc[1]
 
D
cx
5
i=2~ [i]
(1 + n)g
r^xt| {z }
V ALc[2]
(7.5)
The rst term denotes the conventional trade balance e¤ect as documented
in standard textbooks of international macroeconomics. To understand, in a
portfolio-free symmetric model, it read TB = 1
2

y^Dt   c^Dt

. It should be familiar
that when a country is experiencing a temporary increase in relative income or
a temporary decease in relative expenditure, there tends to be a current account
surplus for that country. The TB e¤ect here shares the same interpretation.
However, because of the presence of the country asymmetry and OLG structure
in the model, we observe many terms in the s and n in the current expression.
Besides, with the presence of portfolio choices in the model, we extract c^Dt s
direct response to exogenous shocks, i.e. Dce1y^t + 
D
ce2y^

t , to represent the whole
behaviour of c^Dt in order to obtain the corresponding conventionally-dened trade
balance.
The latter two terms in Eq.(7:5) represent (indirect) valuation e¤ects work-
ing through consumption on the trade balance e¤ect which when taken together
are denoted by V ALc. These terms exist because portfolio returns will feedback
on income and consumption after shocks. Let us now explain how they work.
For instance, when the home country receives a positive endowment shock, y^t
increases. As a result, the return on the home asset exceeds that on the for-
eign asset, i.e. r^xt increases. With a negative gross holding of home asset ~,
this implies a wealth transfer from the home country to the foreign country in
terms of capital gains. (Imagine that the return to external wealth of the for-
eign country, r^1t, is relatively higher while the return to external wealth of the
home country, r^2t, is relative lower.) This lowers home householdsincome and
also consumption. In other words, when relative income increases due to a posi-
tive shock, relative consumption increases as well, with the presence of optimal
portfolios however, not as much as that implied previously, i.e. Dce1y^t + 
D
ce2y^

t .
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Correspondingly, the improvement in the trade balance is more than that dened
conventionally, i.e. V ALc > 0.
According to our categorization of portfolio components into di¤erent hedg-
ing, we know that the diversication term ~ [1] always exists in ~ while the
imbalance terms ~ [i], i = 2; 3; 4; 5, emerge only in an asymmetric model. The
two types of V ALc can thus be distinguished. V ALc [1] captures the indirect
valuation e¤ect that works through ~ [1]. Replacing ~ [1] with ~0 [1], Eq.(6:20),
one can obtain the representation of the e¤ect between two symmetric countries,
the same expression as the one in Eq.(27) of Devereux and Sutherland (2010).
V ALc [2], however, captures the indirect valuation e¤ects that work through ~ [2],
which can only be obtained in the model with global imbalances.
3.7.2 Terms of trade e¤ect
The TT e¤ect emerges only when we take into account country asymmetries
(that are able to generate external imbalances). In Eq. (7:3), this can be seen
by noticing that if wy = 0, TT becomes 0.
The presence of the TT e¤ect reects the fact that when incomes are shocked,
interest rates will move as well, i.e. the terms on which consumers trade current
and future consumptions changes. If net external positions of a country in steady
state are non-zero, this gives rise to movements in the interest payments or rev-
enues on net external positions. In a symmetric model, because the steady-state
net portfolio is zero, this term disappears. In an asymmetric model, the direction
of the e¤ect relies on whether the country runs a net external decit or surplus.
When it is the former case, as is the case of the home country here, because (for
instance) a positive domestic shock favours improvement in the trade balance on
the one hand, on the other hand, the interest rate on the external net position is
also driven up, the TT e¤ect worsens and so works in the opposite direction to
that of trade balance. If the TT e¤ect is su¢ ciently large that it dominates the
trade balance e¤ect, positive shocks to income would even lead to a deterioration
of net external wealth as a whole rather than improving it (Bhagwatti, 1958 and
Chapter 1 of Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1996). In comparison, for a country running
a steady-state current account surplus, as is the case of foreign country here,
a positive domestic shock causes a TT e¤ect which reinforces the TB e¤ect by
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improving net external wealth of the country.
3.7.3 Valuation e¤ect
The V AL e¤ect emerges only when we take into account international portfolios.
In Eq.(7:3), this can be seen by noticing that if only a single asset is present, r^xt
does not make any sense.
As explained before, following a positive domestic shock, the excess return of
the home asset increases. The home country possessing negative gross external
position in the home asset will su¤er a wealth transfer to the foreign country.
The V AL e¤ect captures this e¤ect. It revises w^t+1 downward. By the same
token, when a negative domestic shock takes place, the opposite happens, i.e.
the TB e¤ect is negative while the V AL e¤ect is positive. So the valuation e¤ect
always works in the opposite direction to the trade e¤ect. In the literature and
empirical evidence, this is documented as a stabilizing valuation e¤ect.
By expanding ~ in Eq.(7:3)
V AL =
~ [1]
(1 + n)
r^xt| {z }
V AL[1]
+
5i=2~ [i]
(1 + n)
r^xt| {z }
V AL[2]
(7.6)
we observe the di¤erence that is made by the assumption of a country asymmetry.
As in the case of V ALc, because the steady-state portfolio, ; is made up of
diversication and imbalance terms, V AL is made up of V AL [1] and V AL [2]
which denote respectively the (direct) valuation e¤ect through diversication
term of ~ and that through imbalance terms of ~. Again, by replacing ~ [1] with
its symmetric analogy ~0 [1], we recover the V AL e¤ect between two symmetric
countries, i.e. Eq.(26) of Devereux and Sutherland (2010). With the presence of
a country asymmetry in our model, not only V AL [1] di¤ers, V AL [2] emerges
to reect that the gross position of country is altered to meet the need to hedge
against additional risks.
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3.7.4 The intertemporal external constraint
By assuming a no-Ponzi-game condition, we can iterate Eq.(7:3) forward to ob-
tain
w^t =  
+1X
j=0

1 + n
r
j+1
fTTt+j + V ALt+j + TBt+jg (7.7)
by which we have the following result.
External adjustments of countries in the world of global imbalance work
through three channels, i.e. the trade balance e¤ect, TB, the terms of trade
e¤ect, TT; and the valuation e¤ect V AL. The presence of the TT e¤ect is asso-
ciated with the assumption of a country asymmetry. The presence of the V AL
e¤ect is associated with the assumption of portfolio choices.
Eq.(7:7) can be read in parallel with the similar equations in literature, for
example Eq.(9) in Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Eq.(3) in Blanchard et al.
(2005). Note that because the net and gross portfolio positions are determined
endogenously in this model, the terms of trade and valuation e¤ects generated
here in Eq.(7:7) are fully endogenous and micro-founded in contrast to these two
other papers.
3.8 Model simulation
To illustrate the quantitative implications of the model, we perform a simulation
exercise in this section. It is not intended to be a serious guide to any real issues
of the current world, so the calibration is not based on empirical description of
specic countries. The idea when we choose them is to have an autarky interest
rate of 3% per period in the foreign country and in the home country it is 1%
higher. The growth rate of population is chosen at 1%. Table 3:2 lists all para-
meter values we use. The resulting steady-state net foreign asset, international
interest rate and consumption ratios in two countries are also reported at the
foot of this table.
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Description Value
Home discount factor  = 0:96
Foreign discount factor  = 0:97
Population growth rate n = 0:01
Persistence of endowment shocks  = 0:95
Parameter in home Euler equation  = 0:983
Parameter in foreign Euler equation   = 0:993
Steady-state net foreign asset wy =  12:47
International interest rate r = 1:034
Home consumption ratio to endowment cy = 0:70
Foreign consumption ratio to endowment cy = 1:30
Table 3.2: Parameter values and Steady states
3.8.1 Per capita steady states
According to the results in Table 3:2, the  and  we chose imply autarky
interest rates of 4:17% and 3:09% in the two countries. The steady state r lies
in between at about 3:4%. The related stability and dynamic e¢ ciency conditions
( ;   < 1 and r > (1 + n)) are both satised. Net foreign asset proves to be
unrealistically large in response to even such a small gap between  and . A
one percent di¤erence between the s results in a volume of home net foreign
asset at the level of around 12:5 times average GDP . This is mainly because
we do not allow for any frictions such as trade costs in the model, which is not
a realistic assumption. This tends to exaggerate steady-state w in comparison
to y given that the former is a stock variable while the latter is a ow variable.
However, for our main purpose in this chapter, the strategy in abstracting from
such complexities is more suitable.
Figure 3:2 plots the prole of individual consumption cv across vintages in
the home country. In the gure, the decreasing line is the prole of individual
consumptions in the home country while the dark dot denotes steady-state ag-
gregate per capita consumption in the country. cv is higher than average GDP
for young vintages while lower for vintages beyond a certain age. As explained
in Section 3:2, this is because in an impatient country, households of any vin-
tage consume more than their permanent income when they were born and then
consume less and less afterwards. Even though di¤erent vintages enjoy di¤erent
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Figure 3.2: Consumption aggregation
level of individual consumptions, our assumption of population growth n > 0
make sure that when we aggregate cv into per capita consumption c, young
vintages always account for higher weights while old vintages account for less
and less weights. As a result, when a vintage gets su¢ cient old, the role of its
consumption becomes so small that to be negligible, which justies that it is
no need to explicitly assume death in the model. After aggregation, the per
capita consumption nds its steady-state level at 0:7 which is lower than average
income of 1. The converse is true for the foreign country where the prole of
individual consumption is upward sloping. Aggregate per capita consumption c
is higher than 1 in steady state at around 1:3. The simulation observations here
are consistent with our theoretical ndings in Section 3:3.
3.8.2 Behaviour of model variables (with and without a
country asymmetry)
In this section, we present the results of rst-order dynamics of the model. To
better see how the presence of the country asymmetry and global imbalances
matter, we rst report the results of the model in a symmetric case.
Figure 3:3 plots the case where the model is symmetrically parameterized such
that  =  = 0:97. This gure shows the rst-order behaviour of the model
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Figure 3.3: IRFs of the model to home (solid line) and foreign (dashed line)
shocks: Symmetric case
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Figure 3.4: IRFs of the model to home (solid line) and foreign (dashed line)
shocks: Asymmetric case
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after a 1 percent positive shock to home (solid line) or/and foreign (dashed line)
endowments. Endowments are shown in Panel (j). Panels (a) to (h) are thus
respectively the response of the consumption di¤erential, home NFA (relative
to y), home and foreign consumption, home and foreign asset returns, and home
and foreign asset prices. Panel (i) shows responses of new-borns consumption in
the two countries. We use this to represent the case of a symmetric model even
though in the literature, these models feature representative agents. Except for
inclusion of new-borns consumption, the dynamics of the model is similar to a
standard model without overlapping generations.
Let us look at the solid lines rst. In response to a positive shock to the
home endowment, consumption in both country rises as shown in Panels (c)
and (d). With the shock decaying, consumption decrease gradually towards the
steady state. With current consumption being higher than future consumption,
expected future interest rates are driven down according to the Euler equations.
That is r^1 and r^2 are equal and both below 0 from the second period onwards as
seen in Panels (e) and (f). The sum of the discounted expected future interest
rates, rn; is thus also negative which pushes up asset prices z^1 and z^2. Given
that the shock hits the home country, higher expected future dividend drives up
the price of the home asset z^1 further, i.e. z^1 > z^2, as shown in Panels (g) and
(h). As there are capital gains, the higher price of the foreign equity implies a
higher current rate of return to the foreign equity which explains the rst period
increase in r^2t in Panel (f). By the same token, r^1t will be also higher due to a
higher z^1. On top of this, a higher current dividend payment means r^1t increase
even further, i.e. r^1t > r^2t or r^xt > 0. With gross external positions across
countries in the model, the rise in r^xt implies a wealth transfer from the home
country to the foreign country, i.e. a negative V AL e¤ect. This e¤ect is so big
that it exceeds that of the initial trade surplus. So the net foreign asset position
of the home country, w^t; declines, as shown in Panel (b). Lastly, as shown in
Panel (i), new-borns consumption shows a persistent increase, consistent with
Eq.(3:6).
Now let us look at the dashed lines which describe the model responses after
a positive foreign shock. It is obvious that the dynamics are symmetric to above
dynamics in the sense that the responses of home (foreign) variables now is just
the responses of foreign (home) variables, which is easy to understand because
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the home country in this case steps into the foreign countrys previous shoes.
Now let us turn to the asymmetric case where  < . Figure 3:4 depicts
the corresponding dynamics. The panels represent responses of variables in the
same sequence as in Figure 3:3.
We nd that, except for w^t, the responses of variables does not change very
much when the asymmetry is introduced. They are qualitatively the same but
with quantitative di¤erences reecting the introduction of the country asymme-
try. The symmetry between the responses to the two shocks (i.e. the solid and
dashed lines) that exists in Figure 3:3 therefore breaks down.
With preservation of the qualitative properties of the variable responses, im-
portantly, as previously, a positive home shock still raises the rate of return of the
home asset more than that of foreign asset. In terms of our previous notation,
this implies 0 < re1 < re2. The sum of discounted expected future interest
rates on impact is depressed and responds to home and foreign shocks to the
same degree, i.e. 0 > sre1 = sre2.
As for w^t, a positive home shock still involves a positive trade balance e¤ect
and a negative valuation e¤ect due to, as explained, the facts of r^xt > 0 and a
negative external gross position of the home equity by the home country. In addi-
tion, under the asymmetric parameterization  < , the home country features
a large negative net external position. The attendant rise in r^2 after the shock
also burdens the home countrys interest payments to the foreign country. A
negative terms-of-trade e¤ect thus emerges, which reinforces the valuation e¤ect
in worsening the net external balance. w^t (the solid line in Figure 3:4) declines
further in comparison to that in Figure 3:3. Following similar logic, a positive
foreign shock involves a negative trade balance e¤ect and a positive valuation
e¤ect in the home country. And because the shock hits the foreign country en-
dowment, r^2t increases even more signicantly than in the last case. Given the
steady-state external net position in the home country, the total interest pay-
ments rises substantially, i.e. a negative terms-of-trade e¤ect emerges again. w^t
(the dashed line in Figure 3:4) is lower than in the symmetric case (the dashed
line in Figure 3:3).
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Figure 3.5: Steady-state international portfolios under global imbalances
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3.8.3 International portfolios
In this section, we focus on the results associated with optimal portfolios given
the assumed parameterization. Using the method we discussed in Section 3:4, ,
the optimal gross holding of home equity by the home country, is computed to
be  20:92. Figure 3:5 plots its 5 components, as listed and discussed in Section
3:6, and the related net asset allocations in each country.
The left half of the gure shows the 5 components of  with 5 bars. From left
to right, they are the portfolio diversication term, the term representing hedg-
ing of the current net portfolio return, the term representing hedging of future
net portfolio returns, the term representing hedging of new-borns consumption
and the term representing hedging of consumption tilting. To represent their
signs, negative components are accumulated from the top line (whose height
denotes the value of the assets stock in steady state, i.e. z) downwards while
positive components are accumulated the other way around. The area of the
bars corresponds to their sizes.
For the rst and longest bar to the left, as explained, because home endow-
ment income always moves in the same direction as the home asset return, as a
bad hedge against the risk, the home asset will be shorted by home households,
i.e. a negative diversication term  [1] =  12:58 < 0.
The second bar represents hedging of the current net portfolio return,  [2].
We know that 0 < re1 < re2 from the model dynamics described above, so
according to our discussion in Section 3:6, because asset 2s return increases as
endowments increase in either country, but it rises less in response to a home
shock than to a foreign shock, there is a smaller increase in interest payments
on the net external position at home. The home equity return is therefore posi-
tively correlated with the home net portfolio current returns. Home households
therefore further short the home asset  [2] =  6:21 < 0.
We also see from last subsection that the sum of all discounted expected
future asset returns declines as endowment increases in either country. And it
responds to the two shocks in the same way (sre1 = sre2), which implies that
no risk arises associated with future net portfolio returns. The term representing
hedging of future net portfolio returns,  [3] ; and that of consumption tilting,
 [5] ; are thus both zero, which are represented by the fact that the third and
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fth bars collapse into two lines  [3] =  [5] = 0.
Lastly, as explained in Section 3:6, the term representing the hedging of
new-borns consumption is always positive. This is veried by our result that
 [4] = 1:87 > 0 (the fourth bar in the gure).
Let us compare the sizes of these components. Because self-hedging is linked
to the risk associated with total GDP which is the most important source of
risk, the diversication term is the largest component. Under global imbalances,
the hedging of the current net portfolio return is linked to the risk associated
with the income di¤erence between GNP and GDP , which should be secondary
comparing to total GDP , the hedging is thus less substantial. However, with the
very large external net position here, the hedging of the net portfolio return is still
considerable. Lastly, as an adjustment whose emergence is due to a small growth
rate of population, the term representing the hedging of new-borns consumption
is small.
Now let us turn to the pattern of net portfolio allocations associated with
the level of . The right half of gure shows this in more detail. There are
two wide grey columns representing, from left to right, respectively home and
foreign equity supplies. The height of both of these columns is steady state
value of asset stocks which are equal to z = 1= (r   1) = 29:41. The values are
divided by two solid lines so that there are four cells, i.e. upper left, bottom left,
bottom right and upper right anti-clockwise. The starting axes for home and
foreign holdings are respectively the bottom and the top lines. So the area of
the upper left cell represents the foreign holding of the home asset which equals
1 =  1 = 20:92: (Note that foreign buying is home selling of the home equity).
The home (net) holding of home asset is thus the sum of its endowment and gross
external holding, i.e. z + 1 = 8:49, which explains the area of the bottom left
cell. The area of the bottom right cell, i.e. the home holding of the foreign asset,
is given by 2 = w   1 = 8:44. Lastly, the area of the upper right cell is the
foreign holding of the foreign asset, z   2 = 20:97.
To compare the allocation to that in a symmetric model, we draw a dashed
line in the middle of the two columns. It divides the two columns into four cells
of the same area which corresponds to the situation of fully diversied portfolio
allocation when the two countries are identical. Inspecting the gure, we nd
that the current model deviates from the symmetric case (benchmark) in two
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ways. First, the steady-state net foreign asset at home is negative. The two
solid lines move from the benchmark down to create an area which represents
the home country net foreign asset position, i.e. the area above the solid lines
but below the dashed line. Second, the net portfolio allocations under global
imbalances exhibit asset home bias, i.e. the home holding of the home asset is
larger than the home holding of the foreign asset even though the two assets
are supplied equally in the world portfolio. The left solid line is higher than the
right one. Further experiments show that, as the asymmetry between countries
becomes more severe, the two solid lines move downwards (i.e. the global NFA
imbalance is exacerbated) and the gap between the two widens (i.e. asset home
bias deepens).
3.8.4 Risk-sharing and external adjustments (with and
without country portfolios)
In Figure 3:6 we plot the dynamics of the consumption di¤erential, c^D; and that
of the components of net foreign assets, w^; after a home shock in the cases with
(solid line) and without (dashed line) holdings of international portfolios. By
without portfolio, we mean that the condition of  = 0 is imposed. We come
up with this hypothetical case and compare it to the case with portfolios in
order to highlight the role of the presence of portfolio choices in giving rise to
valuation e¤ects in a model. Panel (j) shows that endowment increases by 1%.
Panels (a) to (h) depict responses of the consumption di¤erential, home and
foreign consumption, home NFA, the trade balance e¤ect, the terms of trade
e¤ect, the valuation e¤ect and interest income (which is negative in the home
country) on NFA.
Let us rst focus on Panels (a) to (d). In the case without portfolio holdings,
most of the e¤ect of an increase in home endowment on consumption will be on
home consumption because the shock a¤ects consumption mainly through the
increased GDP (see the high dashed line in Panel (b) compared to the low dashed
line in Panel (c)). The gap between home and foreign consumption is thus very
large at around 0:73 as shown in Panel (a). However, if optimal portfolios are
in place, the rise in the home endowment a¤ects consumption not only through
a¤ecting GDP , but also through a¤ecting asset returns and therefore portfolio
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Figure 3.6: IRFs to home shock when with (solid line) and without (dashed line)
portfolios
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Figure 3.7: Decomposition of the change in NFA in response to 1% increase in y^
returns. As previously described, the excess return on home equity is driven
up by the home shock. The fact that home country holds a negative external
gross position in home equity while the foreign country holds a positive position
implies a wealth transfer from the home to the foreign country in the form of a
portfolio excess return. Net external wealth, w^; is lower than in the case without
portfolios (see Panel (d)). Home consumption is depressed (to the low solid line
in Panel (b) at the level of around 0:5) at the same time as foreign consumption is
elevated (to the high solid line in Panel (c) also at the level of around 0:5). The
consumption di¤erential across countries is thus narrowed down substantially.
As shown by the solid line in Panel (a), with optimal portfolios, c^D after the
shock is near 0 indicating a signicantly improved level of risk-sharing across
countries.
We discussed the roles of trade and valuation channels in a¤ecting a countrys
external wealth and consumption in Section 3:7. To better see the dynamics of
each component of w^ under the current parameterization, we plot them in the re-
maining panels of Figure 3:6. Panel (e) shows that the positive home shock raises
the trade balance, which is because when GDP increases, consumption increases
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but less than one for one. Without portfolio choices, this is represented by the
dashed line in this panel. If countries hold optimal portfolios, home consump-
tion is lower due to the negative indirect valuation e¤ect through consumption,
V ALc < 0, and therefore the trade balance can be higher. This is represented
by the solid line above the dashed line in Panel (e). Now for Panel (f), again
look at the dashed line for the case of without portfolio choices rst. Because r^2
is driven up immediately after the shock, so the interest payments on net foreign
liabilities, i.e. the TT e¤ect, is lower in the rst period. In subsequent periods,
r^t+i is negative but close to 0. So the interest payments on the negative position
of net foreign assets become positive but also close to 0. Looking at the solid
line in the panel, the inclusion of portfolio choice, ; has no signicant impact
on the TT e¤ect because, as explained in Section 3:7, the TT e¤ect is mainly
linked to the net instead of the gross portfolio position. Panels (g) and (h) plot
respectively the valuation e¤ects on the diversication term of  and that on
imbalance terms, i.e. V AL [1] and V AL [2] for the cases with and without port-
folio choices. When home endowment increases, a substantial rise in the excess
return r^x leads to a large fall in both of these e¤ects on impact. Because expected
future excess returns are 0 in this model, we do not observe any valuation e¤ects
in subsequent periods. Since the presence of the V AL e¤ect is linked to gross
portfolio positions, when  = 0, V AL = 0.
To see clearer the magnitude of each e¤ect, we depict the sizes of all e¤ects
in Figure 3:7. A one percent increase in the home GDP leads to 0:63 percent
increase in the trade balance, i.e. the second bar from the left hand side which
shows the TB e¤ect. In the case without the country asymmetry and portfolio
choices, this constitutes all of the adjustment in net foreign asset (in the period of
the shock), so w^ improves. However, with the presence of the country asymmetry,
a negative external decit implies higher interest payments in the home country
after the shock. So w^ decreases through the negative terms-of-trade e¤ect, i.e.
the third bar which shows the TT e¤ect in the gure; which is 3:35%. Moreover, if
portfolios are optimally chosen, then w^ decreases further as the valuation e¤ect,
V AL; contributes another 8:67% adjustments downwards, i.e. the fourth and
fth bar in the gure. While the valuation e¤ects always work in the opposite
way to the trade balance e¤ects, the direction of the terms-of-trade e¤ect depends
on whether the country is a debtor or a creditor in the steady state. With the
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home country is a debtor, the assumed positive supply shock in the home country
implies that both TT and V AL are negative. And because both the steady state
net foreign asset position and gross external position are very large, these two
e¤ects are also very large which totally o¤set the e¤ect of initial TB e¤ect and
result in the substantial deterioration of the net foreign asset position in the
home country.
3.9 Conclusion
While the traditional single-bond model of global imbalances falls short of in-
cluding portfolio choices, the recent portfolio approach to external adjustments
only considers symmetric situations. In this chapter, we construct an asymmetric
model of a two-country economy to study optimal international portfolio choices
and external adjustments under global current account imbalances. Country
asymmetries create new channels through which consumption uctuates and thus
new risks to be hedged against by holding international portfolios. Specically,
because the steady-state net external asset positions are non-zero in this case,
countries are exposed to the risks associated with international interest payments
in addition to GDP shocks. This gives rise to the hedging of the net portfolio
return in the optimal (gross) portfolio holdings in addition to otherwise only the
standard diversication term. Numerical experiments suggest that the portfolio
allocations implied always and in all countries exhibit equity home bias. What
is important is that, because the model features both global imbalances and in-
ternational portfolio choices, the resulting processes of external adjustment of
the country nest all possible trade and nancial channels, i.e. the terms-of-trade
e¤ects on the net portfolio and the valuation e¤ects on gross portfolios emerge
simultaneously in addition to the traditional trade balance e¤ects.
The model is fully optimizing and micro-founded in accounting for both net
and gross portfolio positions. As a bridge between the literature on global imbal-
ances and that on portfolio choices in international macroeconomics, the model,
obviously, allows for meaningful extensions along these two dimensions.
For the former, a di¤erent story of global imbalances than the one adopted
here can be told. As alluded in the introduction of chapter 2, one common fea-
ture of these works is stressing the role of specic asymmetries or frictions in
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creating a low autarky interest rate in the developing country while a relatively
high autarky interest rate in developed country as the key driver of global im-
balances (Gourinchas and Rey, 2013). So even though only the asymmetry in
the degree of patience is modelled here, the framework developed in this chapter
is representative and can in fact be tailored for potential use with alternative
explanation of non-trivial net portfolios along this line. In Chapter 4, we will
provide such an example where an asymmetry associated with wealth division
across countries is used. It proves that the key implications of global imbalances
on gross portfolios we found in this chapter carry over and they are important
for the analysis in the next chapter.
For the latter, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the existing
literature on gross portfolios choices mostly focuses on explaining (symmetric)
asset home bias with additional hedging motives among which the most impor-
tant two are the hedging of labour income and exchange-rate risks. In the next
chapter, we will also take into account these hedging motives in an extended
variant of the current asymmetric model.
3. External adjustments under global imbalances 136
Appendix
3.A The models with and without global imbal-
ances
Log-linearized model equations for the current asymmetric and comparison sym-
metric models are given in this section.
Based on the assumptions described in Section 3:2, the asymmetric model
consists of the following 11 equations
r^1t =

1  1
r

y^t +
1
r
z^1t   z^1t 1 (A.1)
r^2t =

1  1
r

y^t +
1
r
z^2t   z^2t 1 (A.2)
(1 + n)wyw^t+1 = rwyw^t + rwyr^2t + ryr^xt + y^t   cy c^t (A.3)
Etc^t+1 =  c^t + (1  )Etc^nt+1 + Etr^1t+1 (A.4)
Etc^t+1 =  c^t + (1  )Etc^nt+1 + Etr^2t+1 (A.5)
Etc^

t+1 = 
c^t + (1   )Etc^nt+1 +  Etr^2t+1 (A.6)
cy c^t + 

cy c^

t = y^t + y^

t (A.7)
y^t = y^t 1 + "t (A.8)
y^t = y^

t 1 + "

t (A.9)
c^nt =
r   1
r   y^t (A.10)
c^nt =
r   1
r   y^

t (A.11)
Approximations are conducted around the per capita steady states. The
approximation method is standard. So here we only explain for above equa-
tions where they come from. Equations (A:1) and (A:2) come from (2:6) and
(2:7) which dene the rates of return for the two assets. Eq.(A:3) is the per
capita intertemporal budget constraint for the home country, i.e. Eq.(3:36) .
Eq.(A:4  6) are aggregated per capita Euler equations, i.e. Eq.(3:35) and the
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like. There should have been four such equations in total yet one of them is re-
dundant. Eq.(A:7) is the resource constraint for the whole world, i.e. Eq.(3:37).
Combining it with (A:3) implies the budget constraint of the foreign country.
Equations (A:8  9) are the processes of shocks in the model, Eq.(2:8  9). The
last two equations (A:10  11) approximate the new-borns consumption around
the steady state, i.e. Eq.(3:5) and its foreign analogue to describe cnt and c^
n
t .
To see the implication of global imbalances in the current model, we recast
here another model of a parallel world where there is no asymmetry. It is an
easy task. We get rid of the global imbalance by assuming  = . And to
be consistent with the past literature on two symmetric countries, we also take
away the OLG structure. It is obvious that the steady states are c = y, c = y,
w = 0 and r = 1

. Approximating the model around the steady states yields the
following system
r^1t =

1  1
r

y^t +
1
r
z^1t   z^1t 1 (A.10)
r^2t =

1  1
r

y^t +
1
r
z^2t   z^2t 1 (A.20)
w^t+1 = rw^t + ryr^xt + y^t   c^t (A.30)
Etc^t+1 = c^t + Etr^1t+1 (A.40)
Etc^t+1 = c^t + Etr^2t+1 (A.50)
Etc^

t+1 = c^

t + Etr^2t+1 (A.6
0)
c^t + c^

t = y^t + y^

t (A.7
0)
y^t = y^t 1 + "t (A.80)
y^t = y^

t 1 + "

t (A.9
0)
As in the asymmetric model, Eq.(A:10   20) dene the rates of return on assets
while (A:30) is the home budget constraint. Eq.(A:40   60) are Euler equations.
(A:70) is the resource constraint and (A:80   90) are shocks to endowments. Note
that abstracting from the OLG structure, the model is of representative agent
form. So there is no di¤erence between the individual and per capita variables.
The di¤erence between the two models is compared in the main text. In addi-
tion, remember that all per capita variables with a hat are dened as proportional
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deviations from their steady states, i.e. x^ = x x
x
. However, for symmetric mod-
els, w = 0 so w cannot be used to normalize the deviation of w into percentage
changes. Following the past literature, in Eq.(A:30), w^ is dened as the change
in w relative to y, i.e. w^  w
y
.
3.B The MUC (General steps)
We solve the model by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients (MUC). We do
not solve the model all in once but rather in steps, i.e. rst solve for the behaviour
of expected future variables and then those of current variables to obtain simpler
analytical solutions to (both current and especially expected future) variables (in
terms of variables elasticities to shocks, i.e. s below) which are very useful for
latter comparisons of the magnitudes of variable responses to home and foreign
shocks. This section gives the general description of these steps.
According to the Euler equations for home and foreign countries (A:4  6),
expected asset returns r^t+1 are equalized across assets. This means that r^xt+1 =
0. If we look at the budget constraints (A:3) for time t and t+i, they are di¤erent
in the fact that for the latter, r^xt disappears. The solution process can thus be
separated into the following three steps. That is:
First, solve the system of expected future (or time t+ 1) variables by MUC.
Second, use the r^t+1 obtained, asset pricing equation Eq.(A:2) and an assumed
solution to current variables to obtain r^2t with coe¢ cients to be determined.
Third, substitute this r^2t into the system of current (or time t) variables and
solve it with MUC.
Note we have ve state variables [w^t; z^1t 1; z^2t 1; y^1t 1; y^2t 1]
0 and six free
variables [c^t; c^t ; r^1t; r^2t; c^
n
t ; c^
n
t ]
0.
3.B.1 The expected future variables (consumption and
asset return)
Let us rst focus on the sub-system consisting of Eq.(A3) and (A5  7) to solve
for

w^t+2; c^t+1; c^

t+1; r^2t+1
0
. Lead one period forward to obtain
w^t+2 = J1w^t+1 + J2r^2t+1 + J4y^t+1 + J5c^t+1 (B.1)
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c^t+2 = K1c^t+1 +K2y^t+2 +K3r^t+2 (B.2)
c^t+2 = K

1 c^

t+1 +K

2 y^

t+2 +K

3 r^t+2 (B.3)
cy c^t+1 +


cy c^

t+1 = y^t+1 + y^

t+1 (B.4)
This is a system of four expected future variables

w^t+2; c^t+1; c^

t+1; r^t+1
0
driven by
only net wealth and two shocks

w^t+1; y^t+1; y^

t+1
0
. (Note that w^t+1 is determined
at time t i.e. a predetermined variable and by (A:8  9) that y^t+2 and y^t+2 can
be replaced by y^t+1 and y^t+1.) We have four unknowns and four equations.
Suppose that the solution of the system is of the following form with all s being
the coe¢ cients to be determined.
w^t+2 = wwpw^t+1 + wy1py^t+1 + wy2py^

t+1 (B.5)
c^t+1 = cwpw^t+1 + cy1py^t+1 + cy2py^

t+1 (B.6)
c^t+1 = 

cwpw^t+1 + 

cy1py^t+1 + 

cy2py^

t+1 (B.7)
r^t+1 = rwpw^t+1 + ry1py^t+1 + ry2py^

t+1 (B.8)
Following the process of MUC, we can obtain solutions for

w^t+2; c^t+1; c^

t+1; r^t+1
0
by pinning down the 12 s above. They will be referred as elasticities/responses
of future variables.
3.B.2 The current asset returns
Now we can use Eq.(A:1  2) to solve for the behaviour of current asset returns.
In this description the focus will be placed on asset 2s price and return rate, i.e.
z^2t and r^2t. The derivations and results for asset 1 are similar.
By (A:2), we have
z^2t =
(r   1)
(r   ) y^

t  

r^t+1 +
1
r
r^t+2 +
1
r2
r^t+2 +   

(B.9)
Dene
rt+1 

r^t+1 +
1
r
r^t+2 +
1
r2
r^t+2 +   

(B.10)
as the discounted sum of future asset returns at time t (with the discount factor
r). Making use of the solutions for w^t+i and r^t+i as in the last subsection, i.e.
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(B:5) and (B:8), one can show that rt+1 is equal to (Appendix C:2)
rt+1 =
rrwp
r   wwp| {z }
swp
w^t+1 (B.11)
+

rry1p
r    +
rwpwy1p
r   wwp
r
r   

| {z }
sy1p
y^t+1
+

rry2p
r    +
rwpwy2p
r   wwp
r
r   

| {z }
sy2p
y^t+1
where we dene future elasticities of rt+1, i.e. swp, sy1p and wy2p as functions
of the future elasticities of w^t+2 and r^t+1 found in the last subsection. So they
are all known.
Replace w^t+1 with a proposed solution as in the next subsection, i.e. (B:24)
and use y^t+1 = y^t to yield
rt+1 = swpwx| {z }
sx
^t + swpww| {z }
sw
w^t + swpwz2| {z }
sz2
z^2t 1 (B.12)
+

swpwe1 + sy1p
| {z }
se1
y^t +

swpwe2 + sy2p
| {z }
se2
y^t
where we dene another ve coe¢ cients, i.e. [sx; sw; sz2; se1; se2]
0 as func-
tions of [wx; ww; wz2; we1; we2]
0 in addition to the future elasticities. Because
the s in the former vector are to be determined in the next subsection, the s
in the latter vector are also coe¢ cients to be determined.
Substituting (B:12) into (B:9) we get
z^2t =

(r   1)
(r   )   se2

y^t   sx^t   sww^t   sz2z^2t 1 (B.13)
And by Eq.(A:2)
r^2t = rx^t + rww^t + rz2z^2t 1 + re1y^t + re2y^

t (B.14)
where
rx =  
1
r
sx =  
rwpwx
r   wwp
(B.15)
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rw =  
1
r
sw =  
rwpww
r   wwp
(B.16)
rz2 =  
1
r
sz2   1 =  

1 +
rwpwz2
r   wwp

(B.17)
re1 =  
1
r
se1
=  1
r

swpwe1 + sy1p

(B.18)
re2 =
(r   1)
(r   )  
1
r
se2
=
(r   1)
(r   )  
1
r

swpwe2 + sy2p

(B.19)
Note that the above expressions are not yet known with [wx; ww; wz2; we1; we2]
0
to be determined in Eq.(B:24) in the next subsection.
r^1t can be obtained in a similar way to (B:14). Subtracting r^2t from r^1t yields
r^xt =
(r   1)
(r   ) (y^t   y^

t )  (z^1t 1   z^2t 1) (B.20)
3.B.3 The current variables (consumption and asset re-
turns)
Substitute r^2t into Eq.(A:3) and dening J
0
properly to yield
w^t+1 = J
0
1w^t + J
0
3^t + J
0
4y^t + J
0
5c^t + J
0
6y^

t + J
0
7z^2t 1 (B.21)
This can be combined with Eq.(A:5) and (A:6)
c^t+1 = K1c^t +K2y^t+1 +K3r^t+1 (B.22)
c^t+1 = K

1 c^

t +K

2 y^

t+1 +K

3 r^t+1 (B.23)
to form a system for current variables. Observing the structure of the system,
we propose the solutions
w^t+1 = www^t + wz2z^2t 1 + wx^t + we1y^t + we2y^

t (B.24)
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c^t = cww^t + cz2z^2t 1 + cx^t + ce1y^t + ce2y^

t (B.25)
c^t = 

cww^t + 

cz2z^2t 1 + 

cx^t + 

ce1y^t + 

ce2y^

t (B.26)
with all the s as coe¢ cients to be determined. Again, these 15 coe¢ cients are
solved by MUC.
With [wx; ww; wz2; we1; we2]
0 being solved, they can be substituted back
into the undetermined expressions in the previous subsection.
Now the rst-order behaviour of all relevant current and expected future
variables of [w^; c^; c^; r^]0 is solved. The other variables can be easily obtained
from the solution of [w^; c^; c^; r^]0 and the other equation by substitution.
By Eq.(B:25) and (B:26), c^Dt can be obtained as
c^Dt = 
D
cx^t + 
D
cy1y^t + 
D
cy2y^

t (B.27)
where D     and the conditions w^t = 0 and z^2t 1 = 0 are imposed.
3.C The MUC (Other details)
This section consists of another three corresponding subsections to those in the
last section with each elaborating further details on the MUC when coding them
in Mathematica.
3.C.1 The system of (expected) future variables
The corresponding J , K and K matrix are dened as follows
J1 = J2 =
r
(1 + n)
; J3 =
1
(1 + n)wy
(C.1)
J4 =
1
(1 + n)wy
; J5 =  
cy
(1 + n)wy
(C.2)
K1 = K3 =
r
(1 + n)
; K2 =
(1 + n)  r
(1 + n)
(r   1)
(r   ) (C.3)
K1 = K

3 =
r
(1 + n)
; K2 =
(1 + n)  r
(1 + n)
(r   1)
(r   ) (C.4)
The solution of the system is assumed to be of the form of
w^t+2 = wwpw^t+1 + wy1py^t+1 + wy2py^

t+1 (C.5)
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c^t+1 = cwpw^t+1 + cy1py^t+1 + cy2py^

t+1 (C.6)
c^t+1 = 

cwpw^t+1 + 

cy1py^t+1 + 

cy2py^

t+1 (C.7)
r^t+1 = rwpw^t+1 + ry1py^t+1 + ry2py^

t+1 (C.8)
with 12 s to be determined. 12 equations are needed.
Substitute (B:6) and (B:8) into Eq.(B:1) to obtain the rst three equations
wwp = J1 + J2rwp + J5cwp (C.9)
wy1p = J4 + J2ry1p + J5cy1p (C.10)
wy2p = J2ry2p + J5cy2p (C.11)
Substitute (B:6) and (B:8) into Eq.(B:2) to obtain another three equations
cwpwwp = K1cwp +K3rwpwwp (C.12)
cwpwy1p + cy1p = K1cy1p +K2+K3
 
rwpwy1p + ry1p

(C.13)
cwpwy2p + cy2p = K1cy2p +K3
 
rwpwy2p + ry2p

(C.14)
Substitute (B:7) and (B:8) into Eq.(B:3) to obtain the third three equations
cwpwwp = K

1

cwp +K

3rwpwwp (C.15)
cwpwy1p + 

cy1p = K

1

cy1p +K

3
 
rwpwy1p + ry1p

(C.16)
cwpwy2p + 

cy2p = K

1

cy2p +K

2+K

3
 
rwpwy2p + ry2p

(C.17)
Substitute (B:6) and (B:7) into Eq.(B:4) to obtain the last three equations
cycwp + 

cy

cwp = 0 (C.18)
cycy1p + 

cy

cy1p = 1 (C.19)
cycy2p + 

cy

cy2p = 1 (C.20)
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3.C.2 Solutions to rt+1 and 
rn
t+1
In this subsection, we derive Eq.(B:11) for rt+1 (dened in (B:10)) and Eq.(5:16)
for rnt+1 (dened in (5:6)).
By the solution of r^t+1, i.e. Eq.(B:8)
r^t+1 = rwpw^t+1 + ry1py^t+1 + ry2py^

t+1
and Eq.(A:9), one can obtain
r^t+2 = rwpw^t+2 + ry1py^t+2 + ry2py^

t+2 (C.21)
= rwp
 
wwpw^t+1 + wy1py^t+1 + wy2py^

t+1

+ ry1py^t+2 + ry2py^

t+2
= rwpwwpw^t+1 +
 
rwpwy1p + ry1p

y^t+1
+
 
rwpwy2p + ry2p

y^t+1
r^t+3 = rwpw^t+3 + ry1py^t+3 + ry2py^

t+3 (C.22)
= rwp
 
rwpw^t+2 + ry1py^t+2 + ry2py^

t+2

+ ry1py^t+3 + ry2py^

t+3
= rwp
 
rwp
 
wwpw^t+1 + wy1py^t+1 + wy2py^

t+1

+ ry1py^t+2 + ry2py^

t+2

+ry1py^t+3 + ry2py^

t+3
= rwp
2
wwpw^t+1
+
 
wwprwpwy1p + rwpwy1p + 
2ry1p

y^t
+
 
wwprwpwy2p + rwpwy2p + 
2ry2p

y^t
  
by which the regularity in r^t+i is revealed.
To ease notation, dene
wwp  1 + wwp
r
+
2wwp
r2
+    = r
r   wwp
(C.23)
  1 + 
r
+
2
r2
+    = r
r    (C.24)
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For proof of Eq.(B:11), by r^t+i obtained above and (B:10), rt+1 equals
rwp
wwpw^t (C.25)
+[ry1p
 +
1
r
rwpwy1p
 +
1
r2
rwpwwpwy1p

+
1
r3
rwp
2
wwpwy1p
 +   ]y^t
+[ry2p
 +
1
r
rwpwy2p
 +
1
r2
rwpwwpwy2p

+
1
r3
rwp
2
wwpwy2p
 +   ]y^t
Note that the innite sums in the two brackets can be further simplied to
ry1p
 +
1
r
rwpwy1p
wwp
ry2p
 +
1
r
rwpwy2p
wwp
Replacing wwp and  with Eq.(C:23) and (C:24), one obtains Eq.(B:11).
Because rt+1 and 
rn
t+1 di¤er only in the discount factor, if replacing r with
r
(1+n)
,
one obtains
rnt+1 =
rrwp
r   wwp (1 + n)| {z }
srwp
w^t+1 (C.26)
+

rry1p
r    (1 + n) +
rwpwy1p
r   wwp (1 + n)
r (1 + n)
r    (1 + n)

| {z }
sry1p
y^t+1
+

rry2p
r    (1 + n) +
rwpwy2p
r   wwp (1 + n)
r (1 + n)
r    (1 + n)

| {z }
sry2p
y^t+1
rnt+1|{z}
Future asset return e¤ect
= srwpwx| {z }
srx
r^xt + srwpww| {z }
srw
w^t + srwpwz2| {z }
srz2
z^2t 1 (C.27)
+

srwpwe1 + sry1p
| {z }
sre1
y^t +

srwpwe2 + sry2p
| {z }
sre2
y^t
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3.C.3 The system of current variables
Following subsection (B:3), the system for current variables is
w^t+1 = J
0
1w^t + J
0
3r^xt + J
0
4y^t + J
0
5c^t + J
0
6y^

t + J
0
7z^2t 1 (C.28)
c^t+1 = K1c^t +K2y^t+1 +K3r^t+1 (C.29)
c^t+1 = K

1 c^

t +K

2 y^

t+1 +K

3 r^t+1 (C.30)
where
J 01 = J1 + J2rw = J1   J2
rwpww
r   wwp
(C.31)
J 03 = J3 + J2rx = J3   J2
rwpwx
r   wwp
(C.32)
J 04 = J4 + J2re1 = J4   J2
"
ry1p
r    +
rwpwy1p 
r   wwp

(r   )
#
(C.33)
J 05 = J5 (C.34)
J 06 = J2re2 = J2
(r   1)
(r   )   J2
"
ry2p
r    +
rwpwy2p 
r   wwp

(r   )
#
(C.35)
J 07 =  J2

1 +
rwpwz2
r   wwp

(C.36)
Supposed the solutions are
w^t+1 = www^t + wz2z^2t 1 + wxr^xt + we1y^t + we2y^

t (C.37)
c^t = cww^t + cz2z^2t 1 + cxr^xt + ce1y^t + ce2y^

t (C.38)
c^t = 

cww^t + 

cz2z^2t 1 + 

cxr^xt + 

ce1y^t + 

ce2y^

t (C.39)
with here another 12 s are coe¢ cients to be determined.
Substitute (C:38) into Eq.(C:28) to obtain the rst ve equations
ww = J
0
1 + J
0
5cw (C.40)
wz2 = J
0
7 + J
0
5cz2 (C.41)
wx = J
0
3 + J
0
5cx (C.42)
3. External adjustments under global imbalances 147
we1 = J
0
4 + J
0
5ce1 (C.43)
we2 = J
0
6 + J
0
5ce2 (C.44)
Substitute (C:38) into Eq.(C:29) to obtain another ve equations
cwpww = K1cw +K3rwpww (C.45)
cwpwz2 = K1cz2 +K3rwpwz2 (C.46)
cwpwx = K1cx +K3rwpwx (C.47)
cwpwy1 + cy1p = K1cy1 + K2 +K3rwpwy1 +K3ry1p (C.48)
cwpwy2 + cy2p = K1cy2 +K3rwpwy2 +K3ry2p (C.49)
Substitute (C:39) into Eq.(C:30) to obtain the last ve equations
cwpww = K

1

cw +K

3rwpww (C.50)
cwpwz2 = K

1

cz2 +K

3rwpwz2 (C.51)
cwpwx = K

1

cx +K

3rwpwx (C.52)
cwpwy1 + 

cy1p = K

1

cy1 +K

3rwpwy1 +K

3ry1p (C.53)
cwpwy2 + 

cy2p = K

1

cy2 + K

2 +K

3rwpwy2 +K

3ry2p (C.54)
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Chapter 4
Portfolio choices in a production
OLG model: Asymmetric asset
home bias
In Chapter 3, we showed how analysis of both (non-trivial) net and gross port-
folios can be integrated into the same model. This represents an important
step toward our goal of understanding the empirical pattern of portfolio choices
between developing and developed countries from a theoretical point of view.
However, because we ignore the importance of other income risks, rstly, the
size of gross external positions in the model is close to half of the steady state
asset supplies. This is still too big compared to the data. In reality, a much
smaller proportion of domestic assets is held by overseas investors. Secondly,
the size of net external positons is many times the size of annual GDP . This
is also too big compared to the data. In reality, a net portfolio of this size can
only be seen in very rare cases of small countries/areas with a special status
as international nancial centre, for instance Hong Kong and Singapore. As a
result of these facts, as shown in Section 3:8, the valuation and terms-of-trade
e¤ects generated are unrealistically high, which prevents the simple OLG model
in Chapter 3 from being a proper framework to think about practical issues. We
overcome these drawbacks of the framework in this chapter by generating gross
positions with a more (home) biased pattern as well as a net position with a
more realistic magnitude through including hedging motives of additional risks,
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i.e. the risks associated with labour income and exchange rate uctuations.
4.1 Introduction
Asset home bias describes the phenomenon across countries where foreign own-
ership of assets is limited and assets are mostly held domestically (French and
Poterba, 1991, Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994 and Tesar andWerner, 1995, etc.) Ac-
cording to the basic international capital asset pricing model (CAPM), however,
countries are expected to hold a world market portfolio. Because in reality no
asset of a single country amounts to more than half of world capitalisation, this
implies that assets should actually be mostly held by overseas investors across
countries. Countriesreluctance to reap the obvious international diversication
gains by diversifying their portfolios makes the pattern a well-known puzzle in
international nance. The analysis in this chapter sheds light on the pattern of
asset home bias, however, in terms of its incarnation between developing and
developed countries.
As documented in the rst chapter, a striking fact about the gross portfo-
lio holdings under nancial globalisation is that even though asset home bias is
prevalent across countries, the degree of the bias is much more signicant in de-
veloping countries than in developed countries. In other words, like the pattern
of net external portfolios, the pattern of gross external portfolios between them
is also asymmetric. In this chapter, we argue that the two patterns are actu-
ally inter-linked. As a background to model these facts, from the literature on
the determination of gross portfolios, introducing non-tradable income risks can
account for the emergence of symmetric asset home bias (Heathcote and Perri,
2013), while from the literature on the determination of non-zero net portfolios,
the unequal amount of the non-tradable income risks across countries can ac-
count for the emergence of global imbalances (Caballero et al., 2008). However,
the two strands of literature do not formally interact in the sense that the former
does not deal with asymmetric cases while the latter does not explicitly solve for
the gross positions that are consistent with the net position obtained. The model
in Chapter 3, with an OLG structure, resolves the methodological problem as-
sociated with the analysis of the net and gross portfolio positions. Based on the
results of the above two strands of literature, the model in this chapter assumes
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di¤ering amounts of the non-tradable income risks across countries to allow for
the interaction of non-trivial net positions and biased gross positions, from which
the pattern of asymmetric asset home bias is found to arise endogenously.
The model of this chapter is similar to that in Chapter 3, i.e. a model
of a two-country open economy with two equity assets available in nancial
market to hedge against two exogenous (technological) shocks. As shown in
the previous chapter, the assumption of fully capitalizable output in a model
(with a country asymmetry) gives rise to nearly fully-diversied rather than
signicant biased portfolios. So instead, in this chapter we assume that the
wealth in the two countries is divided into nancial and human (labour) wealth.
And only the nancial wealth can be capitalized. Moreover, wealth divisions in
the two countries are assumed to be di¤erent so that in the home, i.e. developed,
country, nancial wealth accounts for a relatively large proportion of total wealth
while, accordingly, human wealth accounts for the remaining relatively small
proportion.
The cross-country asymmetry in the degree of capitalization can be caused
by various reasons. In the literature, Caballero et al. (2008) attributes it to
nancial development while Jin (2012) attributes it to industrial structure, both
of which are easy to understand. For the former, many factors which a¤ect the
pledgeability of future income streams can inuence how much nancial assets
is nally formed in an economy. Potential candidates are those related to laws
(especially those associated with protection of property rights), quality of gov-
ernance and corporate management, etc, all of which tend to be relatively poor
in developing countries and therefore result in a relatively low share of nan-
cial wealth in these countries. For the latter, the technological di¤erence across
countries simply explains it (Jin, 2012). Imagine an economy mainly relying on
tea gathering, the country would never feature a large share of capital (and a
low share of labour) in income. Anyway, in either case, the fact that income
shares di¤er across countries implies that in the home country the asset supply
is relatively high and asset demand is relatively low while the opposite is true in
the foreign country, which, in a nancially integrated world, will generate current
account global imbalances. To be specic, with net excess supply of assets, i.e.
net capital inows, the home country will be a debtor in steady state, while, with
net excess demand of assets, i.e. net capital outows, the foreign country will be
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a net creditor in steady state.
On the other hand, the assumption of asymmetric wealth division has im-
plications for portfolio diversication as well. This is because portfolio choice
crucially depends on the relationship between the two income streams. If nan-
cial and labour incomes co-move positively, the portfolio should be biased toward
foreign assets because holding more domestic assets exaggerates the e¤ect of risks
(Baxter and Jermann, 1997). If however, the two income streams co-move neg-
atively, the portfolio should be biased toward local assets because holding more
of them hedges the e¤ect of labour income risk. Given the fact that the purpose
of the current chapter is not to show why we have asset home bias but rather
how it is di¤erent in asymmetric models, admittedly, to retain the result of the
home-biased portfolio in our model, one shortcut is to assume exogenously neg-
ative correlation between the two types of incomes. So a modied endowment
OLG model of Chapter 3 can be used to achieve the result of this asset home
bias with the assumption of exogenous forces.
Heathcote and Perri (2013) show that, in a two good production open econ-
omy, nancial and labour incomes will move in opposite directions due to the
automatic responses of the real exchange rate and investment. So even when
there is no asymmetry in wealth divisions, portfolios are (symmetrically) biased
towards local assets by endogenous forces. For this reason, instead of imposing
shocks with a negative correlation, we adopt the same environment by extending
the simple OLG model to the context of multiple goods with capital accumu-
lation and production. Under our assumption of country asymmetry in wealth
division, we nd that the symmetry in the pattern of asset home bias is broken.
While local assets are held disproportionately in both countries, the degree of
bias is higher in the foreign (developing) country than in the home (developed)
country, which is consistent with the stylised fact.
To see the mechanics underlying the result, we decompose the optimal portfo-
lio position as in Chapter 3. It turns out that the gross holding of local assets of
countries is composed of four terms, i.e. the self-hedging, the hedging of labour
income, the hedging of external interest payments and an adjustment term due
to the OLG structure. While the rst and fourth terms are both unambiguously
negative so as to cause agents to diversity portfolio toward overseas assets, the
hedging of labour income, as expected, is unambiguously positive which biases
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portfolios locally. Moreover, the existence of the country asymmetry is reected
on the magnitude of these terms in both countries, however, in the same way. To
put it di¤erently, although being important in creating asset home bias world-
wide, the rst, second and fourth hedging terms are not important when it comes
to the asymmetry associated with the bias.
Instead, the reason that the bias is more signicant in the home country is
related to the hedging of external interest payments. We nd that this hedging
term has a di¤erent sign across countries depending on the debtor or creditor
status of country, i.e. it is negative in the home country and positive in the
foreign country. This tends to mitigate the degree of the asset bias in the home
country while exacerbates that in the foreign country.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 4:2, we describe the model
environment. Section 4:3 presents the steady states of the model. How steady
state global imbalances arise in the model is also demonstrated in this section.
Section 4:4 is used to yield the optimal conditions for portfolios. One key deter-
minant of the optimal portfolio, the behaviour of the consumption di¤erential, is
analysed in Section 4:5. Section 4:6 presents the optimal portfolio as the sum of
hedging components with their properties and relevance to the pattern of asym-
metric asset home bias being discussed. We carry out a benchmark simulation
of the model in Section 4:7 and alternative simulations to assess the robustness
of our result in Section 4:8. Section 4:9 concludes.
4.2 Model
This is a world consisting of two countries. Each country is populated by the
innitely lived OLG households of identical structure to that in the last chapter
(following Weil, 1989). Recall that a population of measure 1 is born at time
t = 0 in each country and then grows at a net rate of n: No one dies so at time
t  1 the number of new-born is (1 + n)t   (1 + n)t 1 = n (1 + n)t 1. So in any
period, the per capita aggregate of any variable x can be obtained by
xt =
x0t + nx
1
t + n (1 + n)x
2
t :::+ n (1 + n)
t 1 xtt
(1 + n)t
where the superscript v and subscript t of xvt denote vintage and time respectively.
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The economic structure of home and foreign countries follows Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1994) and Heathcote and Perri (2013). In each country, households
make decisions on consumption and labour supply. Domestic capital and labour
cannot be traded internationally. They are used within the border by rms to
produce a country-specic intermediate good. The two intermediate goods are
then traded internationally to compose the nal goods that are ready for the
use of consumption and investment in the two countries. In terms of nancial
markets, two equity-style assets are traded respectively representing claims on
the prot made by the intermediate-good producers in either country. The risk in
the world economy comes from stochastic shocks to rmsproduction technology.
We lay out the whole model now.
4.2.1 Householdsproblem
For households of vintage v, their life-time utility function at time t is assumed
to have the following form
U vt =
1X
i=0
i

log
 
cvt+i

+  log
 
1  hvt+i

where cvt and h
v
t denote individual consumption and labour supply.  and  are
respectively the discount factor and the weight controlling the relative impor-
tance between consumption and leisure.
The budget constraint facing the individual is
v1t+1 + 
v
2t+1= r1t
v
1t + r2t
v
2t + l
v
t cvt
for all t where lvt denotes generation vs labour or human income during period
t. It is given by the product of labour supply hvt and real wage (nominal wage gt
over CPI, pt).
lvt =
gt
pt
hvt
vt denotes generation vs net holding of a particular asset at the end of period
t 1. We label the home equity asset 1 and the foreign equity asset 2. So v1t and
v2t are respectively their holding of home and foreign assets. r1t and r2t denote
the two assetsgross rate of return which we will dene later. So the budget
constraint states that households can save by investing in the two assets.
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It is useful to dene the gross wealth as the sum of all holdings across asset
wvt = 
v
1t + 
v
2t
so above constraint can also be written as
wvt+1 = r2tw
v
t + 
v
1trxt + l
v
t   cvt
where rxt = r1t   r2t is the excess return of asset 1 over asset 2.
The households problem is to choose optimal cvt , l
v
t , 
v
t s to maximize their life-
time utility, U vt ; subject to all intertemporal budget constraints. Their behaviour
can thus be described by the following rst-order conditions
t = (c
v
t )
 1
(cvt )
 1 = Et
h
r1t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
(cvt )
 1 = Et
h
r2t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
hvt = 1  
pt
gt
cvt
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with time-t budget constraint.
Foreign households maximize the utility function of the same form. However,
their budget constraints read
st
 
v1t+1 + 
v
2t+1

= st (r1t
v
1t + r2t
v
2t )+l
v
t  cvt
where st denotes the real exchange rate at time t. That is the price of the home
consumption basket in terms of the foreign consumption basket. It appears in
the constraint because we adopt the following convention. Apart from the asset-
related variables (including foreign asset holding vt and return r2t) which are
denoted in terms of the home country consumption basket, all the other variables
are in terms of the local consumption basket. The related rst-order conditions
are obtained similar to those of home country.
For the reasons we elaborated in the last chapter, even though households
optimization is undertaken at the individual level, we care about the models
per capita outcome (in other words, aggregate behaviour). By the demographic
assumptions we have made at the beginning of this section, apart from the Euler
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equations, all the other equations above are linear relations which means they can
be easily aggregated into the related per capita version by our aforementioned
method of population-weighted averaging. For example, per capita labour income
is just the product of real wage and per capita labour supply
lt =
gt
pt
ht
Per capita budget constraints for the two countries are
(1 + n) (1t+1 + 2t+1)= r1t1t + r2t2t + lt ct
st (1 + n)
 
1t+1 + 

2t+1

= st (r1t

1t + r2t

2t)+l

t ct
where (1 + n) emerges because we assume new generations are born with no
assets so tt = 0 following Weil (1989). This is also familiar from Section 3:3:2 of
Chapter 3.
Aggregating the Euler equations is a little bit more di¢ cult. Section 3:3:5 of
Chapter 3 described how we deal with them in more detail. To put it simply,
because to solve the model we still use the standard method of log-linearization
around the (per capita) steady states, we do not need the model in exact form
if we can obtain their linearized form. So for the Euler equations, rather than
to obtain the exact (per capita) form and then linearize them, we linearize them
rst and then aggregate them. The resulting linearized equations are omitted
here and can be found in Section 4:B of the Appendix to this chapter.
To end this subsection, let us dene asset returns r1t and r2t
r1tz1t=dt + (1 + n) z1t+1
r2tz2t=
dt
st
+ (1 + n) z2t+1
where z1t and z2t denote the prices of asset 1 and 2 (in terms of the home
consumption basket) at the end of period t   1. dt is the dividend paid by the
home rm while d is that paid by the foreign rm. st converts the latter into the
home consumption basket. Note the asset returns are dened at the per capita
aggregate level. ( In fact all the aforementioned variables are per capita variables
as is indicated by the absence of the superscript v:)
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4.2.2 Firms problem
We assume the rm uses the familiar Cobb-Douglas production function to pro-
duce intermediate good x
xt = e
"t (kt)
 (ht)
1 
xt = e
"t (kt )
 (ht )
1 
Here "t and "t represent technology shocks which follow the following AR (1)
processes
"t = "t 1 + t
"t = "

t 1 + 

t
where 0 <  < 1. The innovations  and  are zero-mean i:i:d processes with
the property of var () = var () = 2 and cov () = 0.
In the production function,  and  represent the shares of nancial (non-
human) wealth in the total wealth. (1  ) and (1  ) represent the shares of
labour (human) wealth. We assume  >  and so (1  ) < (1  ). The fact
that the share of nancial wealth is relatively higher in the home, in this chapter
also developed, country can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. At the most basic
level, the s denote the capital shares in production. So the asymmetry reects
many factors underlying the determination of di¤erences in industrial structure
across countries among which the most important one is technological di¤erence,
i.e. the home country uses a more capital-intensive technology than the foreign
country as argued by Jin (2012). Besides, as explained by Caballero et al. (2008),
the share of nancial wealth crucially depends on many factors determining one
countrys ability in capitalizing future income or, in their words, generating a
storage of value. These factors include those of nancial development and social
institutions. The question of which particular one or mix of these factors is most
likely to be the real reason leading to the asymmetry in  is interesting. However,
for the purpose of the current work, this is not the focus. So here we just refer
to the s as wealth division parameters. But one should understand that they
actually summarize much deeper information about the di¤erences between the
two countries.
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Given the production function, the rm maximizes the sum of the present
value of all future dividends 1X
i=0

idt+i
where 
 denotes the discount factor

i = ic 1t+i
and dt denotes the dividend, which is dened as the di¤erence between the rev-
enue and labour cost and investment
dt =
qt
pt
xt   lt   it
Here qt denotes the price of the home intermediate good. qt=pt is thus the price
in terms of home nal good.
Corresponding to the OLG structure in the model, investment is given by
it = (1 + n) kt+1   kt
The rst order condition of optimal choices of labour and capital demand can
thus be obtained as follows
MPLt =
gt
qt
rkt =
qt
pt
MPKt + 1

t = Et [
t+1rkt+1]
The two intermediate goods are then combined to form nal goods y and y.
The following formulae describe how the nal goods are aggregated.
yt =
h

1
 (xht)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (xft)
 1

i 
 1
yt =
h
(1  ) 1 (xht)
 1
 + 
1

 
xft
 1

i 
 1
In these formulas, xht and xft denote home demands for home and foreign
intermediate goods. And xht and x

ft denote the foreign demands. Following
the literature, we assume that households in each country are bias towards local
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Home holdings Foreign holdings
Asset 1-Home equity 1 1
Asset 2-Foreign equity 2 = w   1 2 = w   1
Table 4.1: Net asset holdings across countries
products. So the degree of local preference  satises 1=2 <  < 1.  denotes
the elasticity of substitution between the home and foreign intermediate goods.
Given the above aggregation relation of the nal goods, their related consumption-
based price indices can be obtained as
pt =
"
 (qt)
1  + (1  )

qt
st
1 # 11 
pt =
h
(1  ) (stqt)1  +  (qt )1 
i 1
1 
where qt is price of the foreign good. The law of one price holds for the two
internationally traded goods so the foreign price of the home good is given by
stqt and the home price of the foreign good is given by
qt
st
.
The demands for the intermediate goods are respectively
xht = 

qt
pt
 
yt
xft = (1  )

qt
stpt
 
yt
xht = (1  )

stqt
pt
 
yt
xft = 

qt
pt
 
yt
4.2.3 Market clearing
In equilibrium, all markets should clear including asset and good markets. Con-
sider the asset market rst. Remember the portfolio allocation is such as in Table
4:1.
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Asset market clearing requires that the total asset demands meets total asset
supply, i.e.
1t + 

1t = z1t
2t + 

2t = z2t
which are equivalent to
1t = z1t   1t
wt   z1t =   (wt   z2t)
While the interpretation of the rst formula is obvious, the second formula
states that the net asset demands, i.e. the di¤erence between gross asset demand
wt and gross asset supply zt, of home and foreign countries are of the same size but
opposite sign. So when the home country has net capital inows wt   z1t < 0,
the foreign country must have net capital outows wt   z2t > 0 of the same
magnitude. Denote ft as the net foreign asset at the end of time t   1, so the
above formula can be rewritten as
ft =  f t
Note that the presence of the asset market clearing conditions also implies
we only need to work out any one of the four asset holdings and then the world
portfolio allocation can be obtained. When computing the optimal portfolios for
the model later in this chapter, we choose to rst tie down 1t   z1t =  1t, i.e.
home gross holding of the home asset.
For goods markets, intermediate goods market clearing requires
xht + x

ht = xt
xft + x

ft = x

t
while nal goods market clearing requires
ct + it = yt
ct + i

t = y

t
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4.3 Non-stochastic steady states
In this section, we discuss steady states and how global imbalances emerge as a
consequence of the asymmetry in . We focus on the case of the home country.
The foreign countrys situation is similar. Remember, we assumed that the
asymmetry in  is the only structural di¤erence between the two countries, so,
to obtain the foreign country analogies we need simply to replace  with  in
the expressions which follow.
GDP normalization When we say they are two otherwise identical countries
except for  > , we implicitly assume that the sizes of the two countries are
also the same. Given the populations are already the same as a result of our
assumptions on demographics, we now impose that the two countries have the
same level of income. To be specic, we normalize the GDP s at the two countries
to 1.1 By the production approach to GDP it follows that
pt  gdpt = qt  [xht + xht] = qtxt
pt  gdpt = qt 

xft + x

ft

= qt x

t
So
qt
pt
xt = gdpt  1
qt
pt
xt = gdp

t  1
These formulas hold in steady state leading to
q
p
x =
q
p
x = 1
where we drop the time subscripts to represent its steady state.
Capital stock k and Investment i By 
t = Et [
t+1rkt+1] and the Euler
equations, the steady-state return to capital, rk; is in line with the steady-state
return to nancial assets r
rk = r
1In order to do so, in our model, the parameter of  in the utility function is allowed to be
adjusted automatically.
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By rkt =
qt
pt
MPKt + 1, the marginal product of capital is given by
MPK =
p
q
(r   1)
where p and q are to be determined below.
By the production function of the intermediate good x, MPKt =  xtkt , so the
capital stock is given by
k =

(r   1)
q
p
x =

(r   1)
By law of motion of the investment it = (1 + n) kt+1 kt, investment is given
by
i = nk =
n
(r   1)
Labour income l and dividend d By MPLt = (1  ) xtht and MPLt =
gt
qt
,
labour income satises
l =
g
p
h =
q
p
g
q
h =
q
p
(1  )x = (1  )
By dt =
qt
pt
xt   lt   it, the dividend is given by
d =
(r   ~n)
(r   1) 
Asset demand w and asset supply z With innitely lived OLG households,
the derivation from which the steady-state asset demand, w; is determined is
similar to that in Chapter 3. By the individual budget constraint and Euler
equations, the optimal individual consumption is given by
cvt=(1  )

rwvt + 
1
i=0
1
ri
lvt

Aggregating cvt over v to yield the consumption function in per capita form
ct=(1  )

rwt + 
1
i=0
1
ri
lt

Substitute this into the aggregate budget constraint (1 + n)wt+1 = wtr2t +
1trxt + lt   ct to yield the law of motion of wt
wt+1=
r
(1 + n)
wt+
(r   1)
(1 + n) (r   1) lt
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Impose a stability condition
  r
(1 + n)
< 1
and make use of the steady-state labour income l to solve for steady-state asset
demand
w =
(r   1)
(~n  r) (r   1) l =
(r   1) (1  )
(~n  r) (r   1)
where ~n  (1 + n) > r > 1 denotes the gross growth rate of population.
By r1tz1t=dt + (1 + n) z1t+1, asset supply is consistent with capital stock in
steady state
z =
d
(r   ~n) =

(r   1) = k
Net foreign assets, f Net foreign assets, f , is the net asset demand and can
be obtained by subtracting the asset supply z from w
f = w   z =

(r   1)
(~n  r)
(1  )
(r   1) 

(r   1)

w = (r 1)(1 )
(~n r)(r 1) can be proved to be a positive function of r
@w
@r
=
(1  )
(~n  r) (r   1)

 (~n  1)
~n  r  
r   1
r   1

> 0
While the fraction outside the bracket is obviously positive, one can show that
the expression in the bracket is positive when we have (r   1)2 + n (1  ) > 0
which always holds.
In addition it follows that z = q
p

(r 1) is a negative function of r
@z
@r
=   
(r   1)2< 0
Interest rate r In autarky, the condition that the home asset demand equals
the supply w = z or net foreign asset equals zero f = 0 determines the steady-
state interest rate
ra =
1 + n

From this expression, ra positively depends on time preference 1

, population
growth rate n and parameter . Therefore, in a two country open economy, the
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foreign country, having a low  < ; would have a low autarky interest rate
ra < ra.
The international interest rate is determined by the condition of asset market
clearing wt   z1t =   (wt   z2t) or
f + f  = 0
It thus lies between the two extreme autarky interest rates ra < r < ra.
From the Euler equations in the two countries it follows that r1 = r2 = r so
rx = 0
And given the fact that ra < r < ra, we have
f < 0
and
f  =  f > 0
In other words, net capital ows from the foreign to home country.
In Figure 4:1, we cast the result of steady-state net foreign asset global im-
balances into a familiar Metzler diagram. Asset demand and supply, which are
measured on the horizontal axes, for the foreign and home countries are displayed
in the left and right panels of the diagram respectively. The two asset demand
schedules, w and w; are increasing functions of r (which is measured on the
vertical axes). So they are positively sloped. The two asset supply schedules, z1
and z2; are decreasing functions of r so they are negatively sloped. The autarky
interest rate in each country is determined by the intersection of asset demand
and supply schedules of the individual countries. Because  > , we nd that
in the foreign country, asset demand is relatively high, so w > w; while asset
supply is relatively low, so z2 < z1; for a given level of r, which results in a lower
autarky interest rate in the foreign country than in the home country ra < ra.
In a nancially integrated world, the net (excess) asset demand in the foreign
country thus translates into an accumulation of current account surpluses in that
country, which is consistent with the fact that net capital ows out to where the
capital return is relative high. The process keeps going to the point when the
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Figure 4.1: Interpret the global NFA imbalances in the model under a Metzler
diagram
net asset demand in the foreign country is fully satised by the net (excess) as-
set supply in the home country and interest rates are equalized, at which point
the equilibrium under nancial integration is attained. Under this equilibrium,
the foreign country possess net external claims while the home country has net
external liabilities, i.e. net foreign asset global imbalances emerge.
Consumption and nal good demand Knowing w, from the budget con-
straint (1 + n)wt+1= wtr2t+1trxt+lt ct, we can obtain the steady-state con-
sumption, c;
c = l + (r   ~n)w
= (1  ) + (r   ~n) (z + f)
= (1  ) + d+ (r   ~n) f
= 1  i+ (r   ~n) f
from which the nal good demand, y; is given by
y = c+ i = 1 + (r   ~n) f
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One countrys total spending (expenditure on consumption c and investment
i) is restricted by its total income or GNP , with the possibility of external
imbalances that isGDP ( 1) plus net foreign asset income (r   ~n) f . Obviously,
net foreign asset income can be positive or negative depending on the sign of the
countrys net external position f .
As in Chapter 3, we assume a condition of global e¢ ciency:
r > ~n
so the debtor (creditor) countrys disposable expenditure is less (more) than their
average GDP , i.e. when net foreign asset income is negative (positive) or f < 0
(> 0) we have (c+ i) > 1 (< 1).
Knowing y and y, we obtain the intermediate goods demands as below
xh = 

q
p
 
y
xf = (1  )

q
sp
 
y
xh = (1  )

sq
p
 
y
xf = 

q
p
 
y
The new-borns consumption can be obtained from cnt=(1  ) 1i=0 1ri lt, which
yields
cn =
(r   r)
(r   1) l
or from the aggregation relation (in steady state)
cn =
(1 + n  r)
n
c
One can verify that these two relations are equivalent.
Employment h and wage g By the equations ht = 1    ptgt ct, MPLt =
(1  ) xt
ht
and MPLt =
gt
qt
, we have

c
(1  h) =
g
p
=
g
q
q
p
=MPL
q
p
=
(1  )
h
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Given c, we solve the equation  c
(1 h) =
(1 )
h
to obtain steady state working
hours
h =
(1  )
cp=q + (1  )
In addition, the wage rate is
g =
(1  ) q
h
Prices indices The determination of the price system boils down to the de-
termination of the prices of the two intermediate goods p and p if one notices
that the prices of nal goods p and p and the real exchange rate s relate to p
and p through
p =
"
 (q)1  + (1  )

q
s
1 # 11 
p =
h
(1  ) (sq)1  +  (q)1 
i 1
1 
s =
p
p
q and q clear the markets of two intermediate goods, so they must satisfy


q
p
 
y + (1  )

sq
p
 
y = x =
p
q
(1  )

q
sp
 
y + 

q
p
 
y = x =
p
q
Given the two countries being asymmetric, the price vector [q q p p s] is gen-
erally asymmetric as well, i.e. it deviates from [1 1 1 1 1].
4.4 Portfolio optimality condition
We derive the condition for optimal portfolios in this section. As in Section 3:4 of
Chapter 3, with the OLG structure being present, the condition can be obtained
through three steps.
First, optimization of portfolio choices is undertaken at the level of individual
households. Individual portfolio choices vt must satisfy the related rst-order
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conditions. Following Devereux and Sutherland (2011), we approximate these
rst-order conditions up to second-order accuracy along their optimal paths (see
Chapter 3 for the denition of the optimal path of individual variables). This
yields
Et

r^xt +
1
2
r^
(2)
xt   c^vt r^xt

= 0 +O
 
"3

Et

r^xt +
1
2
r^
(2)
xt   c^vt r^xt + s^tr^xt

= 0 +O
 
"3

where r^(2)xt = r^
2
1t  r^22t. These conditions can be referred to as individual portfolio
conditions.
Second, imposing these individual conditions on the (rst-order approxi-
mated) per capita aggregation relation. This yields
Et

r^xt +
1
2
r^
(2)
xt   c^tr^xt

= 0 +O
 
"3

Et

r^xt +
1
2
r^
(2)
xt   c^t r^xt + s^tr^xt

= 0 +O
 
"3

which can be referred to as (per capita) aggregate portfolio conditions.
Third, combine the above two conditions to yield the following condition
Et [(c^t   c^t + s^t) r^xt] = 0
which serves as the condition to tie down .
By this condition, households choose the optimal portfolio to achieve optimal
sharing of income risks. Depending on the income risks contained in the cross-
country consumption di¤erential cdt  (c^t   c^t + s^t), the optimal portfolio  is
built up as the result of a series of corresponding hedging motives. To analyse
this, as in Chapter 3, in the next section we will rst analyse the risk components
of the consumption di¤erential. Then in Section 4:6, we turn to the analysis of
the components of the optimal portfolio in the current model.
4.5 Consumption di¤erential, cdt
In this section, we identify all components of the income stream that impact on
the consumption di¤erential cdt  (c^t   c^t + s^t). As in Chapter 3, we full the
task through analysing the wealth and composition e¤ects of consumption.
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4.5.1 Wealth e¤ect, ct and 
c
t
After a shock, total resources that one country can use (over its innite horizon)
will change. The amount of the change in total resources can be obtained by
aggregating the countrys intertemporal budget constraints.
For the home country, the period budget constraint is
~nft+1 = r1tft + dt   2trxt + lt   ct
Approximate to yield
~nff^t+1 = rf f^t + rf r^1t + dd^t + ll^t   2rr^xt   cc^t
That is
c^t =   ~nf
c
f^t+1 +
rf
c
f^t +
rf
c
r^1t +
d
c
d^t +
l
c
l^t   2r
c
r^xt
So we have total consumption
ct =
rf
c

r^1t +
~n
r
rnt+1

+
d
c
dt +
l
c
lt  
2r
c
r^xt
where ct = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i
c^t+i, rnt+1 = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i
r^t+1+i, dt = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i
d^t+i and lt =
1i=0

~n
r
i
l^t+i.
The above equation can be re-written as follows
ct =
rf
c

r^2t +
~n
r
rnt+1

+
d
c
dt +
l
c
lt  
2r
c
r^xt +
rf
c
r^xt
i.e.
ct =
rf
c

r^2t +
~n
r
rnt+1

+
d
c
dt +
l
c
lt +
(1   z1) r
c
r^xt
because (f   2) = (w   z1)   2 = (w   2)   z1 = (1   z1). In this equa-
tion, home total consumption is composed of, from left to right respectively,
total external interest payments, total nancial wealth, total labour wealth and
unanticipated portfolio valuation e¤ects.
Similarly, for the foreign country its budget constraint is
~nft+1 = r2tf

t +
dt
st
+ (z1t   1t) rxt + l

t
st
  c

t
st
which can be approximated to yield
 ~nff^t+1 =  rf f^t rf r^2t+d

s

d^t   s^t

+
l
s

l^t   s^t

+(z1   1) rr^xt c

s
(c^t   s^t)
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where we use the facts that f  =  f and f^t = f^ t .
So we have
ct =  
rfs
c

r^2t +
~n
r
rnt+1

+
d
c
dt +
l
c
lt  
(1   z1) rs
c
r^xt
where we dene ct = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i 
c^t+i   s^t+i

, dt = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i h
d^t+i   s^t+i
i
and
lt = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i h
l^t+i   s^t+i
i
. Foreign total consumption is also composed of the
above four income resources. However, notice that because the world consists
of the two countries, the interest payments and valuation e¤ects at home and
abroad have the opposite sign.
4.5.2 Composition e¤ect, c^t and c^t
How the lifetime resources are distributed across time in one country is regulated
by the related Euler equations. As in Chapter 3, we rst approximate the indi-
vidual Euler equations and then aggregated them to obtain the following (home
country) per capita Euler equation
c^t+1 =  c^t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  r^t+1
from which we derive
ct = c^t +
~n
r

 c^t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  r^t+1

+

~n
r
2 
 c^t+1 + (1  ) c^nt+2 +  r^t+2

+ :::
= c^t +
 ~n
r
ct +
(1  ) ~n
r
cnt+1 +
 ~n
r
rnt+1
where cnt+1 = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i
c^nt+1+i.
Rearrange this so we get an expression of c^t as follows
c^t =
r    ~n
r
ct  
(1  ) ~n
r
cnt+1  
 ~n
r
rnt+1
By this expression, current consumption in the home country is given by an
average total consumption minus the consumption of the yet unborn and the
interest rate tilting e¤ect of consumption. Of the latter two terms, the tilting
4. Asymmetric asset home bias 172
e¤ect is familiar while the latter arises due to our assumption of new generations
being born each period.
Similarly, aggregating the foreign Euler equation yields
c^t+1 =  c^

t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  [r^t+1 + s^t+1   s^t]
which in turn leads to the following expression for c^t
c^t =
r    ~n
r
ct +
r    ~n
r
st  
(1  ) ~n
r
cnt+1  
(1  ) ~n
r
st+1
  ~n
r
rnt+1  
 ~n
r
st+1 +
 ~n
r
st
where st = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i
s^t+i and cnt+1 = 
1
i=0

~n
r
i 
c^nt+1+i   s^t+1+i

. The explana-
tion for this expression is similar to that for the home country.
4.5.3 Country di¤erence, cdt
The consumption di¤erential (c^t   c^t + s^t) equals
(r    ~n)
r
[ct   ct ] 
(1  ) ~n
r

cnt+1   cnt+1

After substituting ct and 
c
t into above equation, we obtain
(r    ~n)
r

1
c
+
s
c

~r^xt +dt +lt +

1
c
+
s
c

rfrn2t

  (1  ) ~n
r
cnt+1
where
dt =
d
c
dt  
d
c
dt
lt =
l
c
lt  
l
c
lt
rn2t = r^2t +
~n
r
rnt+1
cnt+1 = 
cn
t+1   cnt+1
respectively represents the home countrys (changes in) relative nancial income,
relative labour income, external interest payments and the relative consumption
of new-borns.
According to the analysis in this section, we nd that the relative consump-
tion, cdt, in the model is composed of relative nancial income, relative labour
income, external interest payments, relative consumption of new-borns and ex-
cess return by holding the optimal portfolio ~.
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4.6 Steady-state ~ and Asymmetric asset home
bias
In this section, we represent the steady-state portfolio ~ as the sum of a series
of hedging terms by which process the portfolio solution gains an intuitive in-
terpretation. We compare our results with other results in the related literature
to show their connections and, more importantly, to demonstrate the innova-
tive aspects of the optimal portfolio in our model. We explore the role of the
country asymmetry in accounting for asymmetric asset home bias through gen-
erating global imbalances and the attendant hedging motive of external interest
payments in the optimal portfolio.
Substituting the expression for cdt obtained in the previous section into the
optimal portfolio condition, we can obtain the solution for ~ as follows
~ =   cc

cs+ c
cov (dt; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Self-hedging ( )
  cc

cs+ c
cov (lt; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging labour income (+)
 rf cov (
rn
2t ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging interest payment ( )
+
cc
cs+ c
(1  ) ~n
(r    ~n)
cov
 
cnt+1; r^xt

var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging newborns consumption ( )
Recall that ~ = (1   z1) r denotes home gross holding of the home asset
(multiplied by steady state r). Because the home country is the default supplier
of the home asset, a realistic ~ should be negative and it should satisfy  rz1 <
~ < 0. In absolute value, ~ is viewed as the gross external liability of the home
country. As the other side of the same coin, the absolute value of ~ is also viewed
by the foreign country as its gross external asset stock.
On the right hand side of the above expression for ~, in turn the four terms
can be interpreted respectively as follows:
1. The hedging of nancial income risk (self-hedging). By the asset pricing
relation, the (relative) rate of return on an asset is an increasing function of (rela-
tive) return on physical capital (nancial income), i.e. the (relative) dividend. In
other words, cov (dt; r^xt) is positive. So the home asset is a bad hedge against
the risk associated with the relative dividend income. Self-hedging is therefore
negative.
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Our model features wealth division between nancial and labour incomes
and the associated country asymmetry. In steady state, capitalizable income
only accounts for a fraction, (r ~n)
(r 1) ; rather than all of GDP . This implies that
the self-hedging also only represents a fraction instead of all of ~. With the
presence of the country asymmetry, i.e.  6= , it follows that in general the
values of steady state consumption and the real exchange rate deviate from their
value in symmetric models, i.e. c 6= c and s 6= 1. This implies that in general
the value of the coe¢ cient cc

cs+c in the above formula for ~ is di¤erent from that
in a symmetric model, 1
2
.
Suppose that we assume all wealth is capitalizable (with no production and
investment), the relative dividend income, dt; thus represents the whole source
of risk in the consumption di¤erential. According to the asset pricing relation,
dt will be given by r(r 1) r^xt. Besides, if we also abstract from the country
asymmetry (and the OLG structure), steady state levels of consumption and real
exchange rate will be given by c = c = 1 and s = 1. So we have ~ =   r
2(r 1)
and  = 1
2
z1, i.e. in equilibrium both of the two countries hold half the stock of
the local and overseas assets, and we thus return to Lucass (1982) result of full
diversication.
2. The hedging of labour income risk. The sign of this term depends on how
labour income co-moves with the nancial income. If the two income streams
co-move positively, (and because the excess return always co-moves positively
with the relative dividend, the excess return of the home asset will co-move
positively with relative labour income as well) the home asset is a bad hedge
against home labour income risk. The hedging term for labour income risk will
therefore be negative. Together with a negative term for self-hedging, this implies
that portfolio allocation exhibits a foreign bias (Baxtor and Jermann, 1997). If,
however, the two income streams co-move negatively, by similar logic, the home
asset will be a good hedge against home labour income risk. The hedging term for
labour income risk will thus be positive. This o¤sets the e¤ect of a negative self-
hedging and reduces the share of overseas asset in the home countrys portfolio.
The portfolio allocation can thus exhibit home bias.
By following Heathcote and Perri (2013) in assuming a world with the pro-
duction of two imperfectly substitutable goods and a home bias in commodity
trade, the nancial and labour incomes in the model are in fact negatively corre-
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lated. For a brief explanation, in such an environment, the cheaper home good
in response to a positive shock to home productivity can very e¤ectively stimu-
late (relative) investment in the home country. The rise in (relative) investment,
however, tends to reduce the (relative) dividend by the fact that dt =
qt
pt
xt lt it.
Given that labour income always increases in response to positive supply shocks,
it follows that the dividend (which declines) and labour income (which rises)
move in opposite direction, i.e. cov (lt; r^xt) < 0 which therefore leads to a
positive hedging term for labour income risk. Note that due to the presence of
the country asymmetry, this hedging term also involves a generally asymmetric
coe¢ cient of cc

cs+c 6= 12 .
3. The hedging of interest payment risk. As demonstrated in Section 4:3,
the country asymmetry in the model generates non-trivial net external positions
in steady state. As a result, the income and consumption of the two countries
contain non-trivial international interest payments (Section 4:5). The third term
in ~ captures householdsmotives to hedge against the risk associated with this
income stream.
To nd the sign of this hedging term, notice that in the model, the home
country is a debtor with a steady state negative net external position, f < 0.
It thus has to pay external interest payments. Let us consider when the home
assets excess return is high. Recall from the described variable impulse above, for
the country which experiences positive productivity shock, unlike the endowment
economy in Chapter 3, the return to that countrys asset will be relatively low
instead of being relatively high due to the response of investment. In other
words, when the home assets excess return is high, the foreign (instead of the
home) countrys productivity is hit by a positive shock. The amount of interest
payments is relatively low so the home countrys disposable income and therefore
consumption is also high. This indicates that the home asset is a bad hedge
against interest payment risk for the home country. The hedging term for interest
payments is therefore negative for the home country. That is to say, it biases
the portfolio toward the foreign asset, which tends to reduce the degree of asset
home bias for the home country.
4. The hedging of new-borns consumption. The emergence of this term is
due to the consumption of the yet unborn future generations in the model. Recall
that in Section 4:5, we obtain the (per capita) current consumption by averaging
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the sum of all future consumption with a deduction for the consumption of yet
unborn future generations. The hedging then corresponds to the risk associated
with this deduction. Note that this hedging also appears in Chapter 3 in the
form of Eq.(6:5), they emerge for the same reason.
To analyse its properties, consider when a positive shock hits home country
productivity, the consumption of all future generations goes up and the required
downward adjustment of current consumption is high. Therefore current con-
sumption is low. At the same time, due to the response of investment, the
positive shock depresses the relative dividend and thus the excess return of the
home asset. That is, when home country relative consumption is low, the excess
return on the home asset is also low. The home asset is thus a bad hedge against
the risk from new-born consumption. The hedging of new-born consumption is
therefore negative. Note that the sign of this hedging term is positive in Chapter
3. The change in sign in this chapter occurs because, unlike in the previous chap-
ter, the positive supply shock in the home country decreases, instead of increases,
the relative excess return of the home asset in the current model.
Having obtained ~, in Section 4:C of the Appendix to this chapter we show
how the analogous portfolio holding in the foreign country ~  (2   z2) r can
be derived from the above expression from the fact of ~ = ~ + f . It follows
that
~ =   cc

cs+ c
cov (dt ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Self-hedging ( )
  cc

cs+ c
cov (lt ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging labour income (+)
 rf  cov (
rn
1t ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging interest payment (+)
+
cc
cs+ c
(1  ) ~n
(r    ~n)
cov
 
cnt+1; r^

xt

var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging newborns consumption ( )
where the notions of certain variables are redened from the perspective of the
foreign country, i.e. dt =  dt, lt =  lt, r^xt =  r^xt respectively denote
the relative dividend, labour income and excess return of the foreign asset over
the home asset. rn1t = r^1t +
~n
r
rnt+1 denotes the sum of present value of all asset
1s future rates of return (asset 1 is the overseas asset for the foreign country).
The four hedging terms in ~ have the same meaning as those in ~. Moreover,
except for the hedging of interest payments, the other three terms have the same
sign and size as their analogues in the expression for the home portfolio hold-
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ing. To verify, notice that the involved covariances cov (dt ; r^

xt), cov (l

t ; r^

xt),
cov
 
cnt+1; r^

xt

and variance var (r^xt) have the same value as their counterparts
in ~s expression. In other words, in the foreign country, the local asset (asset
2) is also a bad hedge for nancial income and new-borns consumption while a
good hedge for labour income, so the foreign holding of the foreign asset involves
the same short position due to self-hedging, the same long position due to the
hedging of labour income and the same short position due to the hedging of
new-borns consumption to those in the expression for the home holding of home
asset, ~.
However, the hedging of interest payments in the foreign country works in the
opposite direction to that for the home country. To see this, notice that in the
model, the foreign country is a creditor with a steady state positive net external
position, f  =  f > 0. The foreign country therefore receives international
interest revenues. And when the foreign assets excess return is high, i.e. the
home country is hit by a positive productivity shock, the amount of the revenues
is relatively low and so the foreign countrys disposable income and consumption
will be low, which indicates that the local asset as a good hedge against this risk.
The hedging term for interest payments is thus positive in the foreign country.
That is to say, it biases the portfolio towards the foreign asset, which tends to
enhance the degree of asset home bias in the foreign country.
When the two countries are identical, their portfolio choices should be also
identical (f =  f  = 0), ~ = ~. What we nd above is that introducing
the country asymmetry in  breaks down this symmetry to the extent that the
hedging of the return on the net external position emerges (f =  f  < 0) and
the hedging actually operates in the opposite direction across the two countries.
It lowers the demand for the home asset in the home (debtor) country while it
increases the demand for the foreign asset in the foreign (creditor) country, so
~ < ~ < 0. If the two countries supply the same amount of assets, then it must
be the case that the home country will exhibit a relatively lower degree of asset
home bias than the foreign country. Nevertheless, a relative higher  also allows
the home country to supply a relatively higher amount of the asset (Caballero
et al., 2008), i.e. z1 > z2 > 0. So in response to a rise in the gap between  and
, the demand and supply e¤ects arise simultaneously and compete in giving
rise to asymmetric asset home bias in di¤erent directions. If the values of ~ and
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Parameter Description Value
 Discount factor 0:97
n Net population growth rate 0:001
 Wealth division parameter in the home country 0:12
 Wealth division parameter in the foreign country 0:11
 Persistence of productivity shocks 0:95
 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 0:9
 Share of local intermediate goods in nal goods 0:65
 Parameter in stability condition 0:9991
Table 4.2: Benchmark calibration
z1 (or/and ~ and z2) are su¢ ciently low (high), then the portfolio in the home
country can be less home biased than that in the foreign country. However if the
opposite happens, the pattern of the relative degree of asset home bias across
countries will be reversed. We argue in the following sections of this chapter that
for reasonable parameterization and for the portfolios to fall into an economically
meaningful interval, the asset demand e¤ect dominates the asset supply e¤ect,
which implies that when  > , the home country will possess a less biased
portfolio than the foreign country. We show the result by performing a baseline
simulation of the model in the next section. In Section 4:8, we will carry out a
series of sensitivity analyses of the result.
4.7 Model simulation
In this section, we simulate the model as a benchmark to assess its quantitative
performance. As in Chapter 3, the main purpose of the simulation is to verify
the reasoning in the previous sections and to evaluate the models ability in
producing relevant results, i.e. a steady state of the model, impulse responses
and portfolio choices, up to a reasonable order of magnitude. For this reason, it
su¢ ces if we parameterize the model with empirically plausible values. Following
Chapter 3, we use a year as one period in the following simulation.
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4.7.1 Parameterization
The parameter values we use in the baseline simulation is collected in Table 4:2.
The discount factor in the utility function  is set at 0:97. In Chapter 3, we used
a larger value of the net population growth rate, n; at 0:01. Although the current
simulation is still far from a seriously data-based one, we hope to yield portfolio
choices much closer to reality than the case in Chapter 3. n is chosen here so as to
make sure that, rstly, it is large enough to ensure the stability of the model, i.e.
the condition  < 1 is respected. And then, given this, we make it small to yield
a small amount of new-borns consumption adjustments in cdt and thus a low
value of the hedging of new-borns consumption in the nal ~. So we choose n at
0:001. Besides, together with the fact that  = 0:97, this value of n also implies
a real interest rate close to 3 percent, consistent with one of the calibration
targets as in Caballero et al. (2008). Also as in Caballero et al. (2008), we
choose the value of the home wealth division parameter  to be 0:12. To analyse
the consequence of a shock decline in asset supply, they calibrate a  of 0:08
based on the foreign countrys experiences during the 1997 Asian crisis episode,
which should result in a lower value than that in normal times. For this reason,
we pick  at a higher level but, at the same time, one percentage point lower
than  reecting the relative underdevelopment of the foreign country. When
calibrating their model with sector-specic capital intensity, Jin (2012) uses the
same value for the labour intensive sector. The persistence of the productivity
shock is set at 0:95 which is its median estimate by Smets and Wouters (2007).
 is chosen to be 0:9 following Heathcote and Perri (2013). And  is set at 0:65
implying the local good account for 65% of the input into nal goods in each
country. Given the relatively low value for  and  we choose  and  here to
be low relative to their typical estimates in the literature. This is to ensure that
~ falls in a meaningful range for home bias. We return to discuss this point in
the sensitivity analysis.
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Variable Description Value
r Gross international interest rate 1:0311
z; k Total asset price/supply and Capital stock 3:8645
w Total asset demand 3:8645
f Net foreign assets 0
c Consumption 0:9961
i Investment 0:0039
h Labour supply (hours) 0:8317
l Labour income 0:88
d Dividend 0:1161
x Output of intermediate goods 1
xh Input of local intermediate good in nal good 0:65
xf Input of overseas intermediate good in nal good 0:35
y Final good output 1
q Price of home intermediate good 1
q Price of foreign intermediate good 1
p Price index of home nal good 1
p Price index of foreign nal good 1
s Exchange rate 1
g Wage rate 1:0581
MPK Marginal product of capital 0:0311
MPL Marginal product of labour 1:0581
cn New-borns consumption 0:8766
Table 4.3: Model steady states: Symmetric case
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Variable Description Value
r Gross international interest rate 1:0310
z1; k Home asset price/supply and Capital stock 3:8652
z2; k
 Foreign asset price/supply and Capital stock 3:5574
w1 Home total asset demand 3:6828
w2 Foreign total asset demand 3:7397
f (=  f ) Home (foreign) net foreign asset  0:1823
c Home consumption 0:9907
c Foreign consumption 1:0019
i Home investment 0:0039
i Foreign investment 0:0035
h Home labour supply (hours) 0:8408
h Foreign labour supply (hours) 0:8461
l Home labour income 0:8800
l Foreign labour income 0:8900
d Home dividend 0:1161
d Foreign dividend 0:1065
x Output of home intermediate good 1:0097
x Output of foreign intermediate good 0:9904
xh Demand for x by home agents 0:6521
xf Demand for x by home agents 0:3425
xh Demand for x by foreign agents 0:3576
xf Demand for x
 by foreign agents 0:6479
y Final good output in home country 0:9945
y Final good output in foreign country 1:0054
q Price of home intermediate good 0:9729
q Price of foreign intermediate good 0:9960
p Price index of home nal good 0:9823
p Price index of foreign nal good 0:9864
s Exchange rate 0:9960
g Home wage 1:0281
g Foreign wage 1:0377
MPK Marginal product of capital in production of x 0:0313
MPK Marginal product of capital in production of x 0:0307
MPL Marginal product of labour in production of x 1:0568
MPL Marginal product of labour in production of x 1:0419
cn Newborns consumption in home country 0:8767
cn Newborns consumption in foreign country 0:8867
Table 4.4: Model steady states: Asymmetric case
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4.7.2 Steady states in the two countries
Before proceeding to the asymmetric steady state, let us demonstrate the sym-
metric situation rst. In Table 4:3, we report the steady state of the model
where  is set the same level as  at 0:12. This gives us a level of r at 1:0311
which comes from the formula r = (1 + n) = by our previous analysis. It also
represents the equalized level of the autarky interest rate ra in both countries.
The force causing di¤ering (country-specic) rates of return disappears and net
external positions in steady state are zero, f = f  = 0. The total asset supply,
z; and demand, w; are thus both equal and given by = (r   1) = 3:8645. The
value of the capital stock, k; is in line with that of z, so is given by 3:8645 as
well. As a constant fraction of k, investment, i; is given by nk = 0:0039. Except
for i, the remaining expenditure on gdp = 1 is consumption which accounts for
c = 0:9961. Although households in the two countries both feature preference
bias, the fact that they have the same wealth guarantees balanced relative prices
of x and x, i.e. q = q = 1. This in turn implies the solution of the other
price indices is unity in steady state, i.e. p = p = s = 1. Because of this,
the quantities of intermediate goods and nal goods are also given by 1 under
the GDP normalization. Moreover, the shares of the demands for the local and
overseas goods in each countrys basket are divided exactly according to  = 0:65
and (1  ) = 0:35. Working hours supplied by each economy, h; is obtained at
0:8317, which is linked to the above c, y and k through the optimal condition
of labour supply and production function. The related wage rate is g = 1:0581.
With all prices being 1, labour income, l = gh=p; amounts to 88 percent of
GDP , i.e. 1 minus  multiplied by 100% of the total income gnp = gdp = 1.
Correspondingly, nancial income amounts to the remaining 12 percent of GNP .
After satisfying the need for capital accumulation, the prot of rms that is paid
as dividend is given by d = 0:1161, consistent with z from the point of view of
asset pricing. Finally, we obtain new-born consumption, cn; at 0:8766. This is
simultaneously consistent with the value of l by the fact that new generations
consume the average of their life-time (discounted) labour income and that of c
by the relation between cn and c that is required by the per capita aggregation
relation.
In Table 4:4, we report how the above steady state changes in an asymmetric
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case when  is set one percentage point lower than . As expected, a relatively
higher  induces a relatively higher asset supply z1 = 3:8652 and lower asset
demand w1 = 3:6828 in the home country and a relatively lower asset supply
z2 = 3:5574 and higher asset demand w2 = 3:7397 in the foreign country. (In
other words, the total wealth of a country is about 3:7 times of GDP . As a
reference, Caballero et al. (2008) uses an estimate of 4 times of country wealth
to GDP for the advanced home country. According to the dataset collated by
Heathcote and Perri (2013), however, this ratio averages at around 2:5 over the
period 1970 2010 in the U:S:.) There is thus a steady state negative net external
position in the home country f < 0 and a steady state positive net position in
the foreign country f  > 0. So NFA global imbalances emerge. In terms of
the size of the imbalances, the net external positions are approximately 18% of
the steady state GDP , i.e. f =  f  = 0:1823 as is shown in the table. This is
similar to what happened to U:S: during 1999 2010 when the percentage has an
average of 18:7 according to Lane and Milesi-Ferrettis (2007) (extended) dataset.
The international interest rate, r; declines slightly compared to the symmetric
case and is now at 1:0310, reecting the fact that the foreign autarky interest
rate is lower than before or/and the foreign and global asset supply is reduced
while demand is boosted. By the same argument as explained in the symmetric
case, when z2 becomes lower, so do k and i. Together with the fact that the
foreign country maintains a higher GNP by receiving external interest revenues,
i.e. y = 1 + (r   ~n) f  > y = 1 + (r   ~n) f , a lower level of i in turn means a
higher level of consumption c in the foreign country.
Consider the market clearing condition of the two intermediate goods, x and
x, when the home country is relatively poor while the foreign country is relatively
wealthy. With the same degree of preference over the local goods in the two
countries, there must be an excess supply of x and an excess demand for x. To
achieve equilibrium, the relative price of home good is thus depressed, q < q,
and so is the home CPI, i.e. p < p. The home basket is thus cheaper than the
foreign one, i.e. s < 1. (For convenience of exposition, when computing steady-
state relative prices, we normalize the home price of foreign good to unity, i.e.
q=s = 1, so the terms of trade of the home country, dened as the price of
exports in terms of imports, is equal to q=(q=s) = q in the model.) Steady state
GDP s being normalised at 1 in the two countries, the output of the cheaper
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good is thus raised, i.e. x > x. Due to the fact that  > , the demands for
local and overseas goods are not distributed in the exact proportions of  and
(1  ) any more.
Since the labour income share increases in the foreign country (1  ) >
(1  ), l is relatively higher now. Correspondingly, the nancial income share
in the foreign country decreases. Given that investments are small compared with
prot, even though i is reduced, d is still lower. Again, the fall in d also echoes
the decrease in z2 which is the present value of discounted future dividends. A
higher l also implies a higher cn because new-borns enjoy a higher permanent
income in terms of human wealth now. Because from the per capita aggregation
relation, we obtained cn as a positive function of c in Section 4:3, the higher
cn is also consistent with the higher c.
4.7.3 Impulse responses
We discuss the rst-order behaviour of the model around the above steady state
in this subsection. Taking the case of a positive technology shock in the home
country as an example, we depict the associated responses of a selection of vari-
ables in Figure 4:2.
Panel (a) of the gure shows the one unit rise in the home country produc-
tivity, "t. The supply shock depresses the price of the home intermediate good
because the home country can produce more of it and the foreign good becomes
relative scarcer, i.e. q^t < 0. Due to the lower price, the demand for the home
good can thus be relatively higher, i.e. x^t > 0 (for both xht and xht), which at
the same time matches the increase in the supply of the home good. Given that
the home nal basket is made of a relatively high proportion of the home good
( > 1=2), the deterioration of the terms of trade translates into a depreciation
of the home basket, i.e. s^t = p^t   p^t < 0, as is illustrated in Panel (c).
The lower price of the home good also strongly stimulates home country
investment, {^t > 0; which uses the local good intensively. Relative investment
rises signicantly on impact, {^t   (^{t   s^t) > 0; even though in this process the
depreciation of the exchange rate partially o¤sets the e¤ect. In Panel (d) of the
gure, this is illustrated by the fact that the higher solid line is above the dashed
line. Note that in order to ease comparison, all foreign variables in the gure
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses to a positive shock to home country productivity
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have been converted into units of the home consumption basket, so the dashed
line in Panel (d) represents (^{t   s^t) rather than {^t . While s^t is negative, this
implies that {^t actually lies even lower than the dashed line appearing here.
The positive technological shock increases the marginal products of inputs,
including capital and labour, in the home country. Relative labour supply and
wage are higher than before. Because lt =
gt
pt
ht, together with a stabilizing
relative price p^t < p^t , these lead to a higher relative labour income, i.e. l^t  
l^t   s^t

> 0. This is shown in Panel (f).
In the model, nal goods can be used to either consume or invest. The
price of capital is thus also given by the price of nal goods. The depreciation
of the home consumption basket described above immediately boosts the value
of the existing capital stock, with the current parameterization, so much that
home capital (relative to foreign capital) goes down, i.e. k^t  

k^t   s^t

< 0.
This process of home capital devaluation rationalizes the initial response of asset
prices as is shown in Panel (g). That is, on impact, both zt+1 and zt+1 jump
while z^t+1 is very close to, but lower, than z^t+1.
Now consider the dividend distributed by rm. Recall that the dividend is
dened as the di¤erence between the rms revenue and its expenditure on labour
employment and investment, i.e. dt =
qt
pt
xt   lt   it. Even though xt is higher
than before, the selling price, qt
pt
; combined with increased payments on wages
and investment in fact reduces the relative home dividend, i.e. d^t 

d^t   s^t

< 0.
Panel (e) illustrates the decrease in relative dt.
Asset returns are dened as the dividend dt and capital gains zt+1 over the
cost of asset purchase zt 1. Because z^t+1 accounts for the largest proportion of
the movement, it determines the sign of the change in rates of return. From
Panel (b) of the gure, since z^t+1 and z^t+1 are higher, we observe that both r^1t
and r^2t increase in response to the shock. However, because z^t+1 and z^t+1 are
close, changes in dividends determine the relative rates of return. In Panel (b),
since d^t  

d^t   s^t

< 0, the rate of return for the home asset is less a¤ected by
the shock than that of the foreign asset on impact, which results in a temporary
negative value for r^xt. From the second period on after the shock, r^1t+i = r^2t+i
(i  1) for the same reason as that appears in (Section 3:2 and Figure 1 of)
Heathcote and Perri (2013), i.e. the optimal portfolio is free to re-structure,
which sweeps away the return di¤erence between the two assets.
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Lastly, we depict the responses of new-bornsconsumption in Panel (h). It is
not surprising to discover that the relative consumption of new-borns is positive
after the shock, i.e. c^nt   (c^nt   s^t) > 0; given that new generations in the home
country expect a relatively higher labour income as a result of the shock.
Note that in all of the above analysis, we only consider the initial responses
of the variables. While in fact the relative dt, lt and cnt will reverse their signs
some periods after the shock (Panel (e), (f) and (h)), the sums of all discounted
expected future relative dt, lt and cnt , i.e. the dt, lt and c
n dened in Section
4:5, still feature the same signs as those of the above initial responses due to
the fact of discounting and the small magnitudes of these terms after reversal.
Recognizing this point, the above analysis can be summarised as follows. In
response to a positive supply shock to the home country, i.e. xt > 0, the
relative rate of asset returns declines, i.e. r^xt < 0; while the relative dividend
goes down so cov (dt; r^xt) > 0. However, relative labour income goes up so
cov (lt; r^xt) < 0. The rate of return for both assets goes up so cov (r^1t; r^xt)
and cov (r^2t; r^xt) are both negative. In addition, relative consumption of home
country newborns goes up so cov (cn; r^xt) < 0.
Return now to the expression ~ in Section 4:6. These numerical results verify
our analysis in that section. ~ is made up from negative self-hedging, positive
hedging of labour income, negative hedging of interest rate payments and new-
borns consumption in the home country. Below, we consider the size of these
hedging terms, the optimal s and the resulting portfolio allocations under the
symmetric and asymmetric simulations.
4.7.4 Portfolio allocation
In this subsection, we look at the optimal portfolios and the related portfolio
allocation across countries in the model. We show that when  decreases, in
comparison to the symmetric case, two results emerge. Firstly, the degree of
asset home bias in both countries deepens. Secondly, the increase in the degree
of asset home bias in the home country is more signicant than in the foreign
country. We explore the explanations for the emergence of these results through
portfolio decomposition.
Table 4:5 is used for this subsection. In the table, steady-state portfolios s for
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Variable Description ( = ) ( > )
 = ~=r Gross holding of home asset at home  0:7311  0:7279
cc= (cs+ c) Coe¢ cient in ~ 0:4981 0:4991
cc
(cs+c)
(1 )~n
(r  ~n) Coe¢ cient in ~ 0:0142 0:0143
cov (dt; r^xt) Covariance between dt and r^xt 0:1551 0:1459
cov (lt; r^xt) Covariance between lt and r^xt  0:0982  0:1002
cov (rn2t ; r^xt) Covariance between 
rn
2t and r^xt  0:0288  0:0295
cov
 
cnt+1; r^xt

Covariance between cnt+1 and r^xt  0:0628  0:0656
var (r^xt) Variance of r^xt 0:0388 0:0390
std (dt) Standard deviation of dt 0:7877 0:7391
std (lt) Standard deviation of lt 0:4987 0:5108
std (rn2t ) Standard deviation of 
rn
2t 0:1612 0:1655
std
 
cnt+1

Standard deviation of cnt+1 0:3188 0:3367
cor (dt; r^xt) Correlation between dt and r^xt 1 0:9993
cor (lt; r^xt) Correlation between lt and r^xt  1  0:9930
cor (rn2t ; r^xt) Correlation between 
rn
2t and r^xt  0:9076  0:9015
cor
 
cnt+1; r^xt

Correlation between cnt+1 and r^xt  1  0:9859
vae (dt; r^xt) std (dt) =std (r^xt) 4 3:7408
vae (lt; r^xt) std (lt) =std (r^xt) 2:5327 2:5853
vae (rn2t ; r^xt) std (
rn
2t ) =std (r^xt) 0:8184 0:8378
vae
 
cnt+1; r^xt

std
 
cnt+1

=std (r^xt) 1:6188 1:7039
 [1] Self-hedging  1:9323  1:8097
 [2] Hedging of labour income 1:2235 1:2428
 [3] Hedging of imbalance term 0  0:1377
 [4] Adjustment to new-bornsconsumptions  0:0222  0:0233
1 = z1 +  Home holding of home asset 3:1335 3:1373
2 = w1   1 Home holding of foreign asset 0:7311 0:5456
1 =   Foreign holding of home asset 0:7311 0:7279
2 = w2   1 Foreign holding of foreign asset 3:1335 3:0118
 = 1=z1 Asset home bias in the home country 0:8108 0:8117
 = 2=z2 Asset home bias in the foreign country 0:8108 0:8466
Table 4.5: Steady-state portfolios
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the symmetric and asymmetric cases can be found on the rst row. According to
the previous denition, for each case, we decompose  into the self-hedging  [1],
the hedging of labour income  [2], the hedging of external interest payments
 [3] and the adjustment to new-borns consumption  [4] which are all shown
from row 21 to 24 of the table. To trace the process of decomposition, we also
report the value of the coe¢ cients of cc

cs+c and
cc
(cs+c)
(1 )~n
(r  ~n) , variance of r^xt and
associated covariances in rows 2 to 8. In addition, in rows 9 to 20 the volatility
of the di¤erent components of income and the correlation and variability e¤ects
are displayed. The implied portfolio allocations across the world and the degree
of asset home bias in each country are computed at the end of the table.
Let us start from examining the symmetric result. Under the symmetric case,
we obtain a gross holding of the local asset of  0:7311, which means, with the
same z and w of 3:8645 across countries, each country holds the local asset to
the amount of 3:1335 and holds the overseas asset to the amount of 0:7311. This
in turn leads to a domestic ownership share of the local asset of 81:08% > 50%
in both countries. A symmetric asset home bias emerges. Use  to denote this
degree of asset home bias, so we have  =  = 81:08%. This is qualitatively
the same result as obtained by Heathcote and Perri (2013) (except that now
 includes an adjustment to newborns consumption in addition to the other
hedging), i.e. once we drop the country asymmetry in the model, the negative
correlation between the nancial and labour incomes implies countries overweight
the local asset to the same degree. To check the relative roles of the various
hedging terms, from the result of portfolio decomposition, we observe that self-
hedging,  [1] ; is  1:9323, a short position of the home asset up to nearly half
of z1 in magnitude. The hedging of labour income risk,  [2] ; is 1:2235. This
implies an increase in the net holding of the home asset which is the key portfolio
component in terms of generating asset home bias. Besides,  [4] is  0:0222 and
 [3] does not exist in the symmetric case.
Turning now to the asymmetric case,  is 0:7279. With di¤ering zs, the s in
the two countries are computed at respectively 81:17% and 84:66%. Comparing
them with the previous 81:08%, we observe the following two results. Firstly,
the ratios in the two countries are both higher than before. And secondly, the
ratio in the home country is relative lower than that in the foreign country.
The reason for the rst result lies in the change in the relative importance
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of  [1] and  [2]. By inspecting the distribution of  [i] under the asymmetric
case, rst of all, it is obvious that all components still have the expected signs.
However, in terms of size, as the major force of portfolio component which drives
the country portfolio toward the foreign asset, the self-hedging  [1] becomes less
important. In contrast, the other components, especially the hedging of labour
income  [2] which is the major force in driving country portfolio toward the
local asset, becomes more important. For given asset supplies, this change in
the relative importance of  [1] and  [2], by yielding a low absolute value of 
everywhere, are enough to generate a high  in the both countries. However,
in the model, asset supplies are not xed in response to the change in s. In
the current asymmetric simulation, a lower  create a lower r internationally.
Recall that z1 = r 1 , with the same  and a lower r, the asset supply in the home
country increases. This means for  to stay at the same level, jj should also
increase. A low jj implied by the aforementioned change in relative importance
of  [1] and  [2] therefore implies a higher  (= 1   jj =z1 where jj # while
z1 ") in the home country. For the asset supply in the foreign country (recall
that z2 = 

r 1) the e¤ect of a decrease in 
, as the rst-order e¤ect, outweighs
that of a subsequent lower r. So z2 deceases in response. The degree of asset
home bias in the foreign country,  (= 1  jj =z2 where jj # and z2 #), will go
up for su¢ ciently low jj. In summary,  and  are higher because the positive
 [2] becomes su¢ ciently more important than the negative  [1], which tends to
yield a less negative  across the two countries.
The reason for the second result lies in the emergence of  [3]s. As explained,
a lower  relative to  gives rise to the steady state NFA global imbalances, i.e.
it results in a steady state negative net external position in the home country and
a steady state positive net external position in the foreign country. This expose
the two countries to the risk of external interest payments in addition to theGDP
income risk. For the foreign country, the local asset (the asset 2) does a good
job in terms of hedging against this risk. But for the home country, the overseas
asset (again the asset 2) is a better choice to hedge against this risk. Both of the
two facts encourage the demands for the foreign asset and depress that for the
home asset. The asymmetry therefore tends to decrease the home bias degree
in the home country and increase the home bias degree in the foreign country.
Our simulation results in  [3] =  0:1377 and  [3] = f  +  [3] = 0:0446. The
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result that  <  indicates that the e¤ect coming from opposite hedging, i.e.
 [3] < 0 <  [3] ; exceeds that from supply side, i.e. z1 > z2.
Now, consider the underlying causes of the distribution of e¤ects on the di¤er-
ent  [i]. In particular, why does  [1] shrink while the other hedging terms grow?
Our previous analysis of the determination of the hedging terms as variance-
covariance ratios provides further insights. First of all, from Table 4:5, we notice
that once  > , in comparison to the symmetric case, var (r^xt) increases on
the one hand. On the other hand, cov (dt; r^xt) decreases while the other co-
variances increase. These facts imply the changes in the relative importance of
 [i]s. To see this more transparently, following Chapter 2, we break down the
hedging terms into the correlation and variability e¤ects. Note from the table,
when  = , except for cor (rn2t ; r^xt) which is slightly lower, other correlations
approach to (positive or negative) unity. Introducing a lower  decreases all
these correlations, which means that the collapse of the symmetry in the model
weakens assets relevance in hedging against all income risks in general. This
quality-typee¤ect points to a reduction in all components of . (See Section
2:3:4 for more detailed interpretation of the correlation e¤ect and its role in af-
fecting the size of portfolio holdings.) Nevertheless, note that the relative changes
in the variability e¤ects di¤er. The variability e¤ect associated with the hedging
of nancial income risk declines while those associated with the other hedging
terms rise. This is because intuitively a low  lowers the global share of nancial
wealth. So the volatility of nancial wealth accounts for a smaller proportion of
the total wealth volatility in the model. Correspondingly, the volatility of the
other types of wealth accounts for a remaining larger proportion of the total
wealth volatility in the model. This quantity-type e¤ect is the key reason for the
fall of the relative importance of  [1] and the rise of that of the other hedging
terms.
It is also useful to comment here on how the coe¢ cient of cc

(cs+c) changes.
As mentioned, it reduces to 1
2
in a symmetric endowment economy because
c = c = s = 1. In a symmetric production economy, it decreases because
consumptions account for less than total spending and are both lower than 1.
In the asymmetric production economy (where the average global consumption
is not xed), consumption in the two countries is pushed up by the lower r in
response to a low . Besides, the real exchange rate depreciates due to the pre-
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Figure 4.3: Portfolio allocation and components
viously explained reason, so the value of this coe¢ cient increases, which is also
shown in the table.
We follow Chapter 3 by casting the results of portfolio allocations and decom-
position into a diagram, i.e. Figure 4:3. In the middle of the gure, the heights
of two columns represent the capital stocks, the ks, or/and total asset supplies,
the zs, in the two countries. The upward vertical axis on the left hand side mea-
sures k and z1 while the downward vertical axis on the right hand side measures
k and z2. To nd out how z1 and z2 are distributed across the two countries,
for instance for z1, beside the left-hand-side vertical axis the four bars illustrate
the hedging components and are accumulated to obtain . From the left to the
right, they are respectively the negative self-hedging,  [1], the positive hedging
of labour income,  [2], the negative hedging of interest payments and the ad-
justment to new-borns consumption,  [3] and  [4]. The net holdings of the
home asset by the home and foreign countries are thus respectively 1 = z1 + 
and 1 =  , as depicted in the gure. The same strategy also applies to the
foreign asset z2.
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With the diagram, the result of this chapter can be conveniently put into
the context of the literature. In particular, on the one hand, the three results
obtained by Caballero et al. (2008) are preserved here. Firstly, the home asset
becomes more important in the international asset market, i.e. a higher column
on the left hand side than that on the right hand side in the middle of the diagram
z1 > z2. Secondly, the international real interest rate r is lower because the world
asset supply is reduced while the world asset demand is driven up. Thirdly, the
steady stateNFA global imbalances emerge, i.e. the di¤erence between the areas
of 2 (which is the gross external asset/liability of the home/foreign country)
and 1 (which is the gross external liability/asset of the home/foreign country).
What this chapter does is thus to extend their analysis to also shed light on
the gross portfolio positions s. On the other hand, our study takes the same
approach as that in the literature on the determination of the gross portfolio
positions, i.e. focusing on the hedging properties of assets for di¤erent types
of incomes. In Heathcote and Perri (2013), the positive hedging of the labour
income risk emerges as the key driving force of the symmetric asset home bias
across countries. The asymmetric factor being incorporated into the framework
in this chapter, the way that di¤erent hedging terms play their role in shaping
portfolio holdings and thus allocations di¤ers. The portfolios in both countries
becomes more home-biased (as  decreases). And moreover, the portfolio in the
foreign country is relatively more home-biased than that in the home country.
In the diagram, this is captured by a smaller share of area 1 to z1 relative to
the share of area 2 to z2.
4.8 Sensitivity analysis
In the previous section, the results of the benchmark simulation provides us with
an example where, when  > , the optimal portfolio chosen in the home country
is more internationally diversied than that in the foreign country, i.e.  < .
From the previous analysis, we know that this is possible only when the e¤ect of
decreasing  on the portfolio choice exceeds the e¤ect on asset supplies. So, to
show that the result of Section 4:7 is not a coincidence driven by an elaborate
selection of parameter values, in this section we will perform a series of robustness
checks.
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Figure 4.4: Asset home biases when vary s
4.8.1 Wealth division parameters, the s
As explained, our choice of the values of the s ( at 0:12 while  is one percent
below) relies on Caballero et al.s (2008) calibration which leads to a ratio of
wealth to income lower than 4. If we take the literal meaning of the s, the
estimated share of non-human wealth in total wealth, from the literature, this
is usually about one third (for instance, Lettau 2001 estimates it to be 0:31.).
This is consistent with the estimates of the capital share in production in the
literature. Some literature thus interprets the -asymmetry as the technological
di¤erence across countries (Jin, 2012). Following this approach, the values of the
s should be higher than the ones we use in the benchmark case.
We experiment by varying , keeping the -gap constant, from the current
value of 0:12 up to more than 0:4. Figure 4:4 shows the associated  (solid line)
and  (dashed line) in the two countries. It is obvious that the portfolio in the
home country is always less home-biased by the fact that  <  when the  is
within the range shown, i.e. the dashed line lies above the solid line.
When  increases, both lines show a lower degree of asset home bias in both
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countries. This is economically sensible because, when the s increase, with less
labour income risk to be hedged and with more hedging vehicles available, i.e. a
large share of nancial income and thus large asset stocks, the demands for the
local assets (the good hedge for labour income) will be lower in both countries.
4.8.2 Elasticity of substitution between goods, 
The quantitative literature in open economy macroeconomics usually sets the
value of  at around or higher than unity. For instance, Stockman and Tesar
(1995) set it equal to unity while Backus et al. (1995) set it equal to 1:5. Feenstra
et al. (2014) estimate the median of the macroelasticity to be close to (but
higher than) 1 and the microone to be even higher (up to 2 times larger).
One implication of the choice of value for  is that, the higher is , the higher
are the s. This is because, when the two goods are more substitutable, in
response to a positive shock to home country productivity, the resulting price
responses (i.e. home basket depreciation) are moderated. The weakening of
the stabilizing terms-of-trade e¤ect leaves a heavier load of risk-sharing to be
achieved through portfolio diversication. This requires countries to more over-
weight local assets. When simulating the model, given that we have already
chosen very low s which also tends to yield high s, we choose a low estimate
of  (= 0:9 from Heathcote and Perri, 2002) to avoid the counterfactual case of
s being greater than 1. On the other hand, because we are still interested in
the case of asset home bias (thus s still have to be above 0:5), we do not need
to worry about the situation where  is too low. And based on the literature,
these extremely low values of  are less likely to be relevant.
In Figure 4:5 we assess how  and  respond to  varying in the region of 0:9.
As expected, when  increases, the s increase. But  <  is always observed,
thus verifying the robustness of the result to the change in trade substitutability.
The gap between  and  increases as  increases. This is because, given the
s, asset supplies (the zs) are only a¤ected by r whose value is very insensitive
to that of . So when  changes, the zs almost stay constant. But a rise in
 pushes up net holdings of local assets, 1 and 2; in both countries. As the
country who supplies a lower amount of assets (i.e. z2 < z1), when  increases,
the foreign country will have a  growing faster than .
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Figure 4.5: Asset home biases when vary 
Figure 4:5 shows that the s are quite sensitive to . This is due to a rein-
forcing e¤ect coming from the choice of low s. When the s are set higher, the
two lines in the gure becomes atter and we obtain a wider range of  yielding
s which are lower than 1. In the light of the estimated range of  and  in the
literature, this allows  to approach its typical value and  to gain a more eclectic
interpretation. But this comes with the sacrice of a larger wealth income ratio.
The current study does not aim to identify which aspect of the data should
be more respected in choosing parameter values for this model. Our results pre-
sented here are just an example that, even though we choose to follow Caballero
et al. (2008) in setting a low  in our benchmark simulation, we can take an
alternative route by setting  at a higher value and the resulting choice of the
other parameters approach their commonly-used range. In any case, while af-
fecting the shape of the two lines in the gure, these other parameter variations
do not change the pattern of  >  in the model.
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Figure 4.6: Asset home biases when vary 
4.8.3 Degree of local good preference, 
We turn now to consider the e¤ect of the degree of the trade home bias, ; on
the pattern of  < . In Figure 4:6, we plot the s against a range of values for
. It is obvious that the dashed line, ; is always higher than the solid line, ;
for the range of values of  shown, so the main benchmark result still holds for
this experiment.
As in the case of , a higher  implies higher s in both countries. This
is because a higher  also means a lower terms-of-trade e¤ect takes place in
response to shocks and this lowers the risk associated with income from capital.
This reduces the need for self-hedging and thus induces countries to hold more of
the local asset in their portfolios. To see why the terms-of-trade e¤ect decreases,
consider for instance that home country productivity receives a positive shock.
The supply side e¤ect of this shock is to cause a terms-of-trade deterioration.
However, on the demand side, a higher degree of local product preference, ;
implies a higher share of spending on local goods, which tends to imply that a
rise in home productivity raises home income and home demand for the home
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good, which in turn counteracts the e¤ect of the shock on the terms of trade.
For a similar reason to that of , when  increases, the discrepancy between
 and  becomes larger. Given that in the literature  is usually chosen to be
around 0:85 (for example, Backus et al., 1994), the pattern of  <  will only be
strengthened relative to our benchmark if we choose a  approaching this value.
4.8.4 Shock persistence, 
As another experiment, now we consider the responses of portfolio allocations to
di¤erent degrees of persistence in technological shocks, i.e. di¤erent values for
. In the literature, the shock to productivity is usually assumed to be highly
persistent, i.e.  is around or higher than 0:9. For example, Devereux and
Sutherland (2010) use the value of 0:9 while Backus et al. (1994), Heathcote
and Perri (2002) use 0:91. We test a broad cases of , from 0 to 0:99, and nd
that  is always lower than . A subset of the results is reported in Figure
4:7 where  ranges from 0:8 to 0:99. Similar to the above results, the choice of
value for  does not alter the pattern of  <  but only changes the level of
s in the two countries and the gap between the two s. In particular, the s
increase as the shock becomes more persistent. This is because, the higher is ,
the more volatile are all relevant variables in determining portfolio choices (for
instance r^xt, dt and lt). Nevertheless, the degree of the increase in volatility
di¤ers across these variables. Since in the model, nancial wealth accounts for a
relatively lower share of total wealth,  < 1=2, lt absorbs more volatility than
dt does. This enhances the role of hedging of labour income risk in  while
reducing the role of self-hedging, which leads to a less diversied portfolio in both
countries. Otherwise, if nancial wealth were to account for a relatively large
share of total wealth, its volatility would grow relatively fast as  is increased,
which would result in a reversed e¤ect on the s in response to a change in 
(but still with  < ).
4.8.5 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
By using a logarithmic utility function in the model, we in fact assume that the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is equal to 1. To extend
our framework to account for the case where the elasticity is not equal to 1, in this
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Figure 4.7: Asset home biases when vary 
subsection, we replace the benchmark utility function with the commonly-used
CRRA function as follows
U vt =
1X
i=0
i
" 
cvt+i
1 1=
1  1=   
 
hvt+i
1+
1 + 
#
where  denotes the intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitution and 
is the (inverse) elasticity of substitution of labour supply. The solution process
of the extended model is similar to that of the current model, however, with the
related optimality conditions (mainly those for labour supply hs and portfolio
choices ) and the steady state being modied. The full description of how
this is achieved is attached in Section 4:D of the Appendix to this chapter. In
particular, we nd that in the optimal portfolio, a hedging term for real exchange
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rate risk emerges in addition to the existing hedging terms.
~ =   cc

cs+ c
cov (dt; r^xt)
var (r^xt)
  cc

cs+ c
cov (lt; r^xt)
var (r^xt)
 rf cov (
rn
2t ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)
+
cc
cs+ c
(1  ) ~n
(r    ~n)
cov
 
cnt+1; r^xt

var (r^xt)
 cc
 (  1)
cs+ c
cov (st ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging exchange rate
+
cc (  1)
cs+ c
(1  ) ~n
(r    ~n)
cov
 
st+1; r^xt

var (r^xt)| {z }
Hedging newborns consumption-related exchange rate
Note that on the last line of the above formula, the rst term reects the fact
that agents are exposed to real exchange rate risk and hedging against the risk
arises in response. Besides, the adjustment to the new-borns consumption also
contains a factor of real exchange rate risk which gives rise to hedging represented
by the second term on the last line.
We simulate the model with the previous parameterization. The new para-
meter  is set at 1, which on the one hand is based on the existing literature (for
instance Heathcote and Perri, 2013). On the other hand, when combined with
 = 1, this yields a result for the s that close to those obtained when log utility
is adopted (as in the benchmark model).
In Figure 4:8, we plot the levels of  and  when varying  from about 0:4 to
about 1:2. It turns out that given that the portfolios in the two countries exhibit
asset home bias, the pattern of  <  is always observed.
The gure shows that the lower is , the higher are the s. This is because
the intertemporal substitution rate, ; controls how relative consumptions reacts
to the changes in relative price. The lower is , the more reluctant households are
to adjust consumption in responses to a change in q. In other words, for instance
when the home good becomes relatively more expensive (i.e. q increases), the
more households would like to maintain the purchasing power of their income by
investing in the asset yielding relatively high rate of return. In the model, the
asset possessing this property (yielding higher excess return when the domestic
good appreciates) is the local asset for both countries, which explains the increase
in the s. Moreover, this is actually also the explanation for a positive hedging of
exchange rate when  is low. In this case, the hedging of the exchange rate works
in the same direction as that of the hedging of labour income, thus combatting
the e¤ect of a negative self-hedging. This reinforces asset home bias.
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Figure 4.8: Asset home biases when vary 
Again because asset supplies are insensitive to the change in , when  de-
creases, the gap between  and  grows monotonically.
4.8.6 Country asymmetry
In all the experiments above, we keep the measure of the asymmetry constant,
i.e.  =     = 0:01. It is easy to evaluate the robustness of the result
of  <  for di¤erent sizes of asymmetry across countries by simulating the
model using a  of di¤erent magnitude. And it turns out that the result
persists for such experiments. Only the gap between the two s is varying. For
a given , increasing  widens the gap between the s because a larger country
di¤erence deepens global imbalances, which in turn fuels the e¤ect of the hedging
of interest payments. Again, this asymmetric e¤ect from di¤ering on portfolio
choices always dominates that from relative asset supplies. When is large, the
dominance is strong. When  is small, it is diminishing but never disappears.
To sum up, according to the analysis in this section, we found that the re-
sult of  <  when  >  is robust to variants in parameter values and the
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introduction of hedging motive for real exchange rate variations. It can be es-
tablished that the e¤ects of hedging of external interest payments on otherwise
symmetric home-biased country portfolios usually dominates that coming from
asset supplies.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we develop an asymmetric two-country OLG model to examine
how global NFA imbalances and asymmetric asset home bias, the two most
prominent country-portfolio phenomena in the open economy data, are at the
same time driven by di¤erences between developed and developing countries in
the division of wealth between nancial assets and human capital. Previously,
the literature has analysed global NFA imbalances and asymmetric home bias
as two separate issues. When they are combined together in the same model, we
nd that, because agents have a motive to hedge against the interest payments
that are implied by non-zero net foreign positions, the portfolio allocations move
away from a symmetrically home biased position. To be specic, we nd that
the creditor (developing) country holds domestic assets more intensively than
the debtor (developed) country does. This is in line with the pattern of NFA
imbalances and asymmetric asset home bias that is observed in the data.
One major implication of our result is that some basic facts about wealth divi-
sion and net/gross portfolio phenomena between countries with di¤erent degrees
of development are in fact casually connected. In particular, the importance of a
countrys net external balance in shaping bilateral asset holdings is highlighted,
which makes this work a contribution particularly to the literature on gross port-
folios (and asset home bias). Following the categorization by Coeurdacier and
Rey (2012), the line of literature that focuses on hedging motives in portfolio
choice in frictionless economies is extended by our work because the dispersion
of home bias across countries is missing from that literature. The channel iden-
tied in this chapter also forms a supplement to the literature which attempts
to explain home bias in terms of market integration and trade costs (see Tesar
and Werner, 1995, Warnock, 2002). Lastly, many empirical studies consider the
role of the factors associated with geography, culture and institutions (see, for
instance, Portes and Rey, 2005, Chan et al., 2005, Daude and Fratzscher, 2008)
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in explaining di¤erences in country portfolios. Guided by our results reported in
this chapter, the net external balance of country should be included as a control
in such empirical evaluations.
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the simple endowment OLG
model in Chapter 3 is not a good framework to use quantitatively to think about
policy-oriented problems because of the unrealistically large magnitude of both
net and gross portfolios in that model. The production OLG model in this
chapter avoids this problem and thus provides a general and useful framework
suitable for the analysis of some practical issues between two large economies
where realistic net and gross country portfolios are important.
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Appendix
4.A Model equations in exact form
In this section, except for the utility function and Euler equations, all equations
appear in their per capita form after aggregation.
4.A.1 Householdsproblem
Individual utility function
U vt =
1X
i=0
i

log
 
cvt+i

+  log
 
1  hvt+i

Intertemporal budget constraints
(1 + n) (1t+1 + 2t+1)= r1t1t + r2t2t + lt ct
st (1 + n)
 
1t+1 + 

2t+1

= st (r1t

1t + r2t

2t)+l

t ct
Labour income
lt =
gt
pt
ht
lt =
gt
pt
ht
Asset returns and prices
r1tz1t=dt + (1 + n) z1t+1
r2tz2t=
dt
st
+ (1 + n) z2t+1
Euler equations (optimal choices of consumption/asset holdings)
(cvt )
 1 = Et
h
r1t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
(cvt )
 1 = Et
h
r2t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
st (c
v
t )
 1 = Et
h
st+1r1t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
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st (c
v
t )
 1 = Et
h
st+1r2t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
Labour supply
ht = 1   pt
gt
ct
ht = 1  
pt
gt
ct
New-borns consumption
cnt = (1  ) lt +
1
r
cnt+1
4.A.2 Firms problem
Technology and Marginal products (country asymmetry in , i.e.  > )
yt = e
"t (kt)
 (ht)
1 
yt = e
"t (kt )
 (ht )
1 
MPLt = (1  ) yt
ht
MPLt = (1  )
yt
ht
MPKt = 
yt
kt
MPKt = 
 y

t
kt
Objective function and discount factor
1X
i=0

idt+i

i = ic 1t+i
Dividend
dt =
qt
pt
yt   lt   it
dt =
qt
pt
yt   lt   it
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Investment
it = (1 + n) kt+1   kt
it = (1 + n) k

t+1   kt
Optimal choices of labour and capital demand
MPLt =
gt
qt
MPLt =
gt
qt
rkt =
qt
pt
MPKt + 1
rkt =
qt
pt
MPKt + 1

t = Et [
t+1rkt+1]

t = Et


t+1r

kt+1

4.A.3 Market clearing
Assets market clear
1t + 

1t = z1t
2t + 

2t = z2t
which are equivalent to
1t = z1t   1t
wt   z1t =   (wt   z2t)
Intermediate goods market clear
xht + x

ht = xt
xft + x

ft = x

t
where goods demands are given by
xht = 

qt
pt
 
yt
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xft = (1  )

qt
stpt
 
yt
xht = (1  )

stqt
pt
 
yt
xft = 

qt
pt
 
yt
Final goods market clear
ct + it = yt
ct + i

t = y

t
Price indices
pt =
"
 (qt)
1  + (1  )

q
st
1 # 11 
pt =
h
(1  ) (stqt)1  +  (qt )1 
i 1
1 
st =
pt
pt
Dening wt and ft
wt = 1t + 2t
wt = 

1t + 

2t
ft = wt   z1t
f t = w

t   z2t
4.B Linearized model equations
In this section, we approximate the model to rst order accuracy around the
steady states.
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4.B.1 Householdsproblem
Intertemporal budget constraints at the home country
~nww^t+1= rww^t + rwr^2t + r1r^xt+(1  ) l^t cc^t
Labour income
l^t = g^t + h^t   p^t
l^t = g^

t + h^

t   p^t
Asset returns (~n  (1 + n))
r^1t=

1  ~n
r

d^t +
~n
r
z^1t+1   z^1t
r^2t=

1  ~n
r

d^t   s^t

+
~n
r
z^2t+1   z^2t
Euler equations: Individual conditions are rst approximated along the (per-
fect foresight) optimal path to yield, for example for (cvt )
 1 = Et
h
r1t+1
 
cvt+1
 1i
,
c^vt+1 = c^
v
t + r^t+1
Together with the approximated per capita aggregation relation (see Chapter 3
for more details), the above individual condition leads to the per capita Euler
equations as below
c^t+1 =  c^t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  r^1t+1
c^t+1 =  c^t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  r^2t+1
c^t+1 =  c^

t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  [r^1t+1 + s^t+1   s^t]
c^t+1 =  c^

t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  [r^2t+1 + s^t+1   s^t]
Labour supply
hh^t = (h  1) (p^t + c^t   g^t)
hh^t = (h
   1) (p^t + c^t   g^t )
New-borns consumption
cnc^nt = (1  ) ll^t +
1
r
cnc^nt+1
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4.B.2 Firms problem
Technology and Marginal products
y^t = k^t + (1  ) h^t + "t
y^t = 
k^t + (1  ) h^t + "t
\MPLt = k^t   h^t + "t
\MPL

t = 
k^t   h^t + "t
\MPKt = (   1) k^t + (1  ) h^t + "t
\MPK

t = (
   1) k^t + (1  ) h^t + "t
Dividend
dd^t =
qx
p
(q^t + y^t   p^t)  ll^t   i^{t
dd^t =
qx
p
(s^t + y^

t   p^t )  ll^t   i^{t
Investment
i^{t = ~nkk^t+1   kk^t
i^{t = ~nkk^

t+1   kk^t
Optimal choices of labour and capital demand
\MPLt = g^t   q^t
\MPL

t = g^

t   q^t
rr^kt = (r   1)
h
q^t + \MPKt   p^t
i
rr^kt = (r   1)
h
q^t + \MPK

t   pt
i
c^t+1 = c^t + r^kt+1
c^t+1 = c^

t + r^

kt+1
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4.B.3 Market clearing
Assets market clear
1^1t = z1z^1t   1^1t
ww^t   z1z^1t =   (ww^t   z2z^2t)
Intermediate goods market clear
xhx^ht + x

hx^

ht = xx^t
xf x^ft + x

f x^

ft = x
x^t
where goods demands are given by
x^ht = y^t    (q^t   p^t)
x^ft = y^t    (q^t   s^t   p^t)
x^ht = y^

t    (s^t + q^t   p^t )
x^ft = y^

t    (q^t   p^t )
Final goods market clear
cc^t + i^{t = yy^t
cc^t + i
{^t = y
y^t
Price indices
p^t = 

q
p
1 
q^t + (1  )

q
sp
1 
(q^t   s^t)
p^t = (1  )

sq
p
1 
(s^t + q^t) + 

q
p
1 
q^t
Real exchange rate
s^t = p^t   p^t
Dening wt and ft
ww^t = 1^1t + 2^2t
ww^t = 

1^

1t + 

2^

2t
ff^t = ww^t   z1z^1t
ff^ t = w
w^t   z2z^2t
4. Asymmetric asset home bias 211
4.C Derive ~ from ~
For the foreign country, ~ is negative gross external assets (multiplied by r) while
~ is negative gross external liability (multiplied by r), so net external asset
(multiplied by r) ~f  is given by their (negative) di¤erence  ~  ( ~) = ~  ~.
That is
~ = ~f  + ~
where ~ is given by the expression in the main text. We dene dt , l

t , c
n
t+1,
r^xt as the inverse of their analogues in the home country, so the above equation
can be rewritten as
~ = ~f    cc

cs+ c
cov (dt ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)
  cc

cs+ c
cov (lt ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)
 rf cov (
rn
2t ; r^xt)
var (r^xt)
+
cc
cs+ c
(1  ) ~n
(r    ~n)
cov
 
cnt+1; r^

xt

var (r^xt)
The rst term in the second line can be rewritten as
rf 
cov
 
r^2t +
~n
r
rnt+1; r^xt

var (r^xt)
= rf 
cov
  r^xt + r^1t + ~nrrnt+1; r^xt
var (r^xt)
=   ~f    rf  cov (
rn
1t ; r^

xt)
var (r^xt)
where we use the fact of f =  f  and dene rn1t = r^1t + ~nrrnt+1. Substituting
this back into the second to last equation, we immediately obtain the expression
for ~ as in the main text.
4.D Extended model with hedging of the ex-
change rate
We extend the baseline model to the case where in the utility function the in-
tertemporal substitution rate is not necessarily 1. By doing so, the extended
framework also accommodates the presence of exchange rate hedging in ~. Note
that we only document the places that the benchmark (as in the baseline model
of the main text) needs to be adjusted.
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Utility function Assume the following commonly-used CES utility function
for vintages
U vt =
1X
i=0
i
" 
cvt+i
1 1=
1  1=   
 
hvt+i
1+
1 + 
#
where  denotes the intertemporal substitution rate and  the (inverse) substi-
tution rate of labour supply. As before  represents the relative weight between
utility from consumption and disutility from working hours. The intertemporal
budget constraints are the same as in the baseline model.
Euler equations The related Euler equations are
(cvt )
 1= = Et
h
r1t+1
 
cvt+1
 1=i
(cvt )
 1= = Et
h
r2t+1
 
cvt+1
 1=i
st (c
v
t )
 1= = Et
h
st+1r1t+1
 
cvt+1
 1=i
st (c
v
t )
 1= = Et
h
st+1r2t+1
 
cvt+1
 1=i
which di¤er from the benchmark by the inclusion of . We apply the same
procedure as for the benchmark Euler equations, i.e. linearize the individual
conditions and making use of the per capita aggregation relation to aggregate
them into the following form, for example for line 1 and 3 with expected return
rate of asset 1,
c^t+1 =  c^t + (1  ) c^nt+1 + r^1t+1
c^t+1 =  c^

t + (1  ) c^nt+1 +  [r^1t+1 + s^t+1   s^t]
where  is redened as (r)

(1+n)
< 1. (As a special case, the baseline model has a
 = r
(1+n)
because  = 1.)
In addition, new-borns consumption moves according to
cnt =
 
1  r 1 lt + 1
r
cnt+1
Linearizing yields
cnc^nt =
 
1  r 1 ll^t + 1
r
cnc^nt+1
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Labour supply First-order conditions for optimal labour supply are
 (hvt )
 (cvt )
1= =
gt
pt
 (hvt )
 (cvt )
1= =
gt
pt
To obtain the related (linearized) per capita condition, three steps are in
order (taking the case of home country as an example).
First, the relation implies (cvt )
 1= =  pt
gt
(hvt )
. Combined with the Euler
equation (cvt )
 1= = Et
h
r1t+1
 
cvt+1
 1=i
, we can obtain the relation that hvt
must satisfy in perfect-foresight optimum
hvt+1 = (r)
 1= hvt
That is the optimal path of hvt . (Remember although individual variables do not
have steady states, they have an optimal path. Individual consumption cvt has
an optimal path given by cvt+1 = (r)
 cvt . Chapter 3 has more details on the
optimal paths of individual variables.)
Second, similar to that for Euler equations, linearize the optimal conditions
for hvt along the individual optimal paths to yield
h^vt +
1

c^vt = g^t   p^t
which also applies for the vintages of new-born each period, i.e.
h^nt +
1

c^nt = g^t   p^t
or
h^nt =
1


g^t   p^t   1

c^nt

where hnt denotes the labour supply of new-borns that are equalizing across
time htt = h
t+1
t+1. As an alternative and equivalent way, the above equation is
immediately obtained if one directly linearize  (hnt )
 (cnt )
1= = gt
pt
by realizing
that each periods new-borns decisions are stationary due to the assumption
generations have the same structure.
Finally, according to the per capita aggregation relation for labour supply
ht =
h0t + nh
1
t + n (1 + n)h
2
t :::+ n (1 + n)
t 1 htt
(1 + n)t
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and making use of hvts optimal path in the rst step, it is easy to obtain the
dynamics of ht as follows
ht+1 =  lht +
n
~n
hnt+1
where  l =
(r) 1=
(1+n)
. From this we can work out, rst, steady state hnt as
hn =
~n
n
(1   l)h
and second, its linearized form
hh^t+1 =  lhh^t +
n
~n
hnh^nt+1
Replacing h^nt+1 with the result yielded in the second step, we nally obtain
hh^t+1 =  lhh^t +
n
~n
hn


g^t   p^t   1

c^nt

which represent hts dynamics.
Optimal portfolio Following the same process as in the main text, we obtain
the condition for ~ as
Et [(c^t   c^t + s^t) r^xt] = 0
which is similar to that of the baseline model except for the inclusion of .
Following similar procedures decomposing the wealth and composition e¤ect
of cdt = (c^t   c^t + s^t) as in the main text, for the current set-up, we end up
with an expression for cdt of the following form
r    ~n
r
[ct   ct ] 
(1  ) ~n
r

cnt+1   cnt+1

+
r    ~n
r
(  1)st  
(1  ) ~n
r
(  1)st+1
where the involved notations are the same as before. Due to the presence of the
two terms appearing on the second line, the model generates the need to hedge
against the risks associated with the exchange rate by holding ~. This is the
case only when  6= 1.
Substituting cdt into the optimal condition for the portfolio, we obtain ~s
expression as stated in the main text.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The on-going process of nancial globalization has been making countries across
the world more and more tightly integrated through the rapid expansion of cross-
border asset transactions. While nancial integration has been more pronounced
so far for advanced economies, developing countries are playing a more and more
important role in recent years. The participation of heterogeneous countries
in cross-border asset transactions gives rise to the notable stylised facts about
country portfolios as identied in Chapter 1. They are, rstly, regarding the
net portfolio position, in general the emerging economies have a positive posi-
tion of net foreign assets while developed countries have a negative net foreign
asset position. Secondly, regarding the gross portfolio position, in both groups
of countries, domestic assets are mostly held domestically. And in particular,
this asset home bias is more signicant in developing countries than in devel-
oped countries as a whole. Associated with the presence of the large net and
gross portfolio positions, valuation e¤ects across borders arise and become an
increasingly important channel a¤ecting the process of external adjustments of
a country in addition to the traditional trade channels. Thirdly, with regard to
the asset composition of gross positions, it is the case from the data that in net
terms, developed countries borrow in terms of safe securities, for instance bonds,
and at the same time invest in risky assets, for instance portfolio equity and
FDI, while many emerging markets on the one hand possess a large amount of
foreign reserves which is invested in international bonds, on the other hand, they
experience large net capital inows in terms of equity investments.
218
5. Conclusion 219
This thesis seeks to explain these empirical facts within new theoretical frame-
works. Chapter 2 focuses on accounting for the fact of two-way capital ows.
A general open economy DSGE model is used for this purpose. We assess the
e¤ects of a long list of country asymmetries on the pattern of net equity and
bond ows between countries in this chapter. The analysis shows that the fol-
lowing facts of underdevelopment in the developing countries can be potential
roots for them to have a steady state negative net equity position and a positive
net bond position and for developed countries to have a steady state positive
net equity position and a negative net bond position. Developing countries are
usually those using more labour intensive technology in production. The mar-
ket in these countries is less competitive so that the rms have more power in
pricing. The change in prices and wages is less exible. The monetary author-
ity is more concerned with the output gap than ination when implementing a
monetary policy rule. The degree of price and wage indexation is relatively high.
Trade openness is relatively low. And when pricing exports, the rms in these
countries use more often the currency of customers. Among these facts, those
associated with real factors, such as the technological di¤erence and monetary
policy weights, are found to be more quantitatively relevant while those associ-
ated with nominal factors, such as nominal stickiness and pricing strategies, are
of minor importance. The analysis in Chapter 2 highlights two channels through
which the size of asset positions is determined, i.e. the correlation and variabil-
ity e¤ects. The former represents the relevance of an asset in risk-hedging. The
latter represents the amount of risk to be hedged by that asset. The presence of
the above country asymmetries alters the relative strength of the correlation and
variability e¤ects between the home and foreign assets, which generates unequal
size of domestic and overseas asset holdings and in turn unbalanced net equity
and bond positions across countries. The composite e¤ect of these asymmetries
is also examined and it turns out to be qualitatively consistent with empirical
observed data. Moreover, in the case of asymmetric international nancial mar-
kets where developing countries cannot issue bonds, we nd that the degree of
two-way capital ows deepens.
Chapter 3 integrates the analyses of a non-trivial net portfolio position and
gross portfolio positions in the same theoretical framework. Previously, these two
themes are basically dealt with separately by distinct strands of the literature.
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The non-trivial net portfolio position between developing and developed coun-
tries is studied usually with no reference to the structure of nancial markets
and no explicit solution of gross portfolio choices, while, the determination of
gross portfolio choices is mostly studied within symmetric frameworks where net
portfolio position is zero in steady state. The reason for the treatment in the for-
mer strand of literature lies in the (until recently) lack of a suitable computation
method of portfolio choices. And for the latter strand of literature, the reason
of why it is not easy to take into account a non-zero net portfolio position and
gross portfolio positions at the same time is because a model of representative
agents embedding these two aspects will in general su¤er from a problem of non-
stationarity. In Chapter 3, we show that introducing an OLG structure into the
model can overcome this problem. Relying on an assumption of di¤ering degree
of patience across countries, we generate a positive net foreign asset position in
the developing country and a negative net foreign asset position in the developed
country, i.e. global net imbalances. This creates a di¤erence between GNP and
GDP for both countries, i.e. the return on net external position. Besides, the
way that consumption is distributed across time becomes asymmetric as well.
So relative consumption across countries depends on not only relative GDP but
also on the relative return on net external positions and the country di¤erence
in consumption distribution over time. According to the associated optimality
condition of portfolio choice, the gross portfolio holding is determined so as to
smooth the uctuation of the relative consumption across di¤erent states, i.e.
risk hedging. This change in the components of risk in the consumption di¤er-
ential a¤ects the way gross portfolio positions are structured. To be specic, the
gross position is composed of not only the diversication term but also the hedg-
ing term for the return on net external positions, the hedging term of new-born
consumption and the hedging term of interest rate tilting. Due to presence of
these additional terms, the portfolio allocation across countries becomes asym-
metric. And it appears to be home biased in the sense that in the portfolio
of each country, the local asset is preferred with a relatively large share. With
the non-trivial net portfolio position and the asymmetric gross position being
present, the external adjustments between the creditor (developing) and debtor
(developed) countries work through the intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect and
valuation e¤ect in addition to the traditional trade balance e¤ect.
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Chapter 4 extends the endowment OLG model of Chapter 3 to a produc-
tion economy in order to investigate how the asymmetry associated with wealth
division across countries sheds light on the emergence of both global NFA imbal-
ances and asymmetric asset home bias. Various features in developing countries
potentially underlie the assumed relatively low share of nancial wealth and the
relatively high share of labour wealth in these countries. These include techno-
logical intensity, which is associated with industrial structure and trade division,
and nancial underdevelopment, which is due to many deep institutional factors.
As a consequence of the asymmetry, the model shows that asset demand in the
developing country is relatively high and asset supply is relatively low, which
depresses the autarky interest rate in the developing country and drives a net
capital to ow out. A positive NFA position is thus formed in steady state.
Correspondingly, the NFA position in the developed country becomes negative.
Global net imbalances emerge. The distinction between nancial and labour in-
comes gives rise to a hedging motive against labour income risk when households
have to make their decisions on portfolio choices. In the two-good production
open economy, the endogenous responses of investment and the real exchange
rate make labour income move in the opposite direction to the return to the
local asset. At the optimum, this induces a long position in local assets for both
countries. Asset home bias emerges across the world. In addition, as in Chapter
3, under global net imbalances, countries are exposed to the risk associated with
the return to the non-zero net external position. This results in the presence
of a hedging term for net external interest payments in gross country portfolios.
Moreover, the sign of the hedging in the developed country is negative, which
encourage that country to hold more overseas asset. The sign of this hedging
in the developing country is, however, positive, which encourage that country to
hold more of the local asset. Despite an o¤setting supply e¤ect in response to
the country asymmetry, both of the two above facts point to a relatively lower
degree of asset home bias in the developed country compared to the developing
country. To sum up, represented by the asymmetry of wealth division, some
fundamental economic factors mentioned above in developing countries can be
the cause of both the persistent large net external position and the signicant
cross-country discrepancy in the degree of home bias in portfolio holdings.
This thesis explains a set of prominent facts of country portfolios between
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developing and developed countries. Besides, in this process, it provides two
useful frameworks on which future works can be based. The rst one is given by
the model in Chapter 2. This chapter places the problem of portfolio choices in
a general representative-agents model of an asymmetric two-country open econ-
omy. It is suitable for the analysis of problems where a non-trivial net portfolio
position is not important. The new framework is given by the model in Chapters
3 and 4 where an OLG structure is employed to accommodate both non-trivial
net external positions and gross portfolio choices simultaneously. Since these two
aspects are both very important from a practical point of view, taking the results
of Chapter 3 and 4 as a start, the next step in theoretical research will be there-
fore to explore the implications of merging the analysis of net and gross portfolio
positions for other relevant issues in international economics. These may include,
but are not restricted to, the following. 1. The analysis of gross capital ows un-
der global imbalances. While we analysed (steady state) net capital ows in this
thesis, the analysis of gross capital ows is not presented. This further analysis
can be obtained through a solution for the dynamics of gross portfolio positions.
2. The analysis of policy-oriented problems, for instance optimal monetary pol-
icy and capital control problems, etc. The inclusion of portfolio choices with
non-trivial NFA positions will inevitably a¤ect the answers to these questions
through its impact on economic volatilities, the spill-over e¤ects of policy and
international coordination problems. 3. The analysis of risk contagion and in-
ternational economic crisis against the background of accelerating development
of nancial globalization and the previous global nancial crises. All three of
these lines of research represent interesting and highly topical ways to develop
the analysis presented in this thesis.
